

REPORT

Ukrainian minority
and migrants from Ukraine
in Poland

Discourse analysis

Joint publication





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PIOTR TYMA

Introduction

President of the Association of Ukrainians in Poland (ZUwP) as of 2006; member of the Joint Committee of the Government and National and Ethnic Minorities.

This report is the product of a project carried out by the Association of Ukrainians in Poland (ZUwP) and funded with a grant from the Stefan Batory Foundation. The statutory activity specified in the grant application was to counteract discrimination. Our overarching aim was to document and describe events that show how the Ukrainian minority and Ukrainian migrants are perceived in Poland. First, we wanted to reveal the attitudes adopted towards the Ukrainian minority and Ukrainian migrants by various groups in Polish society that are active in the public sphere, as well as in politics and the media. Second, we wanted to counteract all forms of discrimination against these two groups on the grounds of their ethnicity and/or nationality. Against a background of increasingly (both quantitatively and qualitatively) negative tendencies, our focus is primarily on various anti-Ukrainian activities and expressions observable in Poland in both the project and the report.

The Report includes several sections, each produced by separate researchers responsible for managing specific components of the project, and in particular:

- ☛ a description of the discourse on Polish citizens of Ukrainian origin (an ethnic

minority whose rights and obligations are defined by, inter alia the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Languages), migrants who have come to Poland to find gainful employment or to pursue their studies at Polish universities or secondary schools, and those who have received job placements in the country (whose stay in Poland is governed by, inter alia, the Act on Foreigners);

- ☛ an analysis of hate crimes (crimes intended to incite hatred, violence and/or discrimination against the Ukrainian minority and Ukrainian nationals in Poland), as documented by, and reported to, law enforcement agencies, together with follow-ups on the statuses of the investigations pending in these cases, and an analysis of hate speech. Under this part of the project, monitoring and checks were performed, a network of volunteers was built, and illegal acts were documented and reported to the police and the Public Prosecutor's Office. We also took part in court hearings. This part of the project was managed by Piotr Fedusio, Attorney at Law, and included the monitoring, analysis and reporting of instances of hate and discrimination on the grounds of nationality, and their reporting to law enforcement agencies, Polish government

institutions responsible for executing the country's national and ethnic minorities policy (the Sejm National and Ethnic Minorities Committee, the Joint Commission of Government and National and Ethnic Minorities, the Chancellery of the President, the Commissioner for Human Rights, the Government Plenipotentiary for Civil Society and Equal Treatment), members of parliament, international institutions, and the media. Furthermore, issues related to the situation of Polish citizens of Ukrainian ethnicity, and migrants from Ukraine, were reported to the Canadian Ambassador, the US Consulate in Kraków, the Supreme Council of Ukraine, and the Ukrainian Ambassador;

☞ a comprehensive monitoring of the Internet in order to understand how Ukrainians are perceived as a national/ethnic group. This part was managed and commented on by Marek Troszyński, PhD – Internet researcher and President of the Local Knowledge Foundation.

Analyses covering the two groups of Ukrainians, which have diverse legal statuses, in Poland. In this respect, the following should be borne in mind:

☞ following the resettlements of 1944–1946, approximately 500,000 Ukrainians were relocated from Poland to the USSR. Despite official restrictions, ethnic Ukrainians residing in the People's Republic of Poland (PRL) maintained various ties with family members in the USSR throughout the entire post-war period. Ukrainians who were Soviet citizens later became citizens of independent Ukraine. Their socially active leaders closely followed developments in Ukraine (culture, dissident movements, the Orthodox Church, which operated underground, etc.). Ukrainians in Poland were a group of interest for people who

had Polish roots, as well as for intellectuals, journalists and dissidents;

☞ the democratization processes which sprang up in the USSR in the mid-1980's, and the emergence of an independent Ukraine, brought about an increase in activity on the part of Polish citizens of Ukrainian descent, and led to more contacts between them and Ukrainians in Ukraine (family members, NGOs, schools, religious institutions, etc.). Ukraine, as a country, was not perceived as an abstract "great homeland", but as a country where family members lived, and one that needed support;

☞ the number of Ukrainian nationals (including ethnic Ukrainians) who work in Poland either permanently or temporarily has been increasing since the 1990s. Some work as coaches of artistic groups, Ukrainian language teachers, priests, and minority media journalists. Ukrainian organizations have also been actively involved in providing humanitarian aid in Ukraine, as well as assistance to illegal workers and accident victims in Poland, since the early 1990s. Minority organizations try to help those in straitened financial circumstances and/or afflicted with chronic illnesses;

☞ events of importance to Ukrainians, viz. the presidential elections and the Orange Revolution (2004), the Revolution of Dignity (2013/2014), the occupation of Crimea, and the war in Eastern Ukraine (including the hybrid war) have all mobilized the Ukrainian minority in Poland. Ethnic Ukrainians have engaged in various activities to show solidarity, taken part in observation missions, and provided humanitarian aid and assistance to victims;

☞ more contacts have been made, and several joint initiatives forged, since

2014, with the arrival of significantly higher numbers of Ukrainian migrants. Ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainian migrants have been communicating more frequently, whether through cultural endeavors, sharing premises for religious practices, or through minority media (radio and TV broadcasts in Ukrainian, press, social media etc.). Both groups are more knowledgeable about the specific profile of their partners, and are better informed about their common interests and threats;

☞ a segment of Polish society pin all their expectations and allegations concerning unsettled issues from the past on the Ukrainian minority. Many events, stereotypes and images of Ukraine as a country are projected onto the minority. For their part, Ukrainians react emotionally to any signs of anti-Ukrainian activity.

The Report pays special attention to a recent phenomenon, viz. the feeling of being threatened by Ukraine and Ukrainian migrants/workers has grown over the past three years. We believe that this important, but overlooked, new development is partly inspired by what is happening over the border, and partly by the vituperative language and negative attitudes of media personalities and politicians. Moreover, it is our view that public statements intended to arouse hostility towards ethnic Ukrainians in Poland, to say nothing of actions directed against them, have become a major point of contention in the Polish-Ukrainian debate, and have frequently adversely affected Polish-Ukrainian relations as a whole (even at the government level). This especially applies to the willful dissemination of derogatory materials regarding Ukrainians. These have had a detrimental effect on the way Ukrainians are perceived, and have led to the formation of

new currents in the debate on Ukraine, ethnic Ukrainians, and Ukrainian nationals working in Poland. We further believe that by not only failing to unambiguously and decisively condemn acts of violence perpetrated against ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainian migrants, but actually downplaying these incidents, the Polish authorities and opinion makers (media, elites, experts) may be contributing to these negative tendencies – with unpredictable consequences.¹

The project has led to practical measures being taken to monitor these phenomena, to counteract any manifestations of discrimination against people of Ukrainian nationality or ethnicity, and to secure their civil rights (e.g. the rights to feel safe, to preserve their cultural and national identity, to education, to safeguard cultural assets, including tombs and monuments, and to equal treatment by the authorities at all levels of government) and equal access to public funding.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS OF THE REPORT

This Report primarily aims to capture the relations between Polish society as a whole and the Ukrainian minority

¹ This bears some resemblance to the situation at the turn of the 21st century. Analyses carried out in Poland at the time overlooked the voices and the importance of anti-Ukrainian groups and certain factions of “Eastern Borderlands” organizations (including radical ones). However, their narrative has been determining how the Ukrainian underground movement of the 1940’s and Ukraine today are perceived and assessed for some years now. These groups intend to evoke the memory and presence of Poland in the “Eastern Borderlands” and to influence Poland’s current interests. The narrative of this segment of Polish society is strongly represented in the mainstream media and mass publications. It can even be postulated that some Polish circles and political parties have been held hostage to these groups and their rhetoric. These interdependencies can be confirmed by the adoption in the Polish parliament, on July 22, 2016, of the Volhynia resolution, which paid homage to the victims of massacres committed by Ukrainian nationalists on the citizens of the Republic of Poland between 1943 and 1945. They can also be identified in the attitude of the Polish government to Polish citizens of Ukrainian origin, their rights to their own historical memory, and their subjective recognition. Moreover, some leaders and columnists who have ties with Eastern Borderlands and nationalist communities publicly speak out against Ukrainian migrants. Given the readership of sympathetic media outlets, as well as their diversity and impact, the social effects of this vision of Polish-Ukrainian relations can be extremely negative.

(Polish citizens), which has been present in Poland for centuries, was subjected to strong assimilation pressure during the communist People's Republic of Poland period, and which is now perceived by some as a "foreign", and even downright hostile, element that is disloyal to the Polish State.²

Ukrainian nationals (migrants, workers, students) were the second group analyzed by monitoring shifts in discourse. The project was financially supported by the Stefan Batory Foundation and spanned over a year (2017). However, in order to highlight the build-up of some of the phenomena and processes discussed in the Report, we also refer to the period 2014-2017. Our intention is to depict those developments which, in our view, have not only shaped the way(s) in which Ukrainians are perceived in Poland, but which have also engendered feelings of insecurity among Ukrainian migrants/workers and ethnic Ukrainians. The Report further discusses recent manifestations and tendencies, e.g. the lack of response on the part of government bodies to manifestations of hatred based on nationality, and Poland's partial failure to enforce the provisions of the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Languages (2005). We believe that the praxis of government institutions with respect to public statements and/or acts of violence occasionally contravenes Poland's international obligations,

specifically its obligation to combat xenophobia and intolerance.

A substantial part of the Report includes an analysis of online content concerning Ukraine, migrants and minorities. Research shows that the Internet is the only source of information about the world for many people, especially young people. In the meantime, the number of websites, publications, videos, cartoons, and music clips marked by hostility towards "the other" has been growing. The bulk of this hate speech is targeted at Ukrainians and Ukraine as a country. It includes both spontaneous entries (comments, articles), well-planned and carefully prepared disinformation campaigns, where the web is used as a medium in Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine.³

It should be emphasized that some Polish Internet activity is similar to the operations intended to influence the outcomes of elections in the U.S. and some EU countries, and to achieve other aims of the Russian Federation. To support this assertion, we cite a bulk of research, including reports produced by EU agencies. The European context of these disinformation campaigns is of major importance here, as it helps prove that the Internet activity reported in Poland is not just a reaction to the "promotion of Bandera ideology" in Ukraine and "the unhealed wounds of the Volhynia Massacre", but is part of a larger trend, which is currently affecting Western democracies as well.⁴

2 More and more people in the Polish public sphere are voicing a need to assess the degree of loyalty of Ukrainian communities, their individual leaders and their NGOs. These include politicians in the ruling party (cf. the opinions expressed by Sen. Jan Żaryn: <http://www.fronda.pl/a/prof-jan-zaryn-dla-frondapl-gloryfikujac-upa-ukraina-stawia-sie-pozu-cywilizacja-europy,58658.html>; <https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/366171-prof-zaryn-o-napietych-relacjach-miedzy-warszawa-a-kijowem-ukraincy-sa-przyzwyczajeni-ze-jestesmy-miekkim-partnerem>). Nor was this the first time that Sen. Żaryn had opposed any narratives about the past that differ from the ethnic Polish one. In 2007, he helped bring an end to the cooperation between the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) and the ZUwP at a historical conference organised as a part of commemorations of Operation Vistula.

3 For more information on the Internet and social media, see the Report section by M. Troszczyński PhD, 103.

4 For Russian disinformation activities in various countries see: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/europe-has-been-working-to-expose-russian-meddling-for-years/2017/06/25/e42dcece-4a09-11e7-9669-250d0b15f83b_story.html?utm_term=.7b6a3cf96ceb; <https://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2016/Also-in-2016/lisa-case-germany-target-russian-disinformation/PL/index.htm>; <https://www.stopfake.org/pl/synteza-dezinformacja-rosyjska-bron-strategiczna>.

2016 AND 2017 — NEW DETERMINANTS

We believe that the events which took place in the Maidan, Kiev, in 2013–2014, now known as the “Revolution of Dignity”, were decisive in increasing both the quantity of information on Ukraine in the Polish media and interest among Poles in the social developments taking place there. Initially, this interest translated into numerous campaigns of solidarity and support for Ukrainian society from Polish NGOs, local government bodies, some media, and individual citizens. Kiev’s Maidan protesters were given clothing, medication and food, and several displays of solidarity (pickets, concerts, fundraisings, information campaigns, and assistance to the wounded) were organized in Poland. Politicians from the major parties declared their support for Ukraine, and their leaders, including Jarosław Kaczyński and Grzegorz Schetyna, personally addressed the protestors in Kiev. When Russia occupied Crimea and war broke out in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, assistance was organized for war victims, the wounded, volunteers and volunteer battalions, and to the families of those who had fallen in Maidan and Eastern Ukraine.

There are also indications that an information war (as part of a hybrid war) was being waged in Poland in 2014–2015. This was manifested by media coverage that cast the events unfolding in Kiev in a negative light, and tried to build and consolidate an image of Ukraine as a threatening country in the public mind.⁵ Some publications clearly sought to evoke

negative connotations (e.g. by highlighting and exaggerating the presence of OUN [Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists] symbols, and the representatives of political movements and structures that hark back to the legacy of Ukrainian nationalism) during the Maidan protests. Several analysts highlighted the links between the increased presence of historical issues in the Polish public sphere, and the actions of various political groups, opinion makers and media outlets, on the one hand, and the hybrid war being waged by the Russian Federation on the other. A report issued by the Centre of European Policy Analyses (CEPA), entitled “Defence and targeted fight against Russian disinformation techniques” stressed the fact that Russia was using unresolved past issues to convey negative messages about Ukraine.⁶

The attack on a religious procession organized by the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Przemyśl on June 26, 2016, was evidence of both a new kind of aggression against Ukrainians, and “indifference” and ill-preparedness to adequately respond to it on the part of the Polish authorities.⁷ Some spectacular incidents occurred during the procession: All-Polish Youth (MW) members merged into the crowd with the intention of unfurling a red and black flag, and by so doing, discrediting the religious celebrations and instigating attacks against the participants (the flag was put away after a police officer intervened); At the same time, another group attacked the front of the procession, desecrating religious banners.

⁵ For information on how the Maidan image has been skillfully crafted, see: <http://www.newsweek.pl/swiat/banderowcy-przyjaciele-polski-ukraina-majdan-tiahnibok-news-week-pl,artykuly,280315,1.html>; <http://www.fakt.pl/wydarzenia/polityka/korwin-szokuje-na-majdanie-strzelali-polacy/mgkhqt4>.

⁶ https://cepa.ecms.pl/files/?id_plik=2773; see the chapter on Poland, pp. 30–32.

⁷ For more information on the attacks on the procession in Przemyśl see: <http://www.nowiny24.pl/wiadomosci/przemysl/a/procesja-w-przemyslu-23-zatrzymanych-9-z-zarzutami-foto-to-wideo,10341737>. The example of manipulated facts and photo contents (the photo used for the text shows the events in Kiev) see.: <https://palezja.pl/banderowskie-elementy-przemyslu>.

A month earlier, the graves of two Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) fighters, and people shot in 1947, during Operation Vistula, at the Ukrainian Military Cemetery in the Pikulice district (the cemetery is in ul. Kasztanowa, Przemyśl), had been desecrated. The graves of people who died in the 1940's are located near the monument to the soldiers of the Ukrainian People's Republic (1918–1920), which was erected in the 1920s. In 2002, the Council for the Protection of Struggle and Martyrdom Sites buried the remains of Ukrainians exhumed in the villages of Liszna (1992) and Bircza (1998) in two mass graves in the cemetery. These graves had not been subjected to a single act of desecration or vandalism until May 2016. When footage of the desecration was uploaded on Polish social media, a massive hate campaign was unleashed against “the followers of Bandera”,⁸ and plaques with abusive and insulting inscriptions were placed on the two graves.⁹

As with other damaged and desecrated structures, the emblem of Fighting Poland [a stylized anchor made from the letters “W” and “P”] was placed on the graves, and some other graves and monuments (e.g. the crosses from the villages of Mołodycz and Monasterz near Werchraty) were marked, not by chance in our view, with the Polish national colors. That Polish national symbols were used purposefully is supported by fact that similar means to convey and intensify the intended message were used in similar acts against Polish monuments in Ukraine.¹⁰

Not one of these acts of vandalism and desecration was publicly and strongly condemned, and not one of the perpetrators has been identified. In some media statements and comments, the desecration of the graves of the UPA fighters and Ukrainian civil populations – victims of judicial crimes – were described as the plaques being “corrected” or “replaced”.¹¹

The border between the Third Republic of Poland (i.e. Poland since 1989) and independent Ukraine has been a high-risk area in terms of Polish-Ukrainian relations ever since those two countries came into being. History has played a role here – Poles and Ukrainians have long fought over the area – as has the operation of a so-called “third force”. The southern section of Poland's border with Ukraine is strategically important due to the proximity of several other borders (Polish-Ukrainian, Slovak-Ukrainian, Romanian-Ukrainian). Add to that the nationality factor, e.g. the Ruthenian question in Transcarpathia and Slovakia, and it is easy to see why this area is a fertile ground for national and religious conflicts. Moreover, oil pipelines pass through Transcarpathia.

Analysts claim that the area has been thoroughly infiltrated by the Russian secret services since the 1990s, and that they frequently exploit ethnic/national issues and past quarrels in their operations.

The ZUwP has submitted reports on the threats that have been emanating

8 For more information on the atmosphere on the eve of the traditional procession in Przemyśl, see: <http://prawy.pl/32858-nie-dla-gloryfikacji-banderowcow-w-przemyslu>; <https://www.wykop.pl/link/3160805/banderowskie-swieto-w-polsce-przemy-sl-pikulice-2010-2015>.

9 The plaques affixed to the graves read: “Here lie the remains of Banderite bandits and brutal torturers of Innocent Polish women and children. We remember.”

10 The Polish monument in Huta Pieniacka was blown up and marked with the Ukrainian national colors, and the red-and-black associated in Poland with the OUN. The

desecrated monument of the NKVD victims in Bikivnia near Kiev was marked with SS Halychyna, OUN, UPA, and “F...k”, in Ukrainian. The Polish national colors, the “anchor” symbol of Fighting Poland, and insulting words in Polish appeared on the tomb of Stepan Bandera in Munich. For more, see: http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,17861868,Czerwona_farba_znak_Polski_Walczej_i_napis_j_____html.

11 <https://kresy.pl/wydarzenia/policja-usunela-poprawione-tablice-z-grobow-zbrodniarzy-z-upa-w-pikulicach/>.

from Polish extreme nationalist groups since May 2016 to the Sejm National and Ethnic Minorities Committee, Mariusz Błaszczak (Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration), Wojciek Kolarski (Minister at the Chancellery of the President), and the Department of Religious Denominations and National and Ethnic Minorities at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration. The Union's appeals, however, did not result in better police protection for the religious procession in Przemyśl.¹²

These acts of violence against the procession, perpetrated in broad daylight, in a country where most people declare themselves Catholic, was not condemned. Although these attacks were waged against a religious procession headed by the Head of the Greek Catholic Church in Poland, Abp. Eugeniusz Popowicz, several clergy members, a representative from the Ukrainian Embassy, and several foreign delegations, there was no response from the Polish authorities, i.e. the perpetrators were not officially condemned. Nor was there any condemnation from any social authorities or the Roman Catholic Church. On the contrary, various sources (some media outlets, public officials, Members of Parliament, and local government figures) downplayed the event. Moreover, there was no inquiry as to who was behind this provocation organized in the center of the city. Local media and activists from various organizations put the blame solely on Poland's Ukrainian minority on several occasions. These unprecedented events, which drew responses from the Head of

the Greek Catholic Church worldwide, Abp. Sviatoslav Shevchuk, and from the Polish and Ukrainian media, were airily dismissed as "isolated incidents".¹³

The growing wave of "steered" and ideologically motivated hatred towards Ukrainians was also manifested by the burning of the Ukrainian flag during the Polish Independence Day March in Warsaw on Nov. 11, 2016¹⁴ and during the March of the Przemyśl and Lviv Eaglets in Przemyśl on Dec. 10, 2016.¹⁵ The latter was especially illustrative of how Polish extreme right organizations can threaten Polish-Ukrainian relations and the security of Ukrainians residing in Poland. The march attracted the National Radical Camp (ONR), an organization that was outlawed in 1934 for committing violent assaults and orchestrating acts of terror using firearms. During the march, which traversed the main streets of Przemyśl, the column of ONR and MW members chanted "From cradle to grave – Polish Przemyśl, Polish Lviv", and "Greater Poland is our aim", and called out "Death to Ukrainians" right outside the building that houses the ZUwP office. The March of the Przemyśl and Lviv Eaglets was used to expose the banner of the Camp of Great Poland (OWP), an organization

12 For pertinent questions regarding the police protection of the Przemyśl action, see the paper by P. Rzeszka: <https://www.tygodnikpowszechny.pl/przemy-sl-panie-ministrze-list-do-mariusza-blaszczaka-34489>; For measures taken by the Ukrainians' Union in Poland, see: <http://wschodnik.pl/polska/item/6639-atak-na-procesje-w-przemyslu-ukraincy-przygotowuja-skarge-do-polskiej-prokuratury.html>.

13 For examples of attacks and manipulations see: <http://supernowosci24.pl/zamieszki-podczas-marszu-ukraincow-w-przemyslu-zdjecia/#>; <http://prawy.pl/42977-antypolska-kampania-propagandowa-wsrod-ukraincow-przybiera-na-sile>. In this respect, it can be instructive to analyze the interview with R. Chroma, the Mayor of Przemyśl. See: <http://prawy.pl/44675-prezydent-przemysla-nie-bedzie-zgody-na-chora-ideologie>.

14 For reports on the event in Warsaw and the responses thereto, see: <http://natemat.pl/194501,ambasada-ukrainy-domaga-sie-reakcji-na-zniszczenie-flagi-na-marszu-niepodleglosci-pis-to-nie-nasz-problem>.

15 This was not the first time that hateful slogans had been chanted near the HQ of Ukrainian organizations in Przemyśl. The slogan "We'll find the stick for Bandera snouts" was chanted outside the ZUwP HQ in 2014. NB: school pupils, scouts, priests, and seminary students participated. Visual symbols and a peculiar kind of patriotism were promoted by supporters of Przemyśl sports clubs and members of nationalist organizations. Their behavior was not criticized by any opinion makers. On the contrary, in 2016, the march was organized in conjunction with central and local government bodies, and under the honorary patronage of a member of the Polish Sejm, as well as the Mayor of Przemyśl.

whose members, as widely reported by the Polish media, had taken part in paramilitary training camps in Russia. One of its activists, Dawid Hudziec, is the editor of *Novorossia Today*, a Polish-language website published in Donetsk.¹⁶ The site has been used to upload videos with the OWP logo recorded during acts of destruction of Ukrainian remembrance sites and graves in the Subcarpathian region. Moreover, Hudziec interviewed a member of “Cichociemni” (*The Silent and Unseen*) for *Novorossia Today*. This is an organization that has supported the destruction of Ukrainian remembrance sites and graves in Poland.¹⁷

The police found that the hateful chants of Dec. 10 came from a thirty-year-old from the town of Ropczyce. Despite these findings, some Polish organizations blamed the Ukrainian community for the events in Przemyśl from the outset.¹⁸ The campaign to destroy Ukrainian graves and monuments in south-eastern Poland could justifiably be regarded as a carefully orchestrated and consistently implemented endeavor intended to nurture negative feelings towards Ukraine and Ukrainians residing in Poland, and as a hybrid war tactic.¹⁹

A disinformation campaign that touches upon various areas and consists in publicizing Ukrainian nationalists’ alleged “claims against Poland” is yet another element used to change public sentiment towards Ukraine and Ukrainians.²⁰ This partly explains why stock phrases all too familiar from the Russian information war narrative, e.g. “the spread of fascism in Ukraine” and “the Kiev junta”, have often appeared in comments posted under articles in some media outlets. Pejorative terms, such as “upainiec” [*UPA member*], “upadlina” [*UPA followers*], and “ukropy” [*members of the Ukrainian Association of Patriots*], which had not previously been used in Poland, and which have been borrowed from trolls, have frequently appeared.

As for other information war elements, suffice it to mention pickets and other campaigns held outside the Ukrainian Embassy, and General and Ukrainian Honorary Consulates in several Polish cities, and exhibitions of propaganda materials (including photo exhibitions) displayed in Polish cities to support pro-Russian forces in Donbass.²¹

Pro-Russian groups and instigators have intensified their activity, particularly between Jul. 11, (commemoration of the Volhynia Massacre) and Aug. 24, i.e. during the Ukrainian Independence

16 For more information on the OWP, see.: https://web.facebook.com/RosyjskaVKolumnawPolsce/posts/447971412039730?_rdc=1&_rdr.

17 <http://novorossia.today/hruszwowice-to-dopiero-poczonek>.

18 This is a common component of the strategy adopted by Polish nationalist groups. For instance, a remembrance site was partially destroyed in the Subcarpathian region in 2015. In an interview published by *Nasz Dziennik* daily, MEP and former Sejm parliamentarian Andrzej Zapałowski blamed the Ukrainian SBU and the Ukrainian minority for this act of vandalism (see: <http://www.naszdziennik.pl/polska-kraj/137921.prowokacja-ukrainskich-nacjonalistow.html>). The case of the March of the Przemyśl and Lviv Eaglets was similar. During a press conference held by the organizers and the Mayor of Przemyśl, on Dec. 13, 2016, it was claimed that the event was a ZUWP provocation. Despite the police findings, some journalists and groups are still repeating this claim.

19 Eight Ukrainian graves and remembrance sites were destroyed in Poland (some of them several times) in 2014-2016. This was an organized campaign where the same modus operandi and information items were deployed. Although these provocations took place near the borders of Poland – a NATO member – and despite further provocations targeted at Polish monuments and diplomatic missions in Ukraine, law enforcement agencies have not identified a single perpetrator.

20 These articles were published in a number of outlets, ranging from the “yellow” press to “ideological portals”. See: <http://www.fakt.pl/wydarzenia/polityka/ukrainscy-nacjonalisci-chca-nam-zabrac-wschodnie-ziemie/phlfz0g>; <http://gazetabaltycka.pl/promowane/zle-sie-dzieje-na-ukrainie-be-da-roszczenia-terytorialne-wobec-polski>; <http://www.piens.pl/ukrainscy-mentalnie-przygotowani-do-ataku-na-polske>.

21 These include pickets outside the Ukrainian Embassy in Warsaw, the Ukrainian General Consulate in Kraków, a photo exhibition during the OSCE conference in Warsaw, the promotion of books on Maidan “initiators”, and the tragic events which took place in Odessa in 2014. Moreover, actions targeting the Ukrainian minority have gone beyond the border area, e.g.: in Szczecin, a banner showing support for the Donetsk People’s Republic was unfurled outside the ZUWP office and the Ukrainian Honorary Consulate; and in Gdańsk, bills with a provocative anti-Ukrainian slant on the war in Eastern Ukraine were posted on the Greek Catholic Cathedral.

Day celebrations. These actions, held in Polish cities to show support for the Donetsk and Luhansk “republics”, have invariably received wide coverage in the Russian media.²²

Moreover, provocative acts have taken place either on the eves or days of events considered vital for the normalization of Polish-Ukrainian relations, e.g. the inauguration of Vasyl Stus Square in Warsaw, with the participation of Pavlo Klimkin, Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs. We believe that this is done to “cover up” positive news about Polish-Ukrainian relations in the Polish media. The day before the Warsaw celebrations to pay homage to this prominent Ukrainian poet and dissident, who perished in a Soviet labor camp in 1985, the monument to the memory of Poles was destroyed in the Ukrainian town of Huta Pieniacka.²³

Over the past two years, several news items that seem to have been inspired and financed as part of an anti-Ukrainian campaign in Poland have appeared in Polish cyberspace. InformNapalm is a case in point. This is an analytical center set up by volunteers from Ukraine, and has posted reports discussing possible ties with Polish citizens engaged in activities in the “Ukrainian section”.²⁴

Apart from scanned documents, these reports included footage from locations where Ukrainian tombs and graves have

been desecrated or destroyed (e.g. in Hruszowice, Gmina Stubno). One of the videos shows the recognizable face of a former Polish Communist Secret Police officer, known for his involvement in anti-Ukrainian campaigns. The disclosed copies of documents included data on bank transfers and his correspondence with the campaign coordinator, Alexander Usovski, a Belarusian national.²⁵

These actions have also targeted Ukrainian minority institutions in Poland (especially in Przemyśl). The choice of place is not accidental. During the Maidan protests in Kiev, Przemyśl became a transport hub for a significant portion of the material aid flowing from Poland to Ukraine. Moreover, the location has a buoyant Ukrainian community (several organizations, Greek Catholic Church buildings, an orthodox parish, a school with Ukrainian as a teaching language, and an Ukrainian Honorary Consulate). Przemyśl has been used as a testing ground for activities aimed at exacerbating Polish-Ukrainian relations since the mid-1990s.²⁶ Anti-Ukrainian groups have been active in the city since the 1980s, and have applied their anti-Ukrainian rhetoric to unresolved issues from the past, as well as current economic preoccupations, e.g. the influx of Ukrainian companies and nationals to the city, and the presence of businesses

22 Reports have been broadcast by e.g. *Zvezda* - the TV channel of the Russian Ministry of Defense; for more information see: https://tvzvezda.ru/news/vstrane_i_mire/content/201506280157-gixv.htm.

23 For more information, see: <https://kresy24.pl/ponowne-zniszczenie-huty-pieniackiej-na-chwile-przed-otwarcie-skweru-im-wasyly-stusa>. For information on actions in front of the Ukrainian diplomatic missions in the Republic of Poland against the “promotion of Bandera ideology in Ukraine” see: <http://ewinia.nowyekran.pl/neon24.pl/post/133431,24-08-2016-protest-pod-ambasada-ukrainy>; www.gazetakrakowska.pl/artykul/3818485,krakow-protest-przed-konsulatem-generalnym-ukrainy-zdjecia-wideo,id,t.html.

24 For more information see: <https://informnapalm.org/pl/zatulini-malofiejew-usowski-dzialalnosc-dyweryj-na-fr-polsce-infografika>.

25 For more information re A. Usovski, see: <http://wyborcza.pl/7,75399,21412578,czy-kreml-chce-nas-sklocic.html>.

26 This concerns the protest (church occupation) against the decision of John Paul II to give Greek Catholics St Theresa Church (a Greek Catholic cathedral until 1944) for their temporary use; protests against the 1995 and 1997 Ukrainian Culture Festival, with assaults on participants and attempts to burn down the ZUWP office and a boarding house where participants were accommodated; illegal dismantling of the historic dome of St Theresa Church; protests against the reopening of the M. Shashkevych Ukrainian School and the construction of an Ecumenical Care Center outside Przemyśl; protests against the restitution of Greek Catholic Church property and the “Ukrainian House” of the ZUWP; an administrative request filed by a Przemyśl organization to delegatize the ZUWP; placing a provocative plaque on St Theresa Church.

owned by Polish citizens of Ukrainian descent.²⁷

One-sided memories of the Polish-Ukrainian conflicts of 1918, the Battle of Przemyśl, WWII and the post-war era were the single, cumulative element used to fuel hatred in the press, and electronic and social media.²⁸

Another important element that affected the situation in 2016 was the growing number (since 2014) of negatively tinted Internet posts focused on Ukraine and Ukrainians (including migrants). These have become the norm, even in response to neutral articles that make no mention of politics, history, or current Polish-Ukrainian relations. Researchers believe that some of them are the products of Russian troll factories.²⁹

During the anniversaries of the massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia in 2013 and 2016, respectively, certain Polish government institutions, viz. the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), the Sejm and the Senate, took a series of measures aimed at better publicizing these historical events.

27 In 2016, some stores in Przemyśl posted notices that read "Here, the owner is a Pole". An Internet campaign was promoted with the tagline "Do not buy at Baczyk's" (A. Baczyk is the Honorary Consul of Ukraine in Przemyśl; he is a businessman, who owns retail and wholesale outlets, and is a member of the Ukrainian community).

28 Just how strong this is and how often it is used is evidenced by the mobilization of various groups after the Polish Ministry of Defense had issued a decision to remove a plaque with the locations where battles with the UPA had taken place, and the town of Bircza, from the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Nov. 2017. After the decision was made, campaigns with strong anti-Ukrainian messages were organized in the border area. The theme of the "Bircza heroes" (who, as evidenced by documents, committed war crimes) is ever present in the rhetoric of anti-Ukrainian activists, local media and local government (e.g. Polish Peasants' Party representatives). These campaigns rely on the stereotype of Ukrainians from the time of the People's Republic of Poland, and fuel feelings of being threatened by Ukraine. See: <http://www.wyszperane.info/2017/11/21/obroncy-birczy-wymazani-komu-przeszkadzaj-pamiec-o-ofiarach-upa>.

29 For more information on the activities of Russian and pro-Russian trolls, see: <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/polska-bez-radna-wobec-rosyjskich-trolli-6104591886856833a>; <https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/swiat/1666886,1,rosyjskie-fabryki-trolli-zalewaja-internet-prokremlowskim-przekazem-ale-popelniaja-rowniez-bledy.read>.

Leaders of political parties and Eastern Borderlands communities became actively involved in the process. Debates on parliamentary resolutions concerning the events of 1943 and 1944 were a good opportunity to highlight the history of Poles killed by Ukrainians. Heated Sejm debates over the wording of these resolutions (including a political clash over the spelling of names), and, more generally, the events that occurred during WWII, led to biased media (both mainstream and niche) reports that discussed the historical aspects of Polish-Ukrainian relations, crimes committed against Poles etc. The inordinate number of naturalistic descriptions of massacres and lurid pictures of dismembered bodies of victims, and the competition between various political groups, each vying for the right to "cultivate" history (and the electorate), all contributed to a welter of simplistic judgments and comments in the media. Some publications and comments painted Ukrainians as extremely cruel people, who were hostile to anything Polish. This narrative was put on hold during the Maidan protests in Kiev (2013–2014), as the attention of Polish media, political leaders, and public was refocused on the present. Historical narratives, with their interwoven themes of the Polish victims of the Volhynia and Eastern Galicia massacres, came back just in time for the 2015 parliamentary elections. One of the most glaring examples of anti-Ukrainian media statements is the comment made by Wojciech Cejrowski, a well-known public media journalist, during a Radio Koszalin broadcast.³⁰ This negative trend became significant in 2016, when politicians and

30 Cejrowski said: "Ukrainians are rapists and butchers". To the journalist's question "All of them?", he answered: "So to your question: All Ukrainians? I say all". For more information, see <https://oko.press/cejrowski-wszyscy-ukraincy-gwalciciele-rzezniczy-prokuratura-zniewazanie>.

columnists expressed an “uncompromising” stance towards Ukrainians in the national and commercial media when commenting on Polish-Ukrainian relations. Something similar has taken hold of the academic community. Hateful, anti-scientific rhetoric, until recently restricted to niche nationalist media and anti-Ukrainian publications, has started to gain ground in academia, thanks to the selective choice of panelists invited to Polish universities.³¹

It may be said that, since 2013, Poland has witnessed a massive propaganda campaign against “the followers of Bandera” (for many, this is synonymous with “Ukrainians”), with media statements rich in one-sided opinions (and frequently contempt and hatred), videos and cartoons, music clips, “inserts”, slogans written on walls and banners, comments posted under articles etc. Despite their Codes of Conduct, some media outlets have been persistently displaying (with no warnings that the contents were disturbing) images of victims, very often children, with detailed descriptions of their killing. Some of these contents have had a massive impact (at times ranging from dozens to thousands of views).³²

Another means of dehumanizing Ukrainians as a nation, was Wojciech Smarzowski’s feature film *Volhynia*, which came out in 2016. The movie (which had approximately one and a half million viewers), which was full of acts of cruelty and violence inflicted by Ukrainians,

led to an increase in hostile conduct and comments. Most of them referred to Polish victims from Volhynia in 1943, Eastern Galicia in 1944, and post-war Poland in 1944–1947, in an extremely tendentious and biased manner. There are cases where it can be demonstrated that the film paved the way for acts of aggression, both in the public sphere and in interpersonal relations.³³ The movie was strongly promoted by extreme anti-Ukrainian groups. Some commentators accepted the images in the film as absolute truth, and some considered any criticism as anti-Polish. An increase in the number of acts of hatred against Ukrainians in Poland was noted by the Ukrainian Ambassador, Andrii Deshchytsia.³⁴

Opposition political protests could be said to have drawn a demarcation line for hate speech and creating a feeling of being threatened by Ukrainian nationalists. Some right-wing media outlets (websites) repeatedly mooted the possibility of the Polish political opposition using Ukraine migrants to organize “Maidan-like bloodshed” in Poland.³⁵

In order to further fuel these fears, it was increasingly frequently claimed in 2016 that having the war in Eastern

31 For instance, the conference organized at the Catholic University of Lublin. For more information, see http://www.kul.pl/debata-pojednanie-polsko-ukrainskie-wymiana-doswiadczen,art_75527,1498427760,0.html.

32 See, e.g.: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BH9y3rix-GVg>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6mQdIVw7mUM>. Re the cartoon, see: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uaiKEz-KuMt4>. For activities during mass sports events, see: <http://www.dziennikwschodni.pl/lublin/antyukrainski-transparent-na-arenie-lublin-oskarzeni-czekaja-na-wyrok,n,1000186423.html>.

33 Information about the negative effects of the film *Volhynia* came from all over Poland, and assumed various forms, e.g. verbal threats, ostracism of Ukrainian nationals, and forced conversations on Volhynia. For more examples, see: <http://krakow.wyborcza.pl/krakow/1,44425,20823496,wolyn-pamietamy-napis-ostrzezeniem-dla-ukraincow.html>; <http://wzolnyslasku.com/2017/10/19/wroclaw-grzywna-za-antyukrainskie-okrzyki/>; a young Ukrainian on changes in attitudes: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TodhQ4bY9K4> (from 2:28). The controversies triggered by the movie were mentioned in the Decision of the Public Prosecutor’s Office to dismiss a case against W. Cejrowski for insulting public individuals of Ukrainian nationality.

34 For the assessment of Polish-Ukrainian relations by the Ukrainian Ambassador, A. Deshchytsia, see: <http://wyborcza.pl/10,82983,22650583,troche-obawiam-sie-o-bezpieczenstwo-moich-rodakow-andrij-deszczycia.html>.

35 For more information regarding the involvement of Ukrainian nationals in these Polish political clashes, see: <http://wolnosc24.pl/2016/12/20/nasz-wywiad-michalkiewicz-niemcy-przygotowuja-sie-do-ostatecznego-rozwiazania-kwestii-polskiej-majdan-w-warszawie-robiony-rekami-ukraincow/>, and also: <https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/352896-drozy-ukraincy-i-ich-majdanowi-przyjaciele-jeszcze-troche-takiej-roboty-a-z-sympatii-polakow-dla-waszej-walki-nie-zostanie-wiele>.

Ukraine brought to Poland was a real threat. This was supposedly going to be the work of the “nationalists”, i.e. the Ukrainian voluntary battalions and the “Right Sector” movement. It is our view that these fears were catalyzed by information about “uncontrolled flows of firearms from Ukraine to Poland”. These sorts of claims were repeatedly made (e.g. on TV Republika) by Stanisław Michałkiewicz, a well-known columnist, citing unnamed “reliable sources”.³⁶ Michałkiewicz made other claims to justify his opposition to Ukrainian migrants in Poland, e.g. that foreign secret services could use Ukrainian migrants to overthrow the government. Some articles on “Eastern Borderlands” websites suggested that the Ukrainian minority was a natural proponent of “total opposition” and an opponent of the ruling PiS [Law and Justice] government.³⁷ The Ukrainian threat was to be repulsed by “anti-Bandera patrols” deployed along the Ukrainian border on the initiative of the anti-European and anti-NATO Falanga movement.³⁸

The claims of on-going arms flows from Ukraine to Poland have been repeated on a number of forums. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no official response from the Polish government (the existence of a serious threat to national security has neither been

confirmed nor denied). Nor has there been any official response to the revelations from an organization that deals with information warfare that news on arms smuggling from Ukraine to Poland is manipulative. The claim is still being repeated.³⁹

CREATING A FEELING OF BEING THREATENED BY UKRAINE AND UKRAINIAN MIGRANTS

Ever since the events in the Maidan in Kiev began, some Polish media outlets and politicians have been warning against Poland’s support for the Ukrainian protesters. The case against such involvement is predicated on the possible ramifications for Poland’s relations with Russia. It is said that an “anti-Polish” attitude persists among Ukrainian opposition leaders and that fascist ideology is on the rise in Ukraine.⁴⁰ Some right-wing and “Eastern Borderlands” figures (including PiS president, Jarosław Kaczyński, and Kukiz’15 leader, Paweł Kukiz) have been highly critical of Polish politicians visiting the Kiev protesters. Polish media, including *Gazeta Polska* daily, and TV Republika, have been criticized for covering these events.

Between 2015 and 2017, the increasing number of workers and migrants from Ukraine began to attract warnings as to the negative consequences of such large numbers. These usually came from columnists and prominent political leaders. Some of the most alarming statements

36 News on arms shipments from Ukraine was relayed by a number of media. See: <http://telewizjarepublika.pl/michalkiewicz-dowiedzialem-sie-ze-z-ukrainy-idzie-do-polski-duzy-przemyt-broni-ciekaw-jestem-kto-jest-odbiorca-tej-broni>, 42232.html; <http://prawo.pl/48852-ukraincy-beda-szmulowac-bron-dla-biednych-uchodzcow>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1cxwH-XgaSE>.


37 For more information on building a negative image of the Ukrainian minority and the ZUP, see <https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/25620/Antypolska-propaganda-za-polskie-pieniadze-Kuriosalne-filmiki-nt-relacji-polsko-ukrainskich.html>; <http://prawo.pl/32901-szef-ukraincow-w-polsce-grozi-poparciem-opozycji>; <http://www.naszdziennik.pl/polska-kraj/180949,panstwo-nie-moze-tolerowac-antypolskich-zachowan.html>.

38 <http://xportal.pl/?p=21938>. For more information on infiltrating Polish organizations, including paramilitary and defense organizations by pro-Russian members of anti-European organizations, see the fun page “Russian 5th Column in Poland” by Marcin Rey: https://web.facebook.com/RosyjskaVKolumnawPolsce/posts/256124337891106?_rdc=1&_rdc.

39 For an analysis of the manipulative news about arms flows from Ukraine, see: <http://www.stopfake.org/pl/fejk-zalew-nielegalnej-broni-z-ukrainy-i-podziemne-struktury-ukrainskich-terrorystow>.

40 For statements from Polish political leaders and groups on the situation in Ukraine, see: <http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/opinie/artykuly/542721,leszek-miller-jaroslaw-kaczynski-bandera-upa-oun-ukraina-historia-ss-galizen-rzez-wolynska-opinia.html>; <https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/korwin-mikke-w-tvn24-ukraina-jest-naszym-wrogiem-nie-rosja,585383.html>; <http://www.radiomaryja.pl/multimedia/repor-taz-neobanderyzm/>.

were made by Romuald Szeremietiew, a former Deputy Defense Minister in the right-wing AWS (Solidarity Electoral Action) Cabinet, and until recently, a lecturer at the War Studies University, and Stanisław Srokowski, a writer whose novel *Hatred* was used as the basis for the scenario of the film *Volhynia*, and who is now a columnist at *Gazeta Warszawska*. Srokowski wrote:

 **A MILLION PEOPLE MEANS POWER.** They are now scattered around the country, but once they have a job and a solid footing, they will start to ask themselves “Why shouldn’t we have something more?” [...]. There can be no doubt that those Ukrainians who have just arrived in Poland will soon start setting up their own organizations. We still do not know how or with what, but they already are. And they’re on firm ground here in Poland, where there is a longstanding and well-organized Ukrainian community. Politically speaking, this is dangerous for us Poles. They make no attempt to hide their love for Bandera. In other words, they’re laying down solid foundations for the promotion of Bandera ideology in Poland. We’ve already witnessed it. Once we add that the majority of Ukrainian emigrants are young people, who have been infested with Dontsov, Bandera and Shukhevych ideology in their own country, we can easily predict the direction that such organizations will take in the future.⁴¹

The number of publications, along with the amount of media coverage, devoted to building and reinforcing a negative image of Ukrainians has been steadily increasing since 2013, although this varies across outlets. In addition to

highlighting history, some publications explicitly warn against the negative consequences of such high numbers of Ukrainian migrants, e.g. *Nasz Dziennik* daily, part of Fr. Tadeusz Rydzyk’s media empire, claims that Ukrainians in Poland are not amenable to assimilation.⁴² Extreme-right websites warn of “anti-Polish migrant profiling” by the Ukrainian minority (or more accurately, the ZUwP).⁴³

Some publications have gone so far as to claim that the ways in which migrants can organize themselves, as well as their involvement in the social and political life of the Republic of Poland (e.g. by participating in elections), are also part of the threat. These fears are best exemplified by the following passage, taken from the Catholic weekly *Niedziela*, where Witold Gadowski argues:

 **WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND** that the number of Ukrainians residing in Poland has grown to dangerous proportions. The followers of Bandera and Dontsov are already making plans to set up a political entity (but what kind?) in Poland to serve the interests of Ukraine and the Ukrainian diaspora in Poland. All this is happening, needless to say, right under the noses of the Polish intelligence services [...] they can pose a major threat to the security and integrity of our country.⁴⁴

The alleged involvement of Ukrainian migrants with the political opposition in Poland, financed and supported by foreign sources, has been a recurring theme in media reports on the activities and

41 <http://prawo.pl/52335-romuald-szeremietiew-imigranci-ukraincy-w-polsce-moga-stac-sie-zapleczem-dla-antypolskiego-terroryzmu>; <https://warszawskagazeta.pl/felietony/jadlospis/item/3996-co-z-milionem-ukraincow-zyjacych-juz-w-polsce>. The threat from Ukraine, within the broad meaning of the term, has repeatedly been remarked by A. Zapałowski, PhD from Przemyśl. See: <https://pl.sputniknews.com/polska/201702164851532-Sputnik-Polska-Ukraina-migranci>.

42 <http://naszdzienik.pl/mysl/185411,ukraincy-sie-nie-asymiluja.html>.

43 For more information on how Ukrainian migrants and ethnic Ukrainians are perceived, see: <http://wolnosc24.pl/2017/04/07/imigranci-z-ukrainy-to-zagrozenie-dla-bezpieczenstwa-polski-ostrega-autor-portalu-kresy-czy-podziela-cie-te-obawy-nasza-sonda/>, a także: <http://www.mysl-polska.pl/644>; <http://warszawskagazeta.pl/felietony/jadlospis/item/4640-slugusi-zwyrodnialca>; <http://prawo.pl/54664-milczenie-ukrainskiej-v-kolumny>.

44 W. Gadowski, *Polskie płuco, które słabo oddycha*, in: *Niedziela Tygodnik Katolicki*, No. 52, Dec. 24, 2017.

funding of the “Open Dialogue” Foundation – an organization set up by a Ukrainian national.⁴⁵

Following a successful scare campaign targeted at refugees from Syria and other Muslim countries, Polish MPs began to publicly speak out against receiving “foreign” workers (mainly Ukrainians). Kukiz’15 MPs suggested introducing quotas for Ukrainian workers, and introducing criminal sanctions against the “Bandera ideology” they claimed had permeated the minds of Ukrainian nationals.⁴⁶ Information campaigns (pickets, and marches against Ukrainian workers) were organized by groups from outside the Parliament, e.g. the ONR and the MW.⁴⁷

This fear mongering strategy additionally associated the threats that were allegedly coming from the wave of Muslim refugees from Africa with those emanating from Ukraine. As part of this scare campaign, current and former MPs proposed building a wall along the Ukrainian border. This idea was put forward and then endorsed on several occasions

by Andrzej Zapałowski, PhD, a university lecturer, who is now often invited to comment on the Polish-Ukrainian question and the situation in Ukraine in *Nasz Dziennik* daily, and on the Polish edition of the Russian *Sputnik* website.⁴⁸

Manipulative techniques similar to those used to nurture the growth of anti-Muslim (anti-Islamic) feelings in Poland are used to arouse negative feelings against Ukrainians. Broadcasts are highlighted, and reports on tragic incidents caused by Ukrainian nationals, including criminal acts, are deliberately publicized in the media. Two flagrant cases concern statements attributed to Fr. Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski, who exposed a road accident in Jelenia Góra, where two teenage girls were killed, and the case of the shop owner in Barlinek.⁴⁹

Hostile feelings towards Ukrainian nationals were also nurtured through a negative information campaign against Ukrainian students at the Public Higher Vocational School (PWSZ) in Przemyśl. When their photos, with the red-and-black flag in their hands (an OUN symbol for Poles), were posted on social media, they were accused of promoting nationalist propaganda, sanctioned by the school, and deprived of their Polish Card.⁵⁰

45 The Foundation was particularly active during the Maidan in Kiev, the occupation of Crimea, and the war in Eastern Ukraine. It has organized, inter alia, campaigns to support the Maidan protesters, “observatory missions” in Kiev, and a campaign to purchase bulletproof vests. Some Polish NGOs have always approached the ODF with some distance. For more information on the controversies concerning the Foundation, see: <http://wyborcza.pl/7,75968,22199035,otwarty-dialog-na-rozdrozu-o-zaslugach-fundacji-i-powodach.html>; <https://www.facebook.com/RosyjskaVKolumnawPolsce/posts/582922608544609>; <https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/372628-nasz-news-kolejna-polityczna-decyzja-sad-odmowil-msz-zawieszenia-zarzadu-fundacji-otwarty-dialog-kozlowska-i-kramek-moga-spac-spokojnie>.

46 For more information on the party’s position towards Ukrainian migrants and the disputes over the Kukiz’15 bill, see the interview with the Deputy Speaker of the Sejm, S. Tyska: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hPrA5dDfryk>; <https://kresy.pl/wydarzenia/tyska-o-skali-emigracji-polakow-imigracji-ukraincow-glupki-pisowe-daja-sie-mamic-tania-propaganda/>; <https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/46546/Rzymkowski-PiS-po-raz-kolejny-blokuje-ustawe-o-penalizacji-banderyzmu.html>; <http://wmeritum.pl/pawel-kukiz-banderyzm-ss-galizen/188884>.

47 Protests were held in Warsaw, Gdańsk, Wrocław, and Radomsko. For more information on protests against migrants/workers from Ukraine see: <https://bezpprawnik.pl/ukraincy-w-polsce-onr>; <http://wolnosc24.pl/2017/03/18/demonstracja-onr-stop-ukrainizacji-rynku-pracy-i-sciagania-migrantow-ze-wschodu-video>.

48 For statements about a the Ukrainian border wall, see: <https://parezja.pl/ruch-narodowy-chce-budowy-muru-polsce-przeciw-imigrantom/>; <https://pl.sputniknews.com/polska/201602252147794-kukiz-15-polska-ukraina-mur>; <http://rzeszow-news.pl/wykladowca-ur-do-msw-wybudujmy-3-metrowy-mur-na-granicy>. For more information about A. Zapałowski, see: <https://www.facebook.com/RosyjskaVKolumnawPolsce/posts/534898923346978>.

49 The accident in Jelenia Góra was mainly covered by Polish media. The accident was tentatively used to build (through language and focus) negative feelings towards the nationality of the perpetrator. See: <http://prawicowyinternet.pl/pijany-ukrainiec-zamordowal-dwie-nastoletnie-polki-grozi-mu-smieszna-kara-12-lat-pozbawienia-wolnosci>; <http://isakowicz.pl/lagodny-wyrok-dla-ukrainca-za-zabicie-dwoch-nastolatek-w-jeleniej-gorze>; <https://www.tvn24.pl/po-morze,42/chcial-kazdego-ukrainca-traktowac-jak-zlodzieja-teraz-przeprasza,777033.html>.

50 The fact was reported to the Sejm by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan Dziędziczak. It should be added that the red-and-black flag is not illegal in Poland.

In a similar vein, attempts were made to intimidate Olga Solarz, PhD, a volunteer from Przemyśl and a lecturer at the PWSZ. A photo of Solarz wearing a field uniform and armed was posted on social media. The caption claimed that she had been involved in the fighting in Eastern Ukraine.⁵¹ This news, together with the description, was also sent to the dean of the School for which Solarz worked. In reality, Solarz was a representative of the Ukrainian community, and a volunteer, who had been helping Ukrainian orphans, and patients of the hospital in Svatov, in Eastern Ukraine, for years.

Similar accusations and denunciations were made against Bianka Zaleska, a journalist who had reported on the Maidan in Kiev, and the war in Eastern Ukraine.⁵²

Right-wing media outlets also attempted to intimidate journalists who had made positive comments on the Ukrainian protesters during the Maidan events. Wojciech Mucha and Dawid Wildstein, from *Gazeta Polska* daily, were among those attacked. Their position was criticized by e.g. Waldemar Łysiak, a columnist at *Do Rzeczy* weekly.⁵³

This intensifying anti-Ukrainian campaign has led to increasingly radical public statements, and proposals that would have the authorities act in ways that were completely incompatible with

a country ruled by law. In an article he had posted on the Media Narodowe website, Marcin Skalski, a *kresy.pl* columnist, suggests that the government should draw on the experience of Operation Vistula (1947), arguing that:



THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT the Ukrainian community should be gradually gotten rid of. They are still attracted by lower wages, and Poles are checkmated in their own country by companies that strive to maximize profit whatever the cost [...]. If this is to change, then we have to expel, in an unqualified and immediate manner, individuals such as Ludmiła Kozłowska, whom I've already mentioned, from Poland. This needs to be done, not because she is Ukrainian, but because she has been inciting anti-State sabotage. The Operation Vistula precedent would not be out of place here: resettling hostile individuals and others who constitute the supply base for irredentist movements as an emergency measure is acceptable and justified, even if done against their will. Those Ukrainians who were involved in Maidan and who have now been living in Poland for a while take the liberty of being rude to nationalist and Eastern Borderlands groups. Obviously, all of them have long seen us as Putin's "useful idiots", either because we do not support the brawls in their home country or simply because we are able to effectively prevent them from implementing their agenda, which is, as it turns out, hostile to Poland.⁵⁴

Apart from deporting Ukrainian nationals considered undesirable, the author makes some far reaching demands on the ruling party regarding migrants, the labor market, history policy, and relations with Ukraine. The author's vision reflects the extreme anti-Ukrainian attitudes found among Eastern Borderlands

51 For more information on the intimidation of Solarz, see: <http://krakow.wyborcza.pl/krakow/1,44425,19972009,awantura-w-srodowisku-ukrainoznacow-oskarzenia-listy.html>.

52 The attacks on Zaleska were relayed by media outlets run by Donetsk separatists and by Polish media. See: <http://dev.nrt24.ru/o-tym-jak-obywatelka-polski-mordowala-i-torturowala-ludzi-w-donbasie-2/>; <https://marucha.wordpress.com/2014/12/27/bianka-zalewska-dziennikarka-czy-snajperka/>; http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,17182184,Bianka_Zalewska_ofiara_propagandy_separatystow_Predstawiaja.html.

53 W. Łysiak had several critical articles, in which he attacked both journalists for their position on the Maidan events, published in *Do Rzeczy* weekly; his arguments were repeatedly quoted by other media. See: <http://blogpress.pl/node/19919>; <https://kresy.pl/publicystyka/czego-nie-rozumie-dawid-wildstein>.

54 Skalski's article deserves special attention, especially in light of government measures on migrants and the Ukrainian minority. See: <https://medianarodowe.com/jaroslaw-kaczynski-bedzie-drugim-janukowyczem-o-koniecznosci-wznowienia-operacji-wisla/>.

communities. An analysis of public speeches and papers shows that the role and importance of individuals in public institutions who spoke in a similar vein grew significantly in 2016. Some of them hold now positions in central and local government, and others in the public (national) media.⁵⁵ Prof. Włodzimierz Osadczy, now an international relations advisor to the Lublin Voivode, is a striking example. His public announcements have frequently contradicted those of the Polish government and President.⁵⁶

Manipulating data on the retirement benefits paid to Ukrainian workers may be considered another plank in the strategy to underscore the negative consequences of having Ukrainian citizens stay in Poland.⁵⁷

The policy adopted by the Polish government, along with statements by prominent PiS politicians, have done nothing to improve the public perception of the place and role of workers and migrants from Ukraine in Poland. Polish PMs Beata Szydło and Mateusz Morawiecki have repeatedly opposed the relocation of Syrian refugees to EU Member States, claiming that Poland already has “one million Ukrainian refugees”. Sources show that during the period in question, Poland granted refugee status to four Ukrainian nationals, and tolerated residence to approx. 76 Ukrainian nationals.⁵⁸

55 https://web.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=365191006984438&id=218251225011751&_rdc=1&_rdr.

56 The inconsistency of political declarations of the ruling Cabinet on working with Ukraine, and policy on migration and workers from Ukraine with recruitment decisions and statements by some government officials were highlighted by e.g. Marcin Rey, the founder of the FB fun page “Russian 5th Column in Poland”.

57 <http://natemat.pl/220521,polscy-podatnicy-za-placa-za-emerytury-ukraincow-w-polsce-burza-ale-zus-uspokaja-to-nic-spektakularnego>.

58 *Uchodźcy versus migranci*; For more information, see: <https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/uchodzczy-z-ukrainy-polski-rzad-mowi-o-milionie-statystyki-o-183,730375.html>; <http://www.tvp.info/23670585/szydlo-w-pe-o-milionie-uchodzcow-z-ukrainy-ambasador-to-nie-uchodzczy-oni-tu-pracuja-i-placa-podatki>.

DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES AGAINST POLISH CITIZENS WHO HAPPEN TO BE ETHNIC UKRAINIANS

Media campaigns against Ukrainians, negative public statements about them, and calls for discriminatory policies towards them, have not been restricted to Ukrainian migrants. Certain events in 2016-2017 may well be considered a contravention of Polish legislation and a refusal by the Polish government to continue to safeguard the civil rights of national and ethnic minorities (including Ukrainians). Much the same can be said about the practical application of the “reciprocal policy” towards Polish citizens. One example that demonstrates that these are not isolated errors or decisions of low-ranking officials lies in the answers to the parliamentary questions of MPs Sławomir Nitras and Rafał Trzaskowski (members of the Civic Platform Parliamentary Club). They asked the then Prime Minister, Beata Szydło, why the Polish Ministry of the Interior and Administration (MSWiA) refused to award grants to commemorate the anniversary of Operation Vistula (applications had been submitted by several organizations). Sławomir Nitras asked the following question:



I WOULD LIKE TO ASK [...], what were the specific reasons for the MSWiA rejecting applications submitted by Ukrainian and Lemko organizations to help finance the anniversary of Operation Vistula. Does this have anything to do with the changes to Poland’s national minorities policy?

The answer was provided by the Interior Minister, Mariusz Błaszczak, as follows:



WE ALSO DO NOT CONSIDER OURSELVES THE HEIRS of totalitarian power. When discussing this

matter, you have to be mindful of its current context, i.e. comparing events that are incomparable by their very nature, viz. the 1947 displacements and the Volhynia massacre — and unfortunately, such comparisons are being made, especially over our eastern border. We can now see the cult of Stepan Bandera, the man responsible for crimes against Poles — the genocide committed by the Ukrainian nationalists in 1943 – in Ukraine today. Over 100,000 Poles, including women and children, were brutally murdered. You can find many statements in the media by Mr Piotr Tyma, complaining that the Polish government did not subsidize the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of Operation Vistula. I instructed my colleagues to draw up a list of statements by Piotr Tyma condemning the Banderites, but none were found [...]. The Polish government supports Ukraine joining the family of European nations, we strive to have the best possible relations with Ukraine, but they have to be based on truth. We reject the principle of retaliation, but we demand symmetry. I do not know any of case where the Ukrainian government has financed a place to commemorate the Volhynia massacre. There is no symmetry here.⁵⁹

The decision to refuse a grant to commemorate the anniversary of Operation Vistula attracted a lot of public comment. Various Polish circles protested the decision. The Honorary Committee of the Social Celebration of the 70th anniversary of Operation Vistula was set up in response. Members include Danuta Kuroń, Krystyna Zachwatowicz-Wajda, Rev. Tomasz Dostatni OP, Prof. Włodzimierz Mokry, Adam Bodnar, PhD, Andrzej Seweryn, and Andrzej Stasiuk. The Committee appealed for support for the Ukrainian

community in commemorating the anniversary of these deportations.⁶⁰

This support was forthcoming from many organizations and individuals, as well as the media, and 102,000 PLN were raised for the purpose of organizing the commemoration.

Questions as to the reasons for refusing to support the commemoration were also raised in a parliamentary question from MP Adam Szłapka (Nowoczesna Parliamentary Club) as follows:



DOES THE MINISTRY BELIEVE THAT holding the anniversary commemoration is not important from the standpoint of the discretionary treatment of Polish citizens who belong to minorities, and the development of a Polish-Ukrainian dialogue that might contribute to building positive relations between Poles and Ukrainians? Should the decision to refuse to help finance the anniversary commemoration be interpreted as a political signal from the government that confirms that it has left off building relations with national minorities based on dialogue and reconciliation? This would fit into the broader political context of the decisions of the Ministry, including the obstacles to financing national minority projects under the grant award procedures announced for 2016.

In reply, the MSWiA Secretary of State, Sebastian Chwałek, said:



IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT as far as commemorating historic events shared by the two nations is concerned, it is vital that the principle of reciprocity be maintained.⁶¹

59 For an account of the discussion of the parliamentary questions of the Civic Platform MPS to then Prime Minister Beata Szydło, see: <http://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/historia/news,907784,blaszczak-stosunki-z-ukraina-musza-byc-budowane-na-zasadzie-symetrii.html>.

60 For more information on the appeal, see: <https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/1696654,1,apel-zwiazku-ukraincow-w-polsce-sfinansujmy-spoleczne-obchody-70-rocznicy-akcji-wisla.read>.

61 For the full response to the parliamentary question from MP Adam Szłapka (Nowoczesna), see: <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm8.nsf/InterpelacjaTresc.xsp?key=654FECBE>. It is worth noting that the principle of reciprocity referred to by Polish politicians does not always present Poland in a favourable light. For example, the authorities have failed to provide textbooks to Ukrainian minority students for years (this applies

The Third Congress of Ukrainians in Poland, held in Przemyśl on April 30, 2017, addressed the failure to obtain a grant and the words of Minister Błaszczak. The resolution included the following:



THIS YEAR — FOR THE FIRST TIME FOR 28 YEARS

— the government has refused to support activities connected with organizing the Operation Vistula commemoration. The authorities have justified deportation by employing argumentation taken word for word from the propaganda materials of the communist state that planned and carried out this crime. This runs counter to the European practice of protecting the rights of national and ethnic minorities, which was adopted by the Republic of Poland after 1989. We consider the statement by the Minister of the Interior and Administration of April 21, 2017, who attacked our community, including the President of the Association of the Ukrainians in Poland, Piotr Tyma, while speaking in the Sejm, to be legally inadmissible. We call on the Prime Minister, Beata Szydło, to take appropriate action against the Minister, as it is incumbent upon the head of the police force in a democracy, a member of NATO and the European Union, to care for the safety of the citizenry, and not to incite the majority of Poles and the services subordinate to him against national minorities. This applies a fortiori given that his speech in the Polish Parliament may be construed as giving his consent to similar actions on the part of local authorities and certain political and social organizations in Poland. This having created an atmosphere of Polish-Ukrainian conflict makes our community feel threatened once more.⁶²

Further evidence that discriminatory practices are being used against minority organizations can be found in the changes

to the rules for awarding grants by the MSWiA, the partial rejection of applications without substantive grounds, and delays in signing agreements and transferring the necessary funds. In December 2016, for the first time ever, only part of the sum set aside in the State budget to help national and ethnic minorities preserve their identity was allocated. Moreover, the provisions of the agreements were altered during the award procedure, despite having been previously approved by the government (the MSWiA minister responsible for religious denominations and national minorities) and the minorities (Joint Committee of the Government and National and Ethnic Minorities) after consultation. Making changes when the process of submitting and assessing applications was at an advanced stage (the amount to be divided, the allocation scheme) caused severe difficulties in implementing annual projects and planning other tasks.⁶³ The changes to the grant award procedure, and disinformation on the part of public officials, caused severe difficulties for national and ethnic minority (including Ukrainian) NGOs that year. It should be noted that most of these organizations operate mainly on the basis of social engagement. Grants are an additional opportunity to meet minimum staff requirements (these might be financial and bookkeeping services, premises and coordinators, and the substantive costs of implementing various tasks), and that these organizations would eventually have to drastically restrict their operations without them.

to both textbooks on the history of Ukraine, and Ukrainian language teaching materials). In Ukraine, per contra, textbooks for ethnic Polish students are published, and a methodological centre operates.

⁶² For the wording of the Resolution, see.: http://www.zup.ukraina.com.pl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=432&Itemid=12.

⁶³ For more information on the MSWiA decisions on minority grants, see: <http://www.polsatnews.pl/wiadomosc/2017-01-05/mniejszosci-narodowe-beda-mialy-mniejsze-dotacje-po-wyr-aza-zaniepokojenie>. For the standpoint of the members of minorities in the Joint Committee of the Government and the National Minorities, see.: <http://mniejszosci.narodowe.mswia.gov.pl/mne/komisja-wspolna/opinie-i-stanowiska/2017/10193,Stanowisko-strony-mniejszosciowej-Komisji-Wspolnej-Rzadu-i-Mniejszosci-Narodowyc.html>.

This is especially true of the Ukrainian community, which is largely scattered.

An MSWiA grant is the only guarantee that an NGO can continue its activities, including long-term projects, important to these communities, such as publishing, and year-round cultural activities.⁶⁴

Polish government institutions cancelling their participation in the 70th anniversary commemoration of the deportations of Polish citizens of Ukrainian ethnicity under Operation Vistula in 1947 similarly bore all the hallmarks of discrimination.⁶⁵ The government not only refused to subsidize any activities organized by associations of Polish citizens of Ukrainian extraction, but did not take part in any either (e.g. in the commemoration before the monument to the victims of the Jaworzno Concentration Camp).⁶⁶ Moreover, a newsletter issued by the Institute of National Remembrance [IPN] included an article by Artur Brożyniak, PhD, an historian at the IPN. Some of his theses could only be construed as a form of justification of this communist crime.⁶⁷ These actions of the authorities over Operation Vistula were accompanied by many public addresses by politicians and articles by feature writers approving the

application of the principle of collective responsibility against the country's own citizens by the communist authorities of Poland.⁶⁸

The failure of law enforcement bodies to respond appropriately to acts that are *prima facie* incitements to hatred or even to the commission of crimes, further contribute to Polish citizens belonging to ethnic minorities feeling an increasing sense of insecurity.⁶⁹ It is worth noting that public statements marked with hostility towards Ukrainians have recently appeared in areas where they had previously been absent from the public sphere, e.g. the picket lines in the Podlaskie and Lublin Voivodeships. As is the case in other regions, this is a manifestation of the increasingly visible mobilization of nationalist organizations (e.g. the ONR, and the MW) and the implementation of their game plan to create hostility by referring to WWII events. Graphic and disturbing photos and/or naturalist descriptions of crimes against Poles are a staple of these sorts of campaigns, which have been organized in, e.g., Białystok and Chełm.⁷⁰

The decreasing sense of security, especially among the Ukrainian minority, once experienced as a result of the nationalist policy of the communist (PRL) period is also caused by the actions of national and local administration bodies,

64 To read about the consequences of playing havoc with grants to minority organisations, see: <http://www.newsweek.pl/polska/polityka/mniejszosci-narodowe-bez-grosza-winna-biurokracja-czy-niechec-wladz-,artykuly,407511,1.html>.

65 For more information on the trials and tribulations of trying to obtain a grant to commemorate the anniversary of Operation Vistula, see: <http://www.newsweek.pl/polska/polityka/akcja-wisla-i-ukraincy-rocznica-wydarzen-bez-dotacji-mswia,artykuly,406220,1.html>.

66 Participation in commemorations before a monument financed by the Polish government, and unveiled by the Presidents of Poland and Ukraine, had previously been de rigueur and involved, inter alia, representatives of central and regional public administration bodies, and the IPN. In 2017, the commemorations were only supported by the municipal authorities of Jaworzno, who also were present at the monument. Other official guests included the Ukrainian ambassador Ukrainian Consul General in Kraków.

67 See: A. Brożyniak, *Akcja „Wisła”. Inne spojrzenie*, [Operation “Vistula”: Another Perspective] “Biuletyn IPN” [The IPN Bulletin], No. 6, June 2017, pp. 129–138; and Prof. Roman Drozd's dispute with the theses of A. Brożyniak; see: <http://www.nasze-slowo.pl/operacja-%E2%80%B3wisla%E2%80%B3-inne-spojrzenie>.

68 *Pochwała akcji W [Praiseworthy Operation V]*, Winnicki, Zapałowski and accounts of the conference in which a Law and Justice (PiS) senator took part; see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=omr5C_9U2es.

69 One example may be a piece uploaded on YouTube without impediment, entitled “I do not forgive”, by a rap musician nicknamed “Stopa”; see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ddH-3vsP5_Zo. For the words of Prof. C. Partacz, who publicly calls a legal organisation, viz. the ZUwP, a fifth column, see: <http://prawo.pl/58097-znany-polski-ukrainista-niewpuszczony-na-ukraine-znalazl-sie-na-czarnej-liscie-sbu; and for the decisions of the court in Przemyśl to refuse to open an investigation, see: http://wyborcza.pl/7,75968,22456724,koktajl-molotowa-to-tylko-opinia.html>.

70 For more information, see: <http://bialystok.wyborcza.pl/bialystok/1,35241,20360503,podlascy-narodowcy-sie-ja-antyukrainska-nienawisc-ukraincy.html; http://chelm.naszemiasto.pl/artykul/chelm-w-sobote-ulicami-chelma-przeszedl-marsz-pamieci-o,3449103,artgal,t,id,tm.html>.

which are perceived as manifestations of excessive control on the part of state institutions. The reasons behind the Ministry of Defense initiative of “registering” not only foreign citizens resident in Poland, but also Polish citizens of non-Polish ethnicity have never been explained.⁷¹

An important element, which in our opinion has contributed to the strengthening of anti-Ukrainian activities and comments in the public sphere, is Polish MPs appealing directly to nationalist ideology in parliament. This was expressed, *inter alia*, in a proposal put forward in the Sejm to invalidate the 1990 Senate resolution condemning Operation Vistula, and the tenor of the debate on the Volhynia resolution adopted by the Sejm on Jul. 22, 2016.⁷² Many of the MPs who argued in favor of adopting the resolution appealed exclusively to the emotions of the audience (by e.g. nationalist descriptions of crimes).⁷³

One MP, in addition to negating the rights of Polish citizens of Ukrainian ethnicity, publicly called for the Russian occupation of Crimea to be recognized.⁷⁴

The lack of will on the part of Polish institutions to continue dialogue with the Ukrainian minority and to firmly and unequivocally combat discriminatory practices is supported by the fact that immediately prior to the commemorations

of the 70th anniversary of Operation Vistula on Apr. 26, 2017, the authorities granted permission for a monument in the village of Hruszowice (Stubno Gmina, Subcarpathian Voivodeship) to be dismantled. The actual dismantling, performed by local government authorities, and Subcarpathian anti-Ukrainian circles (including the “National Movement”) is regarded by the Ukrainian community as a provocation.⁷⁵ It was also criticized by the Ukrainian authorities, and was the reason given for their decision to stop Polish exhumations in Ukraine. It is further responsible for the deadlock in the dialogue on overcoming the tragic history of WWII and the post-war period, which continues today.⁷⁶ The dismantling of the monument in Hruszowice was legitimized by the IPN and the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage – both government bodies.⁷⁷ The public statements from these institutions, legitimizing the dismantling of the Hruszowice monument, stand in stark contrast with their complete silence over the desecration of Ukrainian graves and monuments in Poland (including legal graves established by the Council for the Protection of Struggle and Martyrdom Sites) in 2014–2016.⁷⁸

75 For information on the standpoint of the ZUWP on dismantling the monument, see: <http://www.polukr.net/blog/2017/04/zwiazek-ukraincow-w-polsce-o-demontazu-pomnika-w-hruszowicach>; <https://www.portalprzemyski.pl/to-prowokacja-takie-jest-zdanie-zwiazku-ukraincow-w-polsce-na-temat-rozbiorki-pomnika-w-hruszowicach>.

76 For the position of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see: <http://fakty.interia.pl/swiat/news-msz-ukrainy-oburzone-demontazem-pomnika-upa-w-hruszowicach,nId,2387688>.

77 For information on the reaction of the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage to the dismantling of the monument in Hruszowice, see: <http://dzieje.pl/aktualnosci/mkidn-demon-taz-nielegalnego-pomnika-upa-zgodny-z-prawem>.

78 Despite the ZUWP's having provided detailed information on incidents of Ukrainian graves and commemoration sites in Poland being damaged, no Polish government body (e.g. MKiDN, Komisji Mniejszości Narodowych i Etnicznych Sejmu, Kancelarii Prezydenta, ABW) has condemned them. Nor to our knowledge has anything been done to accelerate any investigation that might lead to the identification of the initiators and perpetrators. As for the desecration of the mass graves in Pikulice and Monasterz, financed and established by the Council for the Protection of Struggle and Martyrdom Sites, there was no reaction to these acts of desecration and vandalism; for more information, see: <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/zwiazek-ukraincow-w-polsce-skarzy-sie-rzadowi-ze-groby-i-pomniki-sa-profanowane-6059949986198657a;http://www>.

71 To read about the controversies over the initiative of the Ministry of Defense, see: <http://fakty.interia.pl/prasa/news-rzeczpospolita-burza-o-mniejszosci-narodowe-w-polsce,nId,2399584>; <http://bialystok.wyborcza.pl/bialystok/7,35241,21882215,tyszkiewicz-polska-brunatnie-je-mon-zbiera-informacje-o-mniejszosciach.html>.

72 To read about Operation Vistula being publicly praised, see: <http://prawo.pl/42514-winnicki-czas-odklamac-akcje-wisla>; <http://namzalezy.pl/oswiadczenie-prezesa-ruchu-narodowego-przy-okazji-70-rocznicy-rozpoczecia-akcji-wisla>; <http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/opinie/artykuly/550190,akcja-wisla-i-akcja-matura-wrobel-men-interpelacja.html>.

73 For discussion on Volhynia, see: <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm8.nsf/wypowiedz.xsp?posiedzenie=22&dzien=2&wyp=074>; <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm8.nsf/wypowiedz.xsp?posiedzenie=22&dzien=2&wyp=065>.

74 See: <http://prawo.pl/36902-janusz-sanocki-ukraina-musi-pogodzic-sie-z-tym-ze-krym-zmienil-przynalznosc/>.

That none of the desecrated or vandalized items, apart from the grave in the Pikulice-Przemyśl cemetery, have been repaired (in contrast to the Polish monuments in Bykownia and Huta Pieniacka in Ukraine) evidences a lack of political will to resolve the issue of graves and monuments – to the detriment of Poland’s relations with both Ukraine and its own Ukrainian minority. No dialogue with the Ukrainian community in Poland has been established, and no legalization of “illegal” (Ukrainian) graves and monuments in Poland or (Polish) monuments and graves in Ukraine has been formulated.⁷⁹ Despite the importance of this issue to both Polish-Ukrainian relations, and to the discretionary treatment of the Ukrainian minority (i.e. the indigenous inhabitants of the borderlands), nothing has been done to ameliorate the negative effects of these provocations.

Issues in the historical relations between Poles and Ukrainians, including those between Poland and its Ukrainian minority (Polish citizens of Ukrainian ethnicity), would seem to be the preserve of those who promote an ethnocentric vision of Poland’s past, and refuse to treat Polish citizens belonging to this minority as a subject of social life.

CONCLUSION

The experience of the last three years suggests that migrants and workers from

Ukraine, and the Ukrainian minority in Poland, are being subjected to increasingly frequent acts of aggression and discriminatory practices. This is the diagnosis of Łukasz Jurczyszyn, PhD, a political scientist and sociologist associated with Collegium Civitas and the Polish Institute of International Affairs. In an interview, Dr. Jurczyszyn squarely identified Ukrainian migrants as potential victims of aggression, stating:



WE FEEL THE DISINTEGRATION on many levels, not only in the geopolitical dimension. In these conditions, people gravitate towards strong fundamental values, such as territory, space, nation, and “us”. They therefore have no desire to see the physical presence of other mouths to feed. Objectively speaking, we need economic migrants, and Ukrainians fill this gap to a significant extent, but unfortunately, it’s going to rebound on them. The latest statistics reveal a sharp increase in attacks on Ukrainians and hate speech directed towards them [...]. Xenophobic attitudes are only going to increase in strength and frequency. The real scenario is that this negative energy is being channeled on Ukrainians, whose presence to some extent disturbs the nationalist dream of a mono-ethnic society. What we know as antisemitism, xenophobia or Islamophobia, is nothing more than a resolute opposition to foreigners. Today, with the accumulation of various types of crisis, these attitudes are beginning to assume mass proportions. Our sense and awareness of there being some social stability and some stability in living standards is being put to the test. This makes the situation exceptional.⁸⁰

It is our considered opinion that the Polish authorities do too little to monitor and combat occurrences of the kind described in this Report. There is

sejm.gov.pl/sejm8.nsf/biuletyn.xsp?documentId=85690E6B-6256F6A2C1257FB10047D016. The only action was the reaction expressed in the Werchrata Appeal, adopted after the devastation of a grave in the Werchrata cemetery in October 2016. For more information on the appeal and its signatories, see: <http://fakty.interia.pl/polska/news-werchrata-nie-ma-zgody-na-akty-wandalizmu-i-nienawisci.nId,2291736>.

⁷⁹ The desecrated and vandalized grave in the former village of Monasterz, near Werchrata, has yet to be repaired. The cross and the tombstone were damaged in May 2015. For information on the action itself, see: <https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/1679734,1,skrajnie-prawicowy-oboz-wielkiej-polski-niszczy-ukrainskie-miejsca-pamieci.read>. For more information on the devastated graves, see: <http://prostir.pl/event/документ-знищені-українські-пам'ятні>.

⁸⁰ To read about the threat posed by nationalism and extreme movements from the European perspective, see: <https://www.tygodnikprzeglad.pl/tag/lukasz-jurczyszyn>.

a justifiable fear that these take place on a mass scale in Poland, both through provocative actions and a hybrid war, and as a result of activities that stigmatize Ukrainians and which are supported by public institutions. It is our view that the number of public statements calling on the Polish authorities to implement a policy cannot help but raise serious concerns.

The emotionally charged language used in public discourse on the past, the lack of response to breaches of the law, and the participation in acts of discrimination on the part of government institutions and local government bodies is, in our view, contrary to Poland's democratic traditions. It is also contrary to Poland's European obligations to protect the rights of national and ethnic minorities, adopted after 1989. These practices constitute a clear infringement of fundamental human rights and are damaging to Poland's international image.

The tendencies mentioned by Łukasz Jurczyszyn have been observed in respect of Ukrainians, especially in 2016 and 2017. Whether the negative occurrences and tendencies specified in the Report will be duly assessed, and systemic ways of combating all forms of discrimination and hatred based on nationality worked out will largely depend on the Polish authorities, specifically Sejm Committees, the executive government, the Prime Minister, the MSWiA, the Government Plenipotentiary for Civil Society and Equal Treatment, the Chancellery of the President, the Ombudsmen, and regional administrative bodies. We believe that only by taking decisive action, responding to all illegal activities and incidents, and having administrative bodies work with NGOs can hold back the growing wave of hatred.

Warsaw, January 2018

APPENDIX I

A DETAILED LIST OF OFFENCES AND STATEMENTS AGAINST UKRAINIAN MIGRANTS AND THE UKRAINIAN MINORITY, AND DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES

I. Organized and coordinated provocations, directed against Poland's Ukrainian community, and intended to harm Polish-Ukrainian relations, took place in south-eastern Poland in 2014-2016. These consisted in the damage, destruction, and/or desecration of sites commemorating events that occurred during WWII and the post-war Polish-Ukrainian conflict. Sites were damaged, destroyed and/or desecrated in the following locations:

► Białystok near Liski (Ukr. Біло-стік): Gmina: Dołhobyczów; Voivodeship: Lublin;

► Hruszowice (Ukr. Грушовичі): Gmina: Stubno; Voivodeship: Subcarpathia;

► Monasterz (Ukr. Монастир): Gmina: Horyniec; Voivodeship: Subcarpathia;

► Wierzbica (Ukr. Вербіця): Gmina: Lubycza Królewska; Voivodeship: Lublin;

► Radruż (Ukr. Радруж): Gmina: Horyniec Zdrój; Voivodeship: Subcarpathia;

► Mołodycz (Ukr. Молодич): Gmina: Wiątownica; Voivodeship: Subcarpathia;

► Pikulice (Ukr. Пікуличі): Powiat: Przemyśl;

► Werchrata (Ukr. Вєрхрєтє): Gmina: Horyniec.

The sites in Białystok, Hruszowice, Wierzbica and Mołodycz were destroyed several times. None of the perpetrators have ever been identified. Some investigations have been closed.

Videos of graves and commemorative sites being damaged, destroyed and/or desecrated, along with the Camp of Great Poland logo, were available on the YouTube channel of Dawid Hudziec, editor of the "Novorossia Today" portal.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5cDuXL_D2bQ

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZishvGT-fIU0&app=desktop>

II. Anti-Ukrainian bills were posted on the Greek Catholic Cathedral in Gdańsk, anti-Ukrainian inscriptions appeared on walls in Przemyśl and Kraków, and anti-Ukrainian banners were displayed in Szczecin.

III. The cross commemorating the Heroes of the Maidan near the Eastern Orthodox church in Bartoszyce was destroyed. The perpetrators were detained.

IV. Ukrainian flags (flown in public) were destroyed several times in Olsztyn. The perpetrator was detained.

<http://twojkurierolsztynski.pl/10847,2016,02,27,zniszczono-flage-ukrainska-na-olsztynskim-zatorzu>

V. Jun. 26, 2016: A procession making its way towards the cemetery of the soldiers of the Ukrainian People's Republic (1918–1920) in Przemyśl was attacked. Assault and battery, desecration of a church banner, and unlawful intimidation took place. The celebration was attended by the Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Abp. Eugeniusz Popowicz, priests, nuns, members of the congregation (including children), an advisor to the Ukrainian Embassy, and delegations from Ukraine. Nineteen people were charged. Their cases are being heard in the Przemyśl Regional Court.

VI. Jul. 1, 2016: "Iwana Kupala", a traditional Ukrainian cultural event, was cancelled in Przemyśl due to the threats

from anti-Ukrainian groups, pressure from the municipal authorities, and a refusal on the part of law enforcement agencies to ensure public safety.

VII. Jul. 3, 2016: The Ukrainian band “Ot Vinta” was denied entry into Poland, after the supporters of the “Polonia” Football Club in Przemyśl, and the President of Przemyśl, Robert Choma, had accused them of “promoting Bandera ideology”.

VIII. Jul. 3, 2016: Extremist groups (MW, Falanga [Phalanx], OWP) picketed a Joryj Kłoc concert in Warsaw. The picketers threatened young Ukrainians attending the concert. One incident is being investigated.

IX. Aug. 24, 2016: Attempted assault and battery of a Ukrainian citizen, who was walking past the Ukrainian Embassy in Poland (wearing a T-shirt with the Ukrainian national emblem) while it was being picketed by nationalist and pro-Russian circles. The picketers were calling for the borderlands and Lviv to be taken back from Ukraine. The police did not respond.

X. No response to an application from the Ukrainian minority to have the MSWiA call an extraordinary meeting of the Joint Committee of the Government and National and Ethnic Minorities to discuss the situation in Przemyśl. After calling the meeting on Oct. 5, 2016, there was a refusal (in breach of prior agreements) to invite representatives of NGOs and experts from the Ukrainian community, or representatives of Polish NGOs (including those specializing in combating hate speech and discrimination, e.g. the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, and “Open Republic of Poland”).

XI. Public addresses from politicians and local leaders against the Ukrainian

minority with accusations of provocatively destroying Ukrainian graves and collaborating with the Ukrainian secret service (A. Zapałowski in “Nasz Dziennik”, May 5, 2015; M. Majkowski during a Radio Rzeszów program, Aug 22, 2016).

XII. Oct. 15, 2016: During the “Radiowy Przegląd Prasy”, broadcast by Polskie Radio Koszalin, co-host Wojciech Cejrowski said: “Ukrainians are rapists and butchers”; “So to your question: All Ukrainians? I say all”. The prosecutor closed the investigation.

<http://www.radio.koszalin.pl/pl/program-issue/rapp-radiowy-przeglad-prasy-rapp-radiowy-przeglad-prasy.11048.html>

XIII. Oct. 26, 2016: Police officers searched the home of a member of the Ukrainian community residing near Kętrzyn in the early hours of the morning without prosecutorial authorization. Their reason was that they had been notified that his son was suspected of committing the crime of promoting a totalitarian system (the factual basis being that the son had worn a T-shirt with the Tryzub, i.e. the Ukrainian national emblem). The investigation was closed in December.

XIV. Nov. 11, 2016: The Ukrainian flag was burnt during the Independence Day March in Warsaw. The investigation was closed, and the perpetrators were not punished.

XV. November 2016: Ukrainian Day was held in a Wrocław school as part of an educational program entitled “The Tolerant European”. One of the parents tore the posters (which contained the flag and national emblem of Ukraine) off the windows and from the front of the library, and shouted anti-Ukrainian slogans. The perpetrator was prosecuted.

<https://wroclaw.onet.pl/wroclaw-rodzic-stanal-przed-sadem-za-zerwanie-ukrainskiej-flagi-w-szkole/c5pljrc>

XVI. The growing wave of anti-Ukrainian hatred on the Internet (hostile posts, pieces of music). No progress has been made in the majority of the investigations in the above-mentioned cases (which were reported by the ZUwP), and no ex officio actions have been taken.

XVII. Stickers with the slogan “We remember Volhynia” were affixed to the tram stops, and similar posters were found on the windows of, e.g., Ukrainian House at ul. Zamenhofska 1 in Warsaw.

XVIII. Signboards with geographical names in the language of the Lemko minority were destroyed in Lesser Poland Voivodeship. The signboards, with the names written in Cyrillic (pursuant to the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Languages) were damaged in Gładyszów (2016 — 3 signboards), Regietów (2015), and Ropki (2016).

XIX. Nov. 7, 2016: Members of the Ukrainian minority had their tires slashed in the car park near the Greek Catholic Metropolitan Cathedral in Przemyśl. The incident was recorded on CTTV, and the recording was given to the police. It was the second case of this type in Przemyśl in six months. The first occurred after Przemyśl nationalists had attacked a Greek Catholic procession on Jun. 26, 2016.

XX. Dec. 10, 2016: The shout of “Death to Ukrainians” could be heard during the March of the Przemyśl and Lviv Eagles [the young defenders of Polish Lviv in 1918–1920] in Przemyśl. The event was held under the auspices of Wojciech Bakun, MP, the Institute of National Remembrance, Rzeszów Branch, and the Mayor of Przemyśl, Robert Choma. The March was organized by the ONR, MW Przemyśl, the Cultural Center (a regional

cultural institution), and Przemyśl groups of football fans. During the March, the banners of the Camp of Great Poland — the organization that lent its name to the destruction and desecration of Ukrainian graves and commemoration sites in Subcarpathia — were unfurled. The perpetrator was acquitted by the Przemyśl Regional Court.

<http://www.nowiny24.pl/wiadomosci/przemysl/a/smierc-ukraincom-podczas-marszu-w-przemyslu-ukraina-poprosi-o-sledztwo-wideo,11567854>

XXI. Jan. 6, 2017: Unknown perpetrators slashed the tires of a car belonging to Pawło Striłka, Chairman of the Ukrainian Club of Political Prisoners and Oppressed People.

XXII. In early March 2017, Pawło Striłka had his tires slashed again in Przemyśl.

XXIII. Mar. 13, 2017: The ONR held a demonstration in Gdańsk under the banner: “Migrations from the East are a threat to the Polish nation”. Their posters and information materials included anti-Ukrainian content. The posters were displayed in stores in the Chełm district. Similar demonstrations were later held in Warsaw, Starachowice, Wrocław, and Radomsko (Nov. 17, 2017).

XXIV. Apr. 26, 2017: A monument to the UPA in the cemetery in the village of Hruszowice (Gmina: Stubno) was destroyed on the eve of the 70th anniversary commemoration of Operation Vistula. The monument was destroyed by members of the National Movement and others who had been involved in anti-Ukrainian activities for years. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was among those that protested.

XXV. Jun. 3, 2017: The (Eastern Orthodox) Church of the Basilian Monks

in Przemyśl was vandalized. The perpetrators broke and destroyed ornamented clay pots with plants which had been placed on the stairs leading to the church. The perpetrators have not been identified.

XXVI. Jun. 23, 2017 — The Pro Arte Et Historia Foundation, which manages Park and Palace Complexes (including the Krasiczyn Complex) informed the Przemyśl Branch of the ZUwP that it could not consent to their holding “Noc Kupały” [Midsummer Eve] in Krasiczyn on Jul. 2, 2017. Their stated reason was “the necessity of having to register the event as a mass event and having to ensure adequate physical protection”. The arrangements for holding the event at this venue had been made in July 2016. No objections had been raised prior to June 2017. The event was initially, and in accordance with the law, assumed not to be a mass event. There have been several cases of refusing to grant use of the facility (even for payment) to the Ukrainian minority (including for the Ukrainian Culture Festivals, held in 1995 and 1997 under the auspices of the Polish and Ukrainian Ministers of Culture) since 1989.

XXVII. Jun. 24, 2017: The display window of the “Narodny Dom” [National House] building at ul. Kościuszki 5 (the office of the Przemyśl Branch of the ZUwP) was broken at dawn. The damage was estimated to be 680.00 PLN. Information on cultural events organized by the Association had been displayed in the window. The perpetrators have not been identified.

XXVIII. Jun. 1, 2017 (at 11:34 a.m.) someone under the username of “Przemyślanin” published the following post on www.nowiny24.pl: “There’s

a Ukrainian school in ul. Spółki, Przemyśl. Poles should throw cocktails in there to balance our good neighborly relations”. The incident was reported to the prosecutor’s office. The Regional Prosecutor’s Office in Przemyśl refused to open an investigation stating that the post fell within the bounds of reasonable debate. The Przemyśl Regional Court declined to hear the ZUwP’s complaint to the prosecutor’s decision on Sept. 20, 2017.

XXIX. August 2017: The bilingual signboards with the name “Regietów” (Lesser Poland Voivodeship) were destroyed again. The Cyrillic version of the name was completely erased.

XXX. Sept. 10, 2017: Two people removed the Ukrainian flag from a building in Świdnica and cleaned their shoes with it. The flag had hung over the entrance to the Sudety Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

XXXI. Sept. 28, 2017: The Przemyśl Branch of the ZUwP received a threatening letter that contained the following: “You’d better shut down your operations and shut your mouth, and if you don’t go away to Eastern Ukraine, we’ll burn you down or bomb you” (the Polish original contained several spelling and grammatical errors). The incident was reported to the Przemyśl police.

XXXII. Sept. 30, 2017: The following inscription was written on the wall of the Ukrainian Honorary Consulate in ul. Mochnackiego, Rzeszów: “Ukraine = the Ukrainian Nationalist Organization – the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Waffen SS Galitzien”. The word “Raus” [Out], along with a picture of a gallows, had been written on the information board, which bore the Ukrainian national

emblem. Another gallows with a swastika was drawn below. The symbol of “Fighting Poland” was painted on another wall. The perpetrator was charged and convicted.

<http://rzeszow-news.pl/antyukrainskie-napisy-konsulacie-honorowym-ukrainy-rzeszowie-foto/>

XXXIII. Turn of Oct. 2017: The staff of several establishments in Barlinek and Wrocław behaved in a hostile manner towards Ukrainians. Boards announcing discrimination against Ukrainian citizens were placed in Balinek, and a Ukrainian citizen was harassed by police officers in Wrocław.

<https://finanse.wp.pl/skandaliczna-tabliczka-w-sklepie-w-barlinku-kazdy-obywatel-ukrainy-bedzie-poddany-kontroli-6171321000953473a>

<http://www.msn.com/pl-pl/wiadomosci/polska/ukrainka-sp%24c4%99dzi%25%82a-prawie-dob%24c4%99-na-policji-zastraszana-dwukrotnie-rozebrana-i-wypuszczona-bez-zarzut%23%b3w/ar-AA5VCVD?li=BB5MK7&ocid=UP97DHP>

XXXIV. November 2017: “Death to Ukraine” was written on a railway viaduct in Warsaw.

<http://warszawa.wyborcza.pl/warszawa/7,54420,22656682,smierc-ukrainie-tak-stolica-polski-wita-pasazerow-kolejowych.html#BoxLinkWawLink>

XXXV. Ukrainian citizens have been subjected to assault and battery, destruction of property, and insult due to national origin in Łódź, Kutno, Brzeszcze, Legnica, Rzeszów, Wrocław, Świdnica, Olsztyn, Rudnik nad Sanem, Nowa Huta, Warsaw, Chorzyno (near Gdańsk), Szczecin, Wodzisław Śląski, Poznań, Częstochowa, Gdańsk, and Lublin (on several occasions in some towns and cities).

For detailed information on the incidents, see:

<http://www.rmfm24.pl/goraca-linia/wasze-fakty/news-ukraincy-pobici-przez-polakow-na-podkarpacku-policja-sprawdz,1d,2309214>

<http://lodz.onet.pl/polska-dla-polakow-i-ukrainskie-kuy-napad-na-ukraincow-i-rasistowskie-napisy-na/er6c3f>

<http://www.dzienniklodzki.pl/na-sygnale/a/atak-na-ukraincow-w-kutnie-napastnicy-kazali-im-wynosc-sie-z-polski-wideo,9348112/>

<http://www.gazetakrakowska.pl/wiadomosci/malopolska-zachodnia/a/brzeszcze-skatowali-w-sklepie-ukrainca-zdjeciawideo,9872311/>

<http://www.gazetakrakowska.pl/wiadomosci/malopolska-zachodnia/a/brzeszcze-skatowali-w-sklepie-ukrainca-zdjeciawideo,9872311/>

<http://swidnica24.pl/pobili-i-wywiezli-ukrainca-dolasu/>

<http://rzeszow-news.pl/brutalne-pobicie-ukrainca-w-rzeszowie-4-osoby-zatrzymane/>

<http://www.fakt.pl/wydarzenia/polska/wroclaw/wroclaw-ukrainiec-pobity-przez-kolegow-z-budowy/59sne0r>

<http://www.polskatimes.pl/artukul/9348112,atak-na-ukraincow-w-kutnie-napastnicy-kazali-im-wynosc-sie-z-polski-wideo,id,t.html>

<http://www.nowiny24.pl/wiadomosci/rzeszow/a/mieszkanicy-rzeszowa-pobili-studentow-z-ukrainy,11722560/>

<http://www.dziennikbaltycki.pl/wiadomosci/gdansk/a/pobicie-ukrainca-w-gdansk,12395197>

<http://www.gazetakrakowska.pl/wiadomosci/podhale/a/brutalny-atak-na-ukraincow-wybite-zeby-na-krupowkach,11761340/>

<http://krakow.tvp.pl/30208177/aresztowano-sprawcow-pobicia-nastolatka-z-ukrainy>

http://metrowarszawa.gazeta.pl/metrowarszawa/7,141637,21821852,zaatakowal-pare-na-ulicy-bo-rozmawiala-w-innym-jezyku-pobil.html?utm_source=facebook.com&utm_medium=SM&utm_campaign=FB_metro

<http://trojmiasto.wyborcza.pl/trojmiasto/7,35612,21889822,w-chwaszczynie-zaatakowano-dom-w-ktorym-mieszkaja-ukraincy.html?disableRedirects=true>

<http://szczecin.wyborcza.pl/szczecin/7,34939,21966087,ciezko-pobili-wedkujacych-ukraincow-zrobilismy-to-bez-powodu.html>

<http://katowice.wyborcza.pl/katowice/7,35063,21966816,19-latka-zaatakowala-ukrainca-na-przystanku-zadala-mu-kilkanascie.html>

<http://poznan.wyborcza.pl/poznan/7,36001,22067978,wy-z-tego-kraju-antyukrainski-incydent-w-barze-z-pierogami.html>

https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/brutalnie-pobil-kobietę-w-centrum-miasta-myslal-ze-jest-z-ukrainy-6141933509965953a?src01=6a4c8&src02=facebook_wp

<http://czestochowa.wyborcza.pl/czestochowa/7,89625,22153029,w-czestochowie-pobili-okradli-i-zniewazyli-ukrainca-sa-zarzuty.html>

<http://www.dziennikbaltycki.pl/wiadomosci/gdansk/a/pobicie-ukrainca-w-gdansku,12395197/>,
<http://trojmiasto.wyborcza.pl/trojmiasto/7,35612,22242427,w-centrum-gdanska-pobito-ukrainca-sprzedajacego-kebaby.html?disableRedirects=true>

<http://www.kurierlubelski.pl/wiadomosci/lublin/a/pobicie-ukrainki-w-centrum-lublina-uderzyli-ja-butelka-w-glowe-policja-szuka-sprawcow-zdjecia,12416492/>

<http://www.dziennikwschodni.pl/lublin/zatrzymany-za-brutalne-pobicie-ukrainca-pogryzl-wlasna-reke,n,1000204796.html>

http://metrowarszawa.gazeta.pl/metrowarszawa/7,141637,22539867,bili-i-kopali-po-calym-ciele-a-potem-ugodzili-nozem-wszystko.html?utm_source=facebook.com&utm_medium=SM&utm_campaign=FB_Gazeta

APPENDIX II

MEMO ON THE THREAT IN PRZEMYŚL

There will be a traditional procession from the Greek Catholic Cathedral and the Eastern Orthodox Church to the Ukrainian Military Cemetery (ul. Kasztanowa, Pikulice) on Jun. 26, 2016. Soldiers from the Ukrainian armies of 1918–1921, and prisoners of the POW camp that once existed there, are buried in the Cemetery. UPA soldiers, and civilians executed after being sentenced by the “Vistula” Operational Group in 1947, are buried in two graves. The burial of the UPA soldiers was organized in 2000 by the Council for the Protection of Struggle and Martyrdom Sites. The procession goes back to the Second Polish Republic (1918-1939), and was revived in the 1990s, after the Polish People’s Republic. The procession is attended by Polish citizens and guests from Ukraine.

The procession is a high risk event on account of the strong emotions associated with the “illegal” Ukrainian commemoration sites (especially those commemorating the UPA) that have been damaged or destroyed in Subcarpathia by persons unknown over the past two years. The two graves in the Military Cemetery in Pikulice were desecrated once more in mid-May 2016. Moreover, football supporters associated with e.g. the Polonia Przemyśl club had been active on Internet forums and on social media with calls to combat “the Ukrainian nationalists”, “promoting the UPA” and to prevent the procession. Rhetoric against Bandera and the UPA, and rehashing an incident where Ukrainian citizens (students at a school in Przemyśl) made a selfie with a red-and-black flag, were used to mobilize people. Evidence that the abovementioned circles

were in fact mobilized can be found in the inscriptions painted on city walls (one, on the wall opposite the Greek Catholic Cathedral in the city center, reads: “F**ck the UPA and Bandera”). The municipal authorities have not responded to such content appearing in the public space.

Extremist groups active in the region are a very real threat, having repeatedly demonstrated (e.g. during the picket outside the Ukrainian Honorary Consulate on Oct. 23, 2014) that they can mobilize supporters from other towns and cities in the region (Stalowa Wola, Przeworsk, Jarosław and Mielec) and have them come to Przemyśl. On the eve of the next commemoration in the Ukrainian Military Cemetery, other Ukrainian commemoration sites in the Subcarpathian Voivodeship may well be desecrated, and similar provocative actions against objects associated with Polish history carried out on the Ukrainian side of the border. Incidents like those in Zhovka, where inscriptions appeared on the office of a Polish organization, and Drohobych, where a monument to Pope John Paul II was damaged, may be the catalysts for more anti-Ukrainian incidents.

During last year’s procession to the Ukrainian Military Cemetery, the participants were accompanied by young people wearing MW T-shirts, who repeatedly provoked them.

Even though graves have been repeatedly damaged, destroyed and desecrated, the police have yet to identify a single perpetrator. The videos of these recurring acts of vandalism show that the perpetrators increasingly feel that they are free to act with impunity (the commemorative sites were vandalized and/or desecrated during the daytime, the

perpetrators made no attempt to conceal their identities, and occasional witnesses can be seen).

Similar patterns, i.e. reinforcing and consolidating negative feelings towards Ukrainian commemoration sites, and an “information campaign” (e.g. inscriptions on walls, leaflets, posters), combined with an inadequate response from the police and the municipal authorities, in 1995 (when the Ukrainian Culture Festival was held in Przemyśl), led to the

door of the Przemyśl office of the ZUwP being burnt, attacks on and harassment of the Festival organizers, attempts to set fire to a bus, and setting fire to the door of the boarding house in which Festival participants were accommodated, and throwing military bangers inside.

The Board of the Association of Ukrainians in Poland, drawn up by: PT

Warsaw, June 11, 2016.

APPENDIX III

Desecration and vandalism of graves and commemoration sites associated with the Ukrainian minority in Poland 2014–2016



HRUSZOWICE
Gmina: Stubno
Powiat: Przemyśl
Voivodeship: Subcarpathian

Monument to the UPA repeatedly desecrated and vandalized (since its erection in 1994); a burial site of fallen UPA soldiers, according to veterans and Ukrainian organizations.

State up until July 2014

A. Zapałowski perfectly summarizes how anti-Ukrainian groups employ a strategy of blaming the Ukrainian minority for every incident that affects them.

/In my view, this whole episode of removing the plaques in the Hruszowice cemetery was stage-managed, and the material was forwarded to the Russian side to be disseminated. All this to create a false image of Poland as a nation that does not respect others. It would not surprise me if the Ukrainian Special Services and members of Poland's Ukrainian minority were involved in all this. Andrzej Zapałowski, PhD. "Nasz Dziennik", May 30, 2015./

«Według mnie, całe to zdarzenie z usunięciem tablic
na cmentarzu w Hruszowicach było wyreżyserowane,
a materiał został podsunięty stronie rosyjskiej do
rozpowszechnienia.

Wszystko po to, aby stworzyć zafałszowany obraz Polaków
jako narodu, który nie szanuje innych.

Nie zdziwiłbym się, gdyby w całą tę sprawę
były zaangażowane służby specjalne Ukrainy oraz
przedstawiciele mniejszości ukraińskiej w Polsce»

dr Andrzej Zapałowski

„Nasz Dziennik” 30 maja 2015 r.




HRUSZOWICE

Inscriptions referring to the war in Donbas on the monument; probably made in 2014.



<http://novorossia.today/banderyzmowi-w-polsce-zdecydowane-nie/>

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hQax-w_u8zo&feature=youtu.be



HRUSZOWICE

May 2015

After the plaques had been removed by persons unknown, the monument in Hruszowice was demolished on the initiative of the National Party, in collaboration with Polish nationalist circles from Przemyśl and other regions of the country.






MONASTERZ
Gmina: Horyniec Zdrój
Powiat: Lubaczów
Voivodeship: Subcarpathian

The UPA soldiers grave on Monasterz Hill, erected by the Council for the Protection of Struggle and Martyrdom Sites.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lc8CBa5OIYc>



MONASTERZ

June 2015





MONASTERZ



BIAŁYSTOK
Gmina: Dołhobyczów
Poviat: Hrubieszów
Voivodeship: Lublin

Mass grave of UPA partisans
who died fighting the NKVD.

BIAŁYSTOK

August 2014





WIERZBICA
Gmina: Lubycza Królewska
Powiat: Tomaszów Lubelski
Voivodeship: Lublin

Symbolic grave of village inhabitants who died during WWII and its aftermath in the former Greek Catholic cemetery.

WIERZBICA

June 2015






WIERZBICA

June 2015

The monument has been vandalized in stages. First, insulting inscriptions appeared, along with the symbol of Fighting Poland. Then it was partly destroyed. The photo below shows the current state after being totally destroyed.




https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_aIVT-8MLFA



RADRUŻ
Gmina: Horyniec Zdrój
Powiat: Lubaczów
Voivodeship: Subcarpathian

The grave of the UPA partisans
in the former Greek Catholic
cemetery.

State before destruction.




RADRUŽ

June 2015



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lc8CBa5OIYc>



RADRUŽ

Changes made by persons unknown. The Polish national emblem has replaced the Tryzub. The original plaque, with the names of the buried was broken, and a new one with a provocative inscription added.





RADRUŻ

Current state



/inscriptions on the gravestones:/

In memory of Poles brutally murdered by the fucking spawn of Bandera. We remember.

MOŁODYCZ

April 2014



MOŁODYCZ

March 2016





MOŁODYCZ

Current state





PRZEMYŚL
Voivodeship: Subcarpathian
Ul. Pikulicka
Ukrainian Military Cemetery

Two mass graves, established in 2000 by for the Protection of Struggle and Martyrdom Sites, desecrated.

State up until May 2016



PRZEMYŚL

May 15, 2016

Plaques affixed by persons unknown




/inscriptions on the gravestones:/

Here lie the remains of Banderite bandits, cruel butchers and torturers of innocent Polish women and children. We remember.



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5cDuXL_D2bQ



WERCHRATA
Gmina: Horyniec
Powiat: Lubaczów
Voivodeship: Subcarpathian

The gravestone in the former Greek Catholic cemetery, situated in the center of the village, was destroyed with the use of construction equipment. The perpetrators, as in the other cases mentioned here, have not been identified.


State up until October 2016







<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZishvGTfIU0>





Vandalism of Ukrainian graves and monuments has frequently been lauded and promoted by people associated with Polish nationalist organizations, including OWP activists and Seweryn Bosek from Norway.


Even though the destruction of Ukrainian graves and monuments have borne the signature of the OWP – an organization whose members boast of having taken part in paramilitary camps organized in Russia – these incidents have been investigated separately by the Poviát Police. They have not been connected at any stage of the separate investigations.



That the profanation of the graves and monuments has an organized and provocative nature is demonstrated by the same modus operandi of the perpetrators, viz. displaying Polish national symbols, recording the destruction, and then publishing it – primarily on the website of Donetsk separatists supported by Russia.



The war on monuments has been commented on constantly by pro-Russian groups and media.





The attacks and unlawful threats directed against Ukrainian minority leaders and migrants is a new phenomenon that has intensified in recent years.



BARTOSZYCE

Voivodeship: Warmian-Masurian

The Square outside the Eastern Orthodox Church — the cross “In memory of the Maidan victims” was desecrated.

February 2016





SZCZECIN

A banner signed by the ONR was hung on a fence near the Greek Catholic Church, the office of the Ukrainian Honorary Consulate, and the Ukrainian Cultural Center.



The banner displayed in Szczecin.

BRACIA UKRAIŃCY!

Ukraina w granicach Polski to:
BEZPIECZEŃSTWO oparte o opiekę silnej i gotowej na wszystko, doświadczonej polskiej armii
DOBROBYT i godne warunki życia w jednej z najlepiej rozwijających się gospodarek starego kontynentu
KULTURA o tysiącletniej historii, która pozwoli wam stać się częścią prawdziwego, cywilizowanego, nowoczesnego narodu
POKÓJ z Noworosją, którą ukraiński rząd bezmyślnie sprowokował do wojny, skazując obywateli na biedę i poniewierkę



TAK dla przyłączenia
Ukrainy do Polski!

Leaflets distributed in GDAŃSK



GDAŃSK


Orthodox church
of St. Bartholomew

November 2015




Poles favorably disposed towards Ukraine and Ukrainians, and people who have uncovered Russian influence in Poland, e.g. Marcin Rey, are also being attacked with increasing frequency as part of the information war.

Incidents in countries far from Ukraine and Poland (here, the referendum in Catalonia) have also been used as part of a campaign to create a pervasive atmosphere of feeling threatened by Ukraine.



The attack on the procession in Przemyśl on Jun. 26, 2016 was preceded by an information campaign waged not only by anti-Ukrainian activists from Subcarpathia, but also by historians and feature writers from other Polish towns and cities.




PRZEMYŚL

Jun. 26, 2016

The religious procession to the cemetery in Pikulice was attacked by young nationalists and hooligans.



The incident continued to be used to reinforce negative attitudes towards Ukrainians after the attack; video materials and posts with suitably “molded” messages have been published on social media.



The attack on the front of the procession, when two participants were assaulted and battered, and a religious banner desecrated.



The Przemyśl MW taking part in activities directed against the religious procession on Jun. 26, 2016.




The topic of Volhynia and anti-Ukrainian propaganda have become an element of various information campaigns.



Using images that depict Ukrainians as cruel (in e.g. pieces of music, “advertising” products, videos) is a constant anti-Ukrainian element. The motif of a crucified child does not only appear in the propaganda of Polish nationalist circles; it was also used during the fighting in Donetsk (after Sloviansk had been liberated by the Ukrainian army).






Polish football clubs have also been promoting the borderlands narrative. They have been actively involved in anti-Ukrainian campaigns, and not just in Poland, e.g. Legia Warszawa football club supporters organized provocations before the match in Kiev in August 2015.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-6ZSIQZh-nY>







The collaboration between nationalist groups and central and local government institutions is especially appalling. The most scandalous behavior (e.g. anti-Ukrainian shouts, and other forms of aggression) does nothing to discourage institutions of public trust from collaborating with groups that tolerate, and sometimes even promote, hatred towards their fellow citizens.



During the March of the Przemyśl and Lviv Eaglets [the young defenders of Polish Lviv in 1918–1920] on Dec. 10, 2016, the banner of the OWP — an organization that “lent its name” to the desecration of Ukrainian graves and monuments in Poland — was unfurled.

The provocations in the Ukrainian-Polish border regions has frequently been a topic of interest to the Russian media and the Donetsk separatists, e.g. the "People's Governor" of Donetsk, Pavel Gubarev, has spoken about the destruction of the monument in Hruszowice.





Temat: prośba o spotkanie z Panem Ministrem M. Błaszczakiem

Nadawca: Sekretariat_ZUwP <sekretariat@ukraina.com.pl>

Data: 2016-05-27 14:04

Adresat: sekretariat.mswia@MSWIA.GOV.PL

Szanowni Państwo,

w związku z sytuacją w woj. podkarpackim, prowokacjami wymierzonymi zarówno w mniejszość ukraińską, jak i w Państwo Polskie (niszczeniem mogił i upamiętnień, gróźb wobec organizacji obywateli Polski narodowości ukraińskiej) oraz brakiem pozytywnych rezultatów działań w tym względzie ze strony Policji i Prokuratury zwracamy się z uprzejmą prośbą o spotkanie z Ministrem Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji Panem Mariuszem Błaszczakiem.

Z naszej strony w spotkaniu brali by udział: Prezes Związku Piotr Tyma oraz Mirosław Kupicz, Sekretarza Zarządu Głównego.

W załączeniu pozwalamy sobie przekazać notatkę obrazującą częściową skalę zagadnienia (w międzyczasie doszło do kolejnego zdarzenia na Cmentarzu Wojennym w Pikulicach k. Przemyśla oraz do pojawienia się nowych zagrożeń).

Z wyrazami szacunku

Mirosław Kupicz

--

Mirosław Kupicz
Sekretarz Zarządu Głównego
Związku Ukraińców w Polsce
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sekretariat@ukraina.com.pl

The letter from the ZUwP to the Ministry of the Interior and Administration requesting a meeting with Minister Mariusz Błaszczak.

**INFORMATION MEMO ON THE DESECRATED
AND VANDALIZED UKRAINIAN GRAVES AND
COMMEMORATION SITES IN POLAND**

Organized and coordinated provocations against the Ukrainian minority in Poland and Polish-Ukrainian relations were carried out in south-eastern Poland in 2014–2016. These consisted in desecrating and vandalizing commemoration sites associated with WWII and the post-war Polish-Ukrainian conflict. The purpose of these provocations was to cause tension in Polish-Ukrainian relations. They have become a weapon in the information war against Ukraine. Such acts of destruction have escalated over the past two years, i.e. since Russia annexed Crimea. These acts of vandalism have been publicized by the Russian media (probably thanks to pro-Russian groups in Poland). The long-term goal of these actions is to trigger conflict in the Polish-Ukrainian border region (for historical reasons), torpedo initiatives aimed at improving relations between our two nations, and preempt any agreement on the ground rules for establishing monuments and commemoration sites in places associated with tragic events.

Vandalism and/or desecration has taken place in the following locations:

☞ Białystok near Liski (Ukr. Білостік); Gmina: Dołhobyczów; Voivodeship: Lublin.

On Feb. 26, 1944, there was a battle between the UPA and the NKVD near the village of Liski. Forty one UPA fighters were killed and were buried in a ravine known as Białystok. A mound was built and a cross erected on it. The commemoration site was destroyed after the displacement of the Ukrainian population under Operation Vistula. On Jun. 14, 1990, the former inhabitants of Liski tidied up the mound and set two birch

crosses there. In 1992, the site was tidied up again, and the birch crosses were replaced with a single metal cross. In 1994, a high mound was built, and a tall cross with the following two inscriptions was erected: “Sława herojam wpawszym za wolu i niezależnist Ukrainy” [In memory of the heroes who died for the freedom and independence of Ukraine]; and “Tut spoczywajut wojiny UPA, jaki zahynuly w boju z NKWD. Wiczna jim pamiat” [Here lie the soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army who died fighting the NKVD. For their eternal remembrance]. At the foot of the cross, a plaque was mounted with the names and pseudonyms of those killed in action. In front of the mound an arched gate was mounted with the inscription: “Sława herojam” [In memory of the heroes]. That is how the site appears today. The was renovated after being deliberately destroyed by persons unknown in 1999. It was destroyed again in 2003, and most recently in 2014.

☞ Hruszowice (Ukr. Hruszowyczi); Gmina: Stubno; Voivodeship: Subcarpathian.

On Oct. 10, 1994, on the initiative of the Ukrainian Club of Stalinist Political Prisoners (now the “Ukrainian Club of Political Prisoners and Oppressed People”) a site to commemorate the memory of the “UPA Heroes of Zakerzonie” was established in the Hruszowice cemetery (still in use), where 22 UPA soldiers had been buried. The site consists of a high gate crowned with a Tryzub. A plaque at the foot of the gate bears the inscription (in Ukrainian): “Herojam UPA sława — Borciam za wolu Ukrainy” [In memory of the heroes of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army — fighters for the freedom of Ukraine], and the names of four UPA *kurens* are listed. A crypt under the plaque contains soil from the burial sites of the UPA partisans. The site raised objections from Polish veterans and “patriotic”

groups, mainly from Przemyśl, as they saw it as glorifying the UPA. In January 1995, these organizations lodged a complaint against one Dymitr Bugusz to the relevant law enforcement agencies for allegedly infringing the law applicable to establishing UPA commemoration sites. On Nov. 20, 1995, the Przemyśl Regional Prosecutor's Office discontinued its investigation into establishing UPA commemoration sites in Hruszowice, Kalników, Werchrata, Stary Lubliniec, and Nowy Lubliniec. The site was first damaged on the night of Mar. 25-26, 1995. The monument was renovated by the Ukrainian Club of Stalinist Political Prisoners. In 1999, a protocol was signed between the Council for the Protection of Struggle and Martyrdom Sites and the Ukrainian Inter-Ministry Committee for Commemoration Sites, according to which the parties agreed to leave the monument in Hruszowice in its then current form. The Council for the Protection of Struggle and Martyrdom Sites was provided with documents confirming the burial of UPA partisans at the site. However, the agreement did not prevent further acts of vandalism over the following years, and to "add fuel to the fire" there have been calls from politicians and public administration officials to have the site dismantled. These incidents escalated, especially in 2013. The commemoration site was most severely damaged as a result of an organized campaign to destroy Ukrainian commemoration sites in 2014-2015.

☞ Monasterz (Ukr. Monastyr); Gmina: Horyniec; Voivodeship: Subcarpathian.

In 1993, the Ukrainian Club of Stalinist Political Prisoners decided to renovate the grave on Monasterz hill near Werchrata, where 62 UPA partisans had been killed fighting the NKVD on Mar. 2, 1945, and where civilians who died during the pacification of the village were buried.

On Jan. 24, 1994, Dymitr Bogusz applied to the Voivodeship Conservator of Monuments in Przemyśl for permission to renovate the burial site and erect a monument on behalf of the Organization. Six months elapsed without any response. Bogusz took this to be permission to begin construction, which he commenced in early August 1994. It was then that the local authorities took an interest in the case. The Lubaczów Regional Office ordered him to stop the works and dismantle the uncompleted commemoration site. Bogusz was also issued a fine of 400.00 PLN. Then, on Dec. 27, 1995, the Przemyśl Regional Prosecutor filed an indictment against Bogusz in the Lubaczów District Court. The Court ruled that the case was closed, as the accused had been issued a pecuniary fine, and no appeals were pending. However, Bogusz was further penalized with a fine of 1500.00 PLN for not dismantling the monument as ordered by the Przemyśl Voivode. On Mar. 6, 1998, the Joint Committee of the ZUwP and the Council for the Protection of Struggle and Martyrdom Sites agreed that a new gravestone would be made for the grave in Monasterz, and the new wording of the inscription would read "Died for a free Ukraine. Here lie those who died fighting the NKVD in the forests of Monasterz on the night of March 2-3, 1945 (names). To passers-by: if you stand on this land, remember to pray for them". Having obtained the appropriate permits, the Council for the Protection of Struggle and Martyrdom Sites ordered the dismantling of the uncompleted monument, and a new commemoration site was established in lieu, financed from the Council's budget. The monument was vandalized in mid-2015.

☞ Wierzbica (Ukr. Werbycia); Gmina: Lubycza Królewska; Voivodeship: Lublin.

The first commemoration site was established as early as 1990. The former

inhabitants of this now abandoned village fenced the old cemetery and erected a concrete cross with the inscription (in Ukrainian): “1947. The Tragic extermination of the village of Wierzbica. O our land, we have loved you so much and we will love you. Eternal fame and remembrance to the heroes of this land. 1990. Children and grandchildren”. Two years later, the gravestones of the soldiers of the Ukrainian Galicia Army and the UPA were renovated. Metal crosses were erected, and a commemorative plaque was mounted with the inscription (in Ukrainian): “UPA soldiers. They gave their lives for the freedom of Ukraine. They deserve eternal remembrance”. On Aug. 29, 1993, a cruciform monument on a concrete foundation with a commemorative plaque was unveiled. The inscription read: “This monument is dedicated to the inhabitants of the village of Wierzbica, who lived, fought and died in 1940–1950”. In 1995, a more imposing monument was erected in its place. The inscription at the base read: “In the village of Wierzbica, in the struggle for the freedom of Ukraine, over 100 people from various units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army died. They deserve eternal remembrance.” The names of the fallen were listed underneath. The monument was desecrated in 2015, and completely destroyed a while later.

☞ Radruż (Ukr. Radruż); Gmina: Horyniec Zdrój; Voivodeship: Subcarpathian.

A gravestone cross, similar to those on the graves of Ukrainian Galicia Army soldiers, was placed on the mass burial site of six UPA partisans by former inhabitants, currently Ukrainian citizens, probably in 2007. At the foot of the cross, a new plaque was mounted with the inscription (in Ukrainian): “Tut spoczywajut wojiny Ukrajinskoji Powstanskoji Armiji polehli w borotbi za wilnu Ukrainu. Radruż

1946.” [Here lie Ukrainian Insurgent Army soldiers, who died in the struggle for a free Ukraine. Radruż 1946] along with the names of those buried there. Two people came forward and confirmed the burial of the UPA partisans in this place in 2016. The gravestone was vandalized and desecrated in 2015.

☞ Mołodycz (Ukr. Mołodycz); Gmina: Wiązownica; Voivodeship: Subcarpathian.

A monument commemorating the UPA partisans and Ukrainian civilians (i.e. villagers) killed in 1944–1947 was unveiled in the former Greek Catholic cemetery on Jul. 13, 2002. The monument had been erected through the efforts of the Citizens’ Committee for the Restoration of the Mołodycz Cemetery, founded by the inhabitants of the village. The monument resembled a stylized Tryzub. It consisted of two combined plaques of black granite with arched carvings, and a cross placed inside. The left plaque bears the following inscription (in Ukrainian): “Wojakam UPA poľehłym w 1945–1947” [In memory of the UPA soldiers who fell in 1945–1947], along with a Polish translation and the names of the 23 people buried there. The right plaque bears the inscription (in Ukrainian): “Mołodycьkym parafijanam szczo trahiczno zahynuły w 1945–1947.” [In memory of the Mołodycz parish members who died tragically in 1945–1947], along with a Polish translation and the names of 37 people. The monument was vandalized in 2015 and 2016.

Warsaw, April 25, 2016

Compiled on the basis of: R. Drozd, *Ukraińcy w Polsce wobec swojej przeszłości (1947–2005)* [The Ukrainians in Poland in the Face of Their Past], Słupsk-Warszawa 2013; B. Huk, M. Kozak, M. Nowosad, A. Jaremko, *Czużyncze, idy skaży Ukrajini*, Peremyszl 2001; “Nasze Słowo”, Dec. 14, 2003; and online publications in the case of Radruż.

Przeczytano: prośba o spotkanie z Panem Ministrem M. Błaszczakiem

Temat: Przeczytano: prośba o spotkanie z Panem Ministrem M. Błaszczakiem

Nadawca: Sekretariat MSWIA <Sekretariat.MSWIA@mswia.gov.pl>

Data: 2016-05-30 06:35

Adresat: Sekretariat_ZUwP <sekretariat@ukraina.com.pl>

Twoja wiadomość

Do: Sekretariat MSWIA

Temat: prośba o spotkanie z Panem Ministrem M. Błaszczakiem

Wysłano: 27 maja 2016 14:04:11 (UTC+01:00) Sarajewo, Skopie, Warszawa, Zagrzeb

została przeczytana o godzinie 30 maja 2016 06:35:45 (UTC+01:00) Sarajewo, Skopie, Warszawa, Zagrzeb.

Final-recipient: RPC822; Sekretariat.MSWIA@mswia.gov.pl

Disposition: automatic-action/MDN-sent-automatically; displayed

X-MSEch-Correlation-Key: Wej/hhA9/E+/8xjcdwn0tQ==

Original-Message-ID: <81c2af22-afid-42d6-ccd7-e924e1c375a5@ukraina.com.pl>

X-Display-Name: Sekretariat MSWIA

Confirmation of receipt of the above-mentioned letter. The Association has not received any official response to its request for a meeting with Minister Mariusz Błaszczak.

PIOTR FEDUSIO, ATTORNEY AT LAW
Legal Action

Legal Practice, Gdynia

The author has previously worked with the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights on their Precedential Cases Program, Media Freedom Observatory programs and Hate Crimes Clinic.

Pursuant to the project guidelines, and given the purview of the ZUwP (Association of the Ukrainians in Poland), hate crimes targeting the Ukrainian minority in Poland, and Ukrainian citizens residing or travelling in Poland, have been the subject of legal action. Prosecutions and lawsuits have been launched on behalf of both individuals and the community.

HATE CRIMES

Hate crimes, i.e. crimes motivated by prejudice or hatred, can be defined as crimes committed against a person or group on account of their national, ethnic, national, political, or religious (or irreligious) affiliation(s), irrespective of how the offense is categorized legally.¹ Hate crimes are crimes committed because of (i.e. their reason, cause, motive, grounds, or background is due to) the national, ethnic, racial, political, religious (or irreligious) affiliation(s) of the wronged person or group. These acts can vary in intent, e.g. the perpetrator may

wish to intimidate. It is the motive or reason, e.g. national affiliation, that is material.

The group of offenses that falls under the rubric of “hate speech” is severable from the generic term “hate crime”. By “hate speech” is meant language intended to insult or defame, or to arouse, propagate, incite or justify hatred towards a person or group on account of such traits as nationality (chauvinism) or race (racism).² This is an offense under Arts. 256-257 of the Criminal Code (CC).

CATEGORIES OF HATE CRIME

Hate crimes can be divided into two groups:

1) crimes explicitly designated as such by the provisions of the CC on account of the national affiliation of the wronged group being the reason, motive and/or background for the perpetrator’s conduct; the provisions explicitly refer to the reason, motive and/or background for the perpetrator’s actions. These are crimes that involve:

¹ *Mowa nienawiści a wolność słowa. Aspekty prawne i społeczne*, [Hate Speech and Freedom of Speech: Legal and Social Aspects] R. Wieruszewski, M. Wyrzykowski, A. Bodnar, A. Gliszczyńska-Grabias [eds.], Warsaw 2010, p. 81; The Prosecutor General’s Guidelines on Conducting Hate Crime Proceedings (Feb. 26, 2014), PG VII G 021/54/13.

² *Mowa nienawiści...* [Hate Speech], *op. cit.*, pp. 13, 94.

a) using violence or making unlawful threats towards a person or group of people because of their national affiliation.

CC, Art. 119

§ 1. Anyone found guilty of using violence or making unlawful threats against a person or group of people because of their national, ethnic, racial, political and/or religious (including irreligious) affiliation(s) shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of 3 months to 5 years.

b) publicly inciting the commission of a crime within the meaning of the CC (Art. 119 § 1) and/or publicly commending the commission of such a crime.

CC, Art. 126a

Anyone who publicly incites the commission of any act defined in Arts. 118, 118a, 119 § 1 or 120-125, and/or who publicly applauds the commission of same, shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of 3 months to 5 years.

c) publicly inciting hatred because of national differences.

CC, Art. 256

§ 1. Anyone who publicly promotes a fascist or other totalitarian form of government, or who incites hatred on national, ethnic, racial, religious (or irreligious) grounds shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of up to two years.

§ 2.¹⁾ Anyone who produces, preserves, imports, purchases, stores, possesses, presents, transports, sends or transmits any printed matter, recording or other item containing material of the kind(s)

specified in § 1 with the intent of having it disseminated...

c) publicly defaming a person or group of people because of their national affiliation.

CC, Art. 257

Anyone who publicly defames a person or group of people because of their national, ethnic, racial and/or religious (or irreligious) affiliation, or for the same reason(s) violates the physical integrity of another person, shall be liability to a term of imprisonment up to 3 years.

2) any other crime for which the provisions of the CC do not explicitly mention the reason, motive or background of the perpetrator's conduct, but where the perpetrator is nevertheless driven by animus towards the national affiliation of the person or group of people harmed by it (e.g. the destruction of the property of a person of Ukrainian origin). This reason or motive will be an aggravating circumstance when sentencing. The following serve as examples:

a) malicious interference with the public performance of a religious ceremony.

CC, Art. 195

§ 1. Anyone who maliciously interferes with the public performance of a religious ceremony of the Catholic Church, or any other religious organization with clear legal status, shall be liable to a fine, a community sentence, or a term of imprisonment of up to 2 years.

b) offending religious feelings.

CC, 196

Anyone who offends the religious feelings of others, or publicly insults an object of religious worship or a place designated for religious celebration(s), shall be liable to a fine, a community sentence, or a term of imprisonment of up to 2 years.

c) defamation

CC, Art. 212

§ 1. Anyone who defames another person, group of people, institution, legal person, or organizational entity not vested with legal personality, over behavior or attributes that may humiliate them in the eyes of the public or expose them to the risk of losing the trust and confidence commensurate to their position(s) or profession(s), and/or necessary to perform their functions, shall be liable to a community sentence.

§ 2. Anyone convicted of using the mass media in the commission of an offence specified in § 1 shall be liable to a fine, community sentence, or term of imprisonment of up to one year.

d) inciting and applauding crimes

CC, Art. 255

§ 1. Anyone who publicly incites the commission of a misdemeanor or fiscal offence shall be liable to a fine, a community sentence, or a term of imprisonment of up to 2 years.

§ 2. Anyone who incites the commission of a criminal offence shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of up to 3 years.

§ 3. Anyone who publicly applauds the commission of a crime shall be liable to a daily fine of 180 PLN, a community sentence, or a term of imprisonment of up to a year.

e) desecrating a monument

CC, Art. 261

Anyone who desecrates a monument or other public place set up to commemorate an historic event or honor a person shall be liable to a fine or a community sentence.

f) desecrating and pillaging the resting place of a deceased person

CC, Art. 262

§ 1. Anyone who desecrates human remains or ashes, or the resting place of a deceased person, shall be liable to a community sentence or a term of imprisonment of up to 2 years.

§ 2. Anyone who robs a corpse, grave or other resting place of a deceased person shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of 6 months to 8 years.

Ongoing criminal cases, and cases previously opened on the basis of allegations on the part of the ZUwP or others, have been included, as have new cases of crimes committed or uncovered during the realization of the project.

Having included these legal actions, the project involved: (i) analyses of fact situations; (ii) analyses of cases in progress; (iii) analyses of case files; (iv) legal consultations; (v) examinations of criminal complaints; (vi) examinations of complaints (regarding decisions); (vii)

examinations of other trial documents; (viii) involvement in court hearings; (ix) representation of aggrieved parties and accused persons in proceedings; (x) an analysis of the project to modify the IPN Act; (ix) examinations of applications for the Human Rights Ombudsman (HRO) to lodge cassation appeals in the Supreme Court (SC).

Territorial scope. The entire country was monitored. The cases were/are prosecuted by the police and the public prosecutor, and heard by courts in Warsaw, Przemyśl, Lubaczów, Kętrzyn, Kielce, Szczecin, Koszalin, Wrocław, Myślibórz, and Rzeszów.

Criminal complaints reported during the realization of the project mainly concerned such crimes as:

- using violence or making unlawful threats against another person or group of people because of their national affiliation (CC, Art. 119 § 1);

- publicly inciting the commission of a crime within the meaning of the CC, Art. 119 § 1 or publicly approving of the commission of same (CC, Art. 126a);

- interfering with the public performance of a religious ceremony (CC, Art. 195);

- publicly inciting hatred on the grounds of national differences (CC, Art. 256 § 1);

- publicly insulting another person or group of people because of their national affiliation (CC, Art. 257);

- desecrating a monument (CC, Art. 261);

- desecrating the resting place of a deceased person (CC, Art. 262).

The project contains 49 cases:

Criminal cases resulting in a conviction under the CC, Art. 256 § 1 – 1 (final judgment);

Criminal cases resulting in an acquittal under the CC, Art. 256 § 1 – 1 (judgment not final);

Criminal cases closed or inquiry/investigation not opened – 15, of which some are not final, being subject to complaint, and ongoing;

Criminal cases where the ZUwP was invited to appear as a social organization (CPC, Art. 90) – 2;³

Criminal cases where legal assistance has been granted to a member of the Ukrainian minority unjustifiably suspected of promoting a totalitarian form of government (CC, Art. 256) – 1 case dismissed (final);

Criminal defamation cases where legal assistance has been granted (CC, Art. 212):

- private indictments drawn up by injured parties (CC, Art. 212) – cases ongoing;

- defending the accused in defamation proceedings (CC, Art. 212) – 2 cases, both dismissed.

Although the project has been completed, a significant proportion of these cases are ongoing. They are being monitored, and determinations awaited from the appropriate bodies. Groundless decisions will be appealed if need be.

PUBLICLY INCITING HATRED ON THE GROUNDS OF NATIONAL DIFFERENCES (CC, ART. 256 § 1), AND PUBLICLY DEFAMING A PERSON OR GROUP OF PEOPLE BECAUSE OF THEIR NATIONAL AFFILIATION (CC, ART. 257)

A religious procession making its way towards the Pikulice and Przemyśl Ukrainian Military Cemetery in ul. Kasztanowa, Przemyśl was attacked by a group of men on June 26, 2016. The procession had been organized, as it is every year, by the Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches, and adherents of both Ukrainian faiths took part. The procession had both a religious and legal character. The physical integrity of a participant was violated, a shirt was torn, and shouts of “Get the fuck out of Poland”, “Bandits, murderers”, “You’ll get a club in your bandit snout”, “I’ll kill you”, and “I’ll fuck up that camera for you”, were leveled at the faithful taking part in the procession. One of the participants dropped a banner after being hit, and an object of religious worship was trampled during the attack. It got to the stage where police protection was required. The ZUwP filed a criminal complaint. Following an investigation, an indictment was filed against 10-20 people under the CC (Arts. 195, 257 and others). The trial was held in the Przemyśl Regional Court (II K 599/17). The ZUwP appeared as a social organization, and in support of people who had decided to appear as auxiliary prosecutors. Neither the police nor the public prosecutor had determined the instigators of the attack.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QpzXsXlanxk>

Shouts of “Death to Ukrainians”, “Fuck Ukraine, Russian whore”, and “Przemyśl-Lviv forever Poland” were raised during the March of the Eagles in Przemyśl on Dec. 10, 2016. The event took place outside the Ukrainian Folk House building (a Ukrainian cultural center) in ul. Kościuszko. Following an investigation, an indictment was filed against SR of Przemyśl, charging him with publicly inciting hatred on the grounds of racial differences with the shout of “Death to Ukrainians”, contrary to the CC (Art. 256 § 1). The case resulted in an acquittal. The verdict is not final (II K 31/17).

<http://prostir.pl/перемисьль-вигуки-смерть-українцям/> <http://przemysl.naszemiasto.pl/artykul/zdjecia/marsz-orlat-przemyskich-i-lwowskich-w-przemyslu-zdjecia,3947364,galo-p,23116934,t,id,tm,zid.html>

Someone with the username “Przemyślanin” wrote the following on the www.nowiny24.pl website: *“There’s a Ukrainian school in ul. Spółki, Przemyśl. Poles should throw cocktails in there to balance our good neighborly relations”*. The Przemyśl Regional Prosecutor declined to open an investigation as to whether the CC (Arts. 255 § 1 and 256 § 1) had been breached on account of the conduct not bearing the indicia of a crime (PR 2 Ds.402.2017). The Przemyśl Regional Court declined to hear the ZUwP’s complaint (II Kp 497/17). The ZUwP has applied to the HRO to lodge a cassation appeal (this is more broadly analyzed in a subsequent section of this Report).

A photograph of a T-shirt with the caption “DEATH TO BANDERITES” was offered for sale on the “Przemyskie Bractwo” [Przemyśl Brotherhood] Facebook page. The Przemyśl Regional Prosecutor declined to open an investigation

on account of the conduct not bearing the indicia of a crime (PR 4 Ds.143.2017). The Regional Court declined to hear the ZUwP's complaint. The ZUwP has applied to the HRO to lodge a cassation appeal.

https://www.facebook.com/PrzemyskieBractwo/posts/920704148030202?hc_location=ufi

<https://www.facebook.com/skleppb/?fref=ts>

An event titled "Gdańsk is going to Przemyśl, June 26, 2017" (the wrong date was indicated) was created on Facebook. The inscription read "DEATH TO THE ENEMIES OF THE FATHERLAND". The information regarding the event read in part: "... Przemyśl, June 26, when the Sons of Bander make their pilgrimage...". There is an annual religious procession organized by the Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches in Przemyśl in June. The Warszawa-Praga Południe Regional Prosecutor in Warsaw declined to open an investigation on account of the conduct not bearing the indicia of a crime (PR 4 Ds.44.2017). The Warszawa-Praga Południe Regional Court dismissed a complaint from the ZUwP (III Kp 550/17). The ZUwP has applied to the HRO to lodge a cassation appeal.

https://mobile.facebook.com/event-s/237301760057479?context=%7B%22ref%22%3A%22%22%2C%22action_history%22%3A%22null%22%7D&aref=3

On the "Husaria Polska" [Polish Husars] Facebook page, under the inscription "The Przemyśl Banderites are holding their march on June 11 (Orthodox Memorial Service)...", several users posted: "*Instead of that water, it'd be better to use...*" (and here a drawing of handguns, knives, and bombs), "*Really beat the fuck out of the SS Banderites*", "*Lances for the battle, sabers in hand, pursue the Ukrainian, pursue, pursue!!!!*", "*Organize men, and*

after their cunts... whoreson Ukrainian dogs... motherfuckers...", "*Beat the nasty reptiles*", "*Fuck the sluts*", "*Fuck Ukrainians*", "*We'll smash them as we catch them*", "*Once with the sickle, once with the hammer, Ukrainian vermin*", "*Ukrainians are going to hang in spring instead of leaves*", and "*Better go to Przemyśl and beat the shit out of them*". The Warszawa-Praga Południe Regional Prosecutor closed the investigation, having failed to find the perpetrators (4 Ds.513.2017). The Public Prosecutor reopened the proceedings on the basis of the CC (Art. 327 § 3) following a complaint from the ZUwP.

THE T.K. CASE

T.K. referring to Ukrainians, posted the following on Facebook under the username "A... K...": "*they're animals, not people*", "*the massacres of Polish people that this rabble organized*", "*ukranians (we're talking about parasites here, not people) are not a nation, this vermin came out of bandits and degenerates... out of traitors*", "*A Russky is a better neighbor than a Ukrainian*", "*an outlaw (Ukrainian) will always be a creep and stick a knife in your back*", "*riff-raff*", "*bandits*", "*created their own language, but they're so limited mentally*", "*I don't agree with the claim that Ukrainians are people*".

The ZUwP filed a criminal complaint under the CC (Arts. 256 § 1 and 257). On Sept. 12, 2016, the Kielce Regional Court (Div. II, Criminal) (Case Ref. No. II K 496/16) found the accused, T.K., guilty of publicly inciting hatred on the grounds of national differences and publicly defaming the Ukrainian people as a group, contrary to the CC (256 § 1 concurrently with Art. 257).

The Court was in no doubt that the above post referred to Ukrainian nationals.

The court held that the accused, in making statements like *“massacres of Polish people that this rabble organized”, “vermin came out of bandits and degenerates... out of traitors”, “A Russky is a better neighbor than a Ukrainian”, and “an outlaw (Ukrainian) will always be a creep and stick a knife in your back”*, kindled strong feelings of aversion, if not downright hostility, towards the Ukrainian people, and, in so doing, constituted an incitement to hatred on the grounds of national differences within the meaning of the CC (Art. 256 § 1).

The Court held that such comments as *“they’re animals, not people”, “rabble”, “vermin came out of bandits and degenerates... out of traitors”, “A Russky is a better neighbor than a Ukrainian”, “an outlaw (Ukrainian) will always be a creep and stick a knife in your back”, “riff-raff”, “mentally limited”, and “creep”*, were defamatory in that they expressed contempt.

The court considered the post a substantial public nuisance on the grounds that the accused, by his conduct, had come to terms with the fundamental legal benefits of peace, public order, and the dignity of a national group. The judgment is final.

A music clip entitled *“Nie wybaczę”* [I won’t forgive] by a singer with the “artistic” pseudonym of “S...” was posted on YouTube. The work included the following phrases: *“What Ukraine, it’s not even a country”, “Polish province, we should re-take it”, “fucking armies”, “smash the Band-erites, and if necessary, weed them out and drown them in blood”, “impale them”,*

“Lviv has always been Polish”, “kill off the wolf pack that attacks in winter”, “Take back what’s ours and the bandits will perish”, “For me, a Ukrainian is a monster in human skin”, “inhuman garbage”, “from father to son, they’ve got blood on their hands, hunt the motherfuckers down and may they die in agony”, “a good Ukrainian is a dead Ukrainian”. The ZUwP filed a criminal complaint (CC, Arts. 256 and 257). The investigation was closed, as the perpetrator(s) could not be identified. The investigation was reopened after the ZUwP lodged an application with the Prosecutor General, (CC, Art. 256). It was then closed:

— in the matter of publicly inciting hatred towards the Ukrainian people by publishing the musical work *“Nie wybaczę”* on YouTube, as it was not determined who shared the subject work on the Internet;

— in the matter of possessing and presenting the musical work *“Nie wybaczę”*, which includes content specified in the CC (Art. 256 § 1), as this comes under the aegis of artistic works;

— in the matter of writing and recording the work *“Nie wybacze”*, as this conduct was not of a public nature.

The decision is final.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ddH3vsP5_Zo&feature=youtu.be

There are several comments under this work inciting hatred on the grounds of national differences and defaming people of Ukrainian nationality. These are the subject of a separate complaint.

A Facebook page titled “Ukraińska V kolumna w Polsce” [Ukrainian 5th Column in Poland] was created. A fragment of the ZUwP logo, along with the caption “Związek Ukraińców w Polsce”, was placed next to the page name. The perpetrator thereby sought to show that Ukrainians and the ZUwP comprised a 5th column in Poland. The ZUwP filed a criminal complaint over inciting hatred towards Ukrainians (PR 4 Ds.1501.2017).

<https://www.facebook.com/Ukrai%C5%84ska-V-kolumna-w-Polsce-514729365331686/>

On Oct. 15, 2016, on “RaPP” [Radio Press Review], a program broadcast by the station Polskie Radio Koszalin, Wojciech Cejrowski, who co-hosts the program, claimed: “*Ukrainians are rapists and butchers*”, “*So to your question: All Ukrainians? I say all*”. The Szczecin Regional Prosecutor deemed that the conduct did not bear the indicia of a crime under the CC (Art. 257) and closed the investigation (PR Ds.1413.2017). The ZUwP has lodged a complaint.

<http://www.radio.koszalin.pl/pl/program-issue/rapp-radiowy-przeglad-prasy-rapp-radiowy-przeglad-prasy.11048.html>

Someone with the username “J... W...” posted a photo of Piotr Tyma (President of the ZUwP, and a Ukrainian) on Facebook. The caption “DEATH PENALTY! FOR THE BANDERITE!” was placed above and below the figure of Tyma. Next to the photo was written “*There is only the noose for incitement to murder / Banderite filth subsidized by the current residents of the RP*”. Underneath, someone with the username “S... K...”, referring to Piotr Tyma, wrote: “*... I don’t know what I’d do if I ever got my hands on that prick*”. The Warszawa-Praga Południe Regional Prosecutor closed the investigation (PR 4 Ds.28.2017). The

Warszawa-Praga Południe upheld an appeal from the ZUwP (III Kp 1115/17).

The following comment, addressed to Piotr Tyma, was posted on Facebook: “*You Ukrainian scum remember that there are over 200 well-trained boys in Poland who are already in Poland and some are about to come back from donbass. And then nobody’ll help the cattle from the upa*”. A photo of a masked person aiming a machine gun at a target was placed underneath. An investigation was opened (PR 4 Ds.1291.2017).

https://www.facebook.com/messages/requests/t/messengerniedostepny?notif_t=message_request¬if_id=1506103879305408

The following comments were placed under the Facebook profile of journalist Igor Isajew (ІГОР ІСАЄВ), who acknowledges being Ukrainian on his Facebook page: “*Ukrainian scum*”, “*... motherfucker*”, “*You fucking Banderite fuck...*”, “*Fuck off to Ukraine*”, “*Not long now, Ukrainian fuck*”, “*Just let me get my hands on you, you Ukrainian fuck, and you’ll get Maidan, you fucking mulch*”, “*... better for you if you went back home*”, “*Trash, you’ll end up like your dog pals in Maidan... mongrel*”, “*fucking UPA-ite descendant of Banderite murderers sadists murdering innocent women children old people and men*”, “*Die, you Ukrainian rubbish*”, “*STFU, you Russian dimwit*”. The case is being conducted by the Warszawa-Praga Północ Regional Prosecutor (Case Ref. No. PR 4 Ds.1206.2017).

The following comments were posted under an article entitled “They’ll prosecute hate speech for Soros’s money” on the www.kresy.pl website: “*The effrontery of the riff-raff in this country has reached its zenith*”, “*... they’re destroying Poland and trying to browbeat Poles at*

every step... savages...”, “Sly and cunning UPA scum saturated with the sick ten commandments of Ukrainian nationalists...”, “Sneaky Ukrainian Banderite cattle... nothing’s changed. They’re sneaky, inhuman and arrogant”, “And you Banderite fucks, the way you sound off about Poles and Russians you fucking scum / you allow yourselves too many scumbags”, “No true Pole would ever associate with fucking Banderites”, “Piss off to the Podlachian steppes, to your own Banderite kind, you Podlachian creep, nobody asked you to come to Poland, nobody’s forcing you to stay here, nobody promised you anything. I don’t want Banderite motherfuckers...”. The Warszawa-Praga Południe (Warsaw) Regional Prosecutor declined to bring criminal proceedings on account of the conduct not bearing the indicia of a crime (Case Ref. No. PR 4 Ds.162.2017). The Warszawa-Praga Południe Regional Court declined to hear the ZUwP’s complaint. The ZUwP has applied to the HRO to lodge a cassation appeal.

Someone with the username gotan@gotan, referring to Ukrainian nationals, posted the following on the www.kresy.pl website: *“By what right do these kinsmen of Bander live...”, “Driving that scum to their own in the east”, “The most disgusting criminals in the world”, “... so-called Ukrainian, is a savage without humanitarian inhibitions. The worse criminal dross!”, “The Warszawa-Praga Południe Regional Prosecutor closed the investigation as the perpetrator could not be identified (PR 4 Ds.471.2017). The Warszawa-Praga Południe Regional Court upheld an appeal from the ZUwP (III Kp 1355/17).*

Someone with the username “A...W...”, referring to Ukrainian nationals, posted the following under an article entitled “Ukrainians buying up apartments

in Kraków” on the “Polskie piekielko” [Polish Hellhole] Facebook page: *“Where do these Banderite scumbags get all that dough”*. Similarly, someone with the username “banderacwel”, likewise referring to Ukrainian nationals, posted the following under the same article on the www.kresy.pl website: *“Banderite filth should be swept out of our country, as a cockroach deserves more respect than a qrwyk UPA-ite”*. The ZUwP filed a criminal complaint. The case is ongoing.

“Na czasie UA” [UA Today] is a weekly TV information program in Ukrainian on Telewizja Superstacja. The following comments appeared under a broadcast uploaded on YouTube: *“... you broadcast 24h in Ukrainian and no one except that vermin watches you”, “The program should be called ‘Banderite News’”, “Vermin”, “UPA Today”, “Fuck the sluts off fucking after. What the fuck are they doing here!?!?!?!?... We’ll beat them in the cunt / why the fuck do they get that??? Fuck off back to where you belong / Fucking Romanians”*. The ZUwP filed a criminal complaint under the CC (Arts. 256 § 1 and 257).

A plate bearing the inscription *“Every Ukrainian citizen will be checked after leaving the checkout”* was displayed in the PPHU B... store in Barlinek. The ZUwP filed a criminal complaint and asked the HRO to intervene.

<https://finanse.wp.pl/skandaliczna-tabliczka-w-sklepie-w-barlinku-kazdy-obywatel-ukrainy-bedzie-poddany-kontroli-6171321000953473a>

The following were painted on the front of the building at ul. Mochneckiego 15 in Rzeszów, which houses the Honorary Ukrainian Consulate: *“RAUS”, “Ukraine=OUN UPA”, “Waffen SS”, and a symbol of a swastika being hanged. The*

perpetrator was identified, apprehended and charged, and the indictment has been filed in court.

During the “Patriot March” in Wrocław in October 2016, one J. M., during a speech, shouted: *“about the factory of lies run by the Ukrainian Jew Adam Michnik”* and the *“Banderites flooding Wrocław and Poland”*. The ZUwP filed a criminal complaint under the CC (Arts. 256 § 1 and 257).

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8xaIAeHQQMI>

<http://www.gazetawroclawska.pl/wiadomosci/a/marsz-patriotow-2016-we-wroclawiu-uczestnicy-precz-z-ue-zdjecia,11448620/>

THE CASE OF PUBLICLY PROMOTING A TOTALITARIAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT BY WEARING A T-SHIRT WITH A TRYZUB

The ZUwP granted legal assistance (defense) to a member of the Ukrainian minority unjustly suspected of promoting a totalitarian form of government and “promoting a symbol of hatred”, presumably by wearing a T-shirt with the Tryzub. The investigation was closed on the grounds that the Tryzub is the official Ukrainian coat-of-arms and not a symbol of hatred (Kętrzyn Regional Prosecutor, Case Ref. No. PR Ds.1061.2016).

DESTROYING AND DESECRATING MONUMENTS COMMEMORATING A PERSON/VICTIM OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALITY. DESECRATING BURIAL PLACES

In the towns of Hruszowice, Mołodycz, Pikulice, Wierzbica, and Radruż, in the south-east of Poland, monuments within and without cemeteries commemorating people and/or victims of Ukrainian nationality, as well as events that occurred during WWII and subsequent conflicts,

were desecrated and destroyed in 2014–2017. These events have been included in the project, as they had a nationalistic basis, viz. historical events caused by the Polish-Ukrainian conflict (at least in the ZUwP’s assessment), negatively affected Polish-Ukrainian relations, and unleashed a wave of hate speech.

May 2014 – a monument in the Mołodycz (Voi. Jarosław) cemetery was smeared with paint. The investigation was closed after failing to identify the perpetrator (Przemyśl Regional Prosecutor 4 Ds.318/2014).

August-November 2014 – The monument to the Ukrainian victims of communist repression in the Hruszowice (Gm. Studno, Pov. Przemyśl, Voi. Subcarpathian) communal cemetery was smeared in paint by a person or persons unknown. The Falanga emblem was painted on the monument, along with “Death to the butchers of Volhynia and Donbass” and “Fuck the UPA”. Photographs of human bodies, and other defamatory slogans and incitements to hatred on the grounds of national differences, were placed on pipes embedded in the ground around the monument. The investigation was closed (Przemyśl Regional Prosecutor, 4 Ds.502/14):

— in the matter of incitement to hatred on the grounds of national differences (CC, Art. 256 § 1), as the perpetrator(s) could not be identified;

— in the matter of desecrating a monument (smearing with paint, writing) (CC, Art. 261), because it did not bear the indicia of a crime, as the “object” was held not to constitute a monument within the legal meaning of the term, having been erected illegally and “without

a submission from the Council for the Protection of Struggle and Martyrdom Sites”.

— in the matter of desecrating a burial place (CC, Art. 262 § 1), because it did not bear the indicia of a crime, as the “object” was held not to be a burial monument or a tomb. Hence, the question of desecrating a resting place of the deceased did not arise.

The ZUwP applied to have investigation reopened in 2016 and 2017, having provided the police with a film/recording of the scenes of the events, which were publicly available on the Internet, along with email correspondence, that Ukrainian hackers from the “CyberHunta” and “Ukrainian CyberAlliance” groups captured and uploaded to:

<https://informnapalm.org/pl/kreml-finansuje-pol-skich-radykalow-zadania-wypłaty-raport-moskwy/>

— The monument in the Hruszowice cemetery was demolished in April 2017 at the request of the Stubno Gmina Vogt. The pieces were used as building material for a road.

<https://www.portalprzemyski.pl/nielegalny-pomnik-upa-w-powiecie-przemyskim-rozebrany-po-23-latach-pierwsza-taka-akcja-w-polsce-galeria-zdjec/>

<http://natemat.pl/223393,resztek-honoru-zesmysie-pozbyli-to-serwilizm-tak-konflikt-miedzynarodowy-widziany-jest-na-podkarpackiej-wsi>

This case is the subject of further legal analysis.

February-March 2015 – The rallying cry “Death to the UPA” and the Fighting Poland (PW) monogram were painted in red on a monument commemorating fallen UPA soldiers in the Wierzbica (Voi. Tomaszów) municipal cemetery by a person

or persons unknown. The monument was also damaged. The investigation conducted by the Hrubieszów Regional Prosecutor was closed on account of the conduct not bearing the indicia of a crime:

— in the matter of the CC (Arts. 256 § 1 and 257), it was held that painting “Death to the UPA” in red did not constitute either incitement to hatred on the grounds of national differences or defamation of a group by reason of its national affiliation, “this conduct was simply and solely [...] directed against the glorification of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, an anti-Polish organization...”.

— in the matter of the CC (Art. 261) it was held that the monument was not a monument within the meaning of the CC (Art. 261), as it had been erected without “the permits, decisions, agreements and submissions required by the regulations”. Moreover, it was not on a burial site.

June 2015 – a Ukrainian monument in the Radruż (Pov. Lubaczów, Voi. Subcarpathian) municipal cemetery was damaged. The memorial plate was smashed, and another plate bearing the inscription “Motherfucking Filth” was mounted. The ZUwP argued that it was a burial site. The request to open an investigation under the CC (Art. 261) was denied (Lubaczów Regional Prosecutor, PR Ds.295.2016). The Lubaczów Regional Court dismissed a complaint from the ZUwP (II Kp 48/15).

In a separate criminal complaint, the ZUwP argued that the site of the monument was a resting place of the deceased (killed) and produced an affidavit from a witness confirming the fact as evidence. The request to open an investigation into

the desecration of a burial site was declined. The witness was therefore not examined (CC, Art. 262 § 1, Lubaczów Regional Prosecutor, PR PR Ds.295.2016). The Lubaczów Regional Court declined to hear the complaint from the ZUwP.

The ZUwP applied to the HRO to lodge a cassation appeal on the grounds that the substantive law had been breached in that CC, Art 261 had been misconstrued.

May 2016 – a burial site of Ukrainian Insurgent Army soldiers and people shot in Liszno in the Ukrainian Military Cemetery in Przemyśl was desecrated. The investigation was closed as the perpetrator could not be identified (Case Ref. No. PR 1 Ds.243.2016).

October 2016 – a monument in the Werchrata (Voi. Subcarpathian) municipal cemetery was damaged by hacking off the memorial plate bearing the names of fallen Ukrainians. A film showing the monument being destroyed was published online.

<https://pl.sputniknews.com/polska/201610104035819-Polska-pomnik-UPA-zniszczenie/>

The ZUwP filed a criminal complaint of public incitement to hatred on the grounds of national differences (CC, Art. 256 § 1).

 The media reported:

The radical nationalist group, Camp of Great Poland, has claimed **RESPONSIBILITY FOR AN ACT OF VANDALISM** and has published a video of the monument being vandalized.

<http://wschodnik.pl/polska/item/8184-na-poludniu-polski-znow-zniszczono-ukrainski-pomnik.html>

“Sputniknews” likewise named the Camp of Great Poland as the perpetrators:



MEMBERS OF THE FAR-RIGHT Camp of Great Poland party have destroyed a Ukrainian Insurgent Army (the OUN-UPA is banned in Russia) monument in the village of Werchrata in eastern Poland, the Kresy portal has reported today.

<https://pl.sputniknews.com/polska/201610104035819-Polska-pomnik-UPA-zniszczenie/>

The kresy.pl portal reported:



THE CGP HAS PUT A FILM ON THE INTERNET bearing its logo in which two men can be seen cutting up and dismantling a monument to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the village of Werchrata.

<http://www.kresy.pl/wydarzenia,spoleczenstwo?zobacz/polska-zniszczono-kolejny-pomnik-upa-video>

The case is currently with the Przemyśl Regional Prosecutor (PR 4 Ds.567.2017).

Assistance has been granted in criminal defamation cases (CC, Art. 212) as part of the project. Legal assistance has been granted to the aggrieved party in two cases. It was held that the statements had the nature of hate speech directed at the Ukrainian minority in Poland, ZUwP members, and the ZUwP itself. Assistance was granted to the accused in two cases, where the indictment was, according to the ZUwP, against people standing up to defend the rights of national minorities and acting on behalf of reconciliation and Polish-Ukrainian dialogue. For this reason, it was decided to offer them legal support.

An article entitled “Well-known Polish Ukrainian studies scholar denied entry to Ukraine! He found himself on the SBU blacklist”, posted on the www.prawy.pl website on Sept. 9, 2017, contained the following statement attributed to Czesław Partacz (Dr. Hab. Prof. Ord. Koszalin Institute of Technology): “*And evidently, one of the members of the Association*

of the Ukrainians in Poland simply packed me off, as they fulfill the role of spies in Poland [...] They packed me off to their security services...". This statement was made after Prof. Partacz was denied entry to Ukraine. The matter is the subject of ongoing legal action.

Karol Kaźmierczak leveled the following accusation at Piotr Tyma (ZUwP President) in an article entitled "Leader of the Association of the Ukrainians in Poland threatens another Volhynia" posted on the www.kresy.pl website on April 4, 2017: *"The leader of the Associations of the Ukrainians in Poland has threatened another Volhynia"*. The matter is the subject of ongoing legal action.

Fr. Tadeusz Zaleski brought a private prosecution against Dr. Kazimierz Wóycicki (an opposition activist during the communist period), alleging that he had been defamed by comments made by Dr. Wóycicki during a radio broadcast entitled "Has the world forgotten about Ukraine?" on the Puls Trójki program (on Polish Radio III) on Jan. 25, 2016. Dr. Wóycicki used the phrase "agents of influence" during the broadcast. The Warszawa-Śródmieście Regional Court (in Warsaw) dismissed the proceedings (II K 558/16).

APPLICATIONS TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN FROM THE ZUWP TO LODGE CASSATION APPEALS IN CRIMINAL CASES

Applications to the HRO to lodge cassation appeals in criminal cases where the judgments are final, where investigations have been refused, and where courts have dismissed complaints against the decisions of the police or the prosecutor. The ZUwP is not entitled to cassation in such cases. Pursuant to the CPC (Art.

521 § 1), the HRO may lodge a cassation appeal against any final judgment of a Court of last instance. Applications for cassation have been lodged:

☞ in the case of someone with the username "Pzemyskie Bractwo" [Przemyśl Brotherhood] producing T-shirts with the caption "Death to Banderites" and offering them for sale on Facebook. The Warszawa-Praga Południe Regional Prosecutor (in Warsaw) declined to open an investigation (Case Ref. No. PR 4 Ds.143.2017). This decision was upheld by the Przemyśl Regional Court (Case Ref. No. II Kp 502/17). The ZUwP applied to the HRO to lodge a cassation appeal, and is waiting for the HRO to state its position on the matter.

☞ in the case of the following comments being posted under an article entitled "They'll prosecute hate speech for Soros's money" on the www.kresy.pl website: *"The effrontery of the riff-raff in this country has reached its zenith", "... they're destroying Poland and trying to browbeat Poles at every step... savages...", "Sly and cunning UPA scum saturated with the sick ten commandments of Ukrainian nationalists...", and "Sneaky Ukrainian Banderite cattle... nothing's changed. They're sneaky, inhuman and arrogant"*. The Warszawa-Praga Południe (Warsaw) Regional Prosecutor declined to bring criminal proceedings on account of the conduct not bearing the indicia of a crime (Case Ref. No. PR 4 Ds.162.2017). The Warszawa-Praga Południe Regional Court upheld this decision. The ZUwP applied to the HRO to lodge a cassation appeal, and is waiting for the HRO to state its position on the matter.

☞ in the case of the inscription "DEATH TO THE ENEMIES OF THE

FATHERLAND” being placed under a Facebook event entitled “Gdańsk is going to Przemyśło, June 26, 2017”, and the description that read in part: “Gdańsk will be ready and waiting for Przemyśl, June 26, when the Sons of Bander make their pilgrimage...”. The Warszawa-Pra-ga Południe Regional Prosecutor (in War-saw) declined to open an investigation (PR 4 Ds.44.2017), and the Warszawa-Pra-ga Południe Regional Court dismissed a complaint from the ZUwP (III Kp 550/17). The ZUwP applied to the HRO to lodge a cassation appeal, and is waiting for the HRO to state its position on the matter.

☞ in the case of destroying the mon-ument in Radruż, the Powiat Police Headquarters in Lubaczów declined to open an investigation (Case Ref. No. PR Ds.295.2016). The ZUwP lodged a complaint. This was dismissed by the Lubaczów Regional Court (Act. Ref. II Kp 97/16). The ZUwP applied to the HRO to lodge a cassation appeal, alleging that the substantive law had been breached, in that the CC (Art. 261) had been miscon-strued, as the view had been expressed that, to constitute a “monument” within the meaning of the CC (Art. 261), an ob-ject/artwork had to be erected legally, af-ter obtaining all the necessary permits, agreements and submissions, and that an object erected in contravention of the binding legal regulations did not qualify. The correct interpretation of the CC (Art. 261) should lead to the conclusion that a monument is any object erected to com-memorate or honor a person or event, whether erected after obtaining the nec-essary permits, agreements and submis-sions or not. The ZUwP is waiting for the RPO to state its position on the matter.

Someone with the username “Prze-myślanin” wrote the following on the

www.nowiny24.pl website: *“There’s a Ukrainian school in ul. Spółki, Przemyśl. Poles should throw cocktails in there to bal-ance our good neighborly relations”*. The Przemyśl Regional Prosecutor declined to open an investigation as to whether the CC (Arts. 255 § 1 and 256 § 1) had been breached on the grounds that *“it is diffi-cult to determine whether the writer was affecting the minds of others for the pleas-ure of arousing enmity towards Ukrain-ians in them. The subject post is in one sense a polemic – a debate in connection with a Polish school recently being burnt down in Ukraine”* (PR 2 Ds.402.2017). The Przemyśl Regional Court declined to hear a complaint from the ZUwP, arguing that the author *“Was expressing his wishes, expectations [...] The aforementioned post can be treated as a wish”*. The ZUwP ap-plied to the HRO to lodge a cassation ap-pel and is waiting for the HRO to state its position on the matter.

Application for the HRO to file an ap-plication in the SC under the HRO Act (Art. 16) for a resolution to have legal reg-ulations that were creating uncertainty clarified (CC, Art. 261).

The ZUwP requested that the HRO file an application in the SC pursuant to the HRO Act of Jul. 15, 2016 (Art. 16 Para. 2 Pt. 4) for a resolution to have legal reg-ulations that were creating uncertainty clarified, specifically, for a clarification as to whether the term “monument” as the subject matter of the conduct de-scribed in the CC (Art. 261), was to be con-strued as a monument erected legally, or whether the term “monument”, within the meaning of the Article, denoted any monument, regardless of whether it had been erected in accordance with the legal regulations.

Applications to the Polish Prime Minister and the HRO regarding a “list of people of non-Polish ethnicity” maintained by the Voivodeship Office in Szczecin.

On May 17, 2017, the Deputy Director of the Security and Crisis Management Department of the West Pomeranian Voivodeship Office in Szczecin wrote to the voivodeship vogts, mayors and presidents to send, *inter alia*:

— “*information on Polish citizens of other nationalities*;

— an indication of “*the number of such people registered in the gmina/city*”.

The letter cited the Crisis Management Act (Art. 14), which provides that the organizational unit responsible for crisis management in the voivodeship office is especially responsible for:

1) collecting, storing and processing information, and assessing any threats that appear in the voivodeship;

2) monitoring, analyzing and anticipating the build-up of any threats in the voivodeship.

The Act stipulates the organs responsible for crisis management, and sets out their tasks and operating principles in this area, as well as the rules for financing crisis management tasks (Art. 1). The Act explains that crisis management is an element of national security management, that it is under the charge of public administration bodies, and that it involves preventing crisis situations by being prepared to take control of them through scheduled activities, responding to crisis situations and eliminating their consequences, and replenishing vital

resources and rebuilding critical infrastructure (Art. 2).

The Act explains that by “crisis situation” is meant any situation that negatively affects the degree of safety and security of people, property (to a significant extent) or the environment, and which puts the responsible public administrative bodies under significant strain due to the inadequacy of their manpower and equipment (Art. 3 Pt. 1).

The letter from the Deputy Director of the Security and Crisis Management Department of the West Pomeranian Voivodeship Office in Szczecin alarmed the Ukrainian community, including the ZUwP. When read in conjunction with the Crisis Management Act (especially Arts. 1, 2, 3 and 14), it suggests that the presence of Polish citizens of other nationalities in the West Pomeranian Voivodeship is seen as a “threat”, as it is categorized as a “situation that negatively affects the level of safety and security in the voivodeship”.

APPLICATIONS

There has been an increase in speech directed against the Ukrainian minority and Ukrainian citizens living in Poland in recent times. The desecration and destruction of Ukrainian monuments (even in cemeteries), memorials, and other sites commemorating the Ukrainian presence in Poland (as in Radruż, Hruszowice and Wiezbica) has similarly been escalating. There have been cases of assault and violation of physical integrity by reason of the national affiliation of the victim(s), and more incidents of online “verbal aggression”.

Hate crimes have mostly been classified by the police, prosecutors and the courts as crimes that involve:

— violence or unlawful threats against a person or group of people because of their national affiliation (Ukrainian) (CC, Art. 119 § 1);

— publicly inciting hatred on the grounds of national differences (CC, Art. 256 § 1);

— publicly defaming a person or group of people because of their national affiliation (CC, Art. 257);

— desecrating a monument (CC, Art. 261);

— desecrating or robbing a resting place of the deceased (CC, Art. 262).

Hate crimes targeting members of Poland's Ukrainian minority, its representative organization (ZUwP) and/or the members and leaders thereof, a Ukrainian journalist, and Ukrainian citizens residing or traveling in Poland, examples being the "Ukrainian Fifth Column in Poland" case and the defamation of P. Tyma and I. Isajew.

Online posts inciting hatred towards Ukrainians or defaming Ukrainians by referring to history, the Polish-Ukrainian conflict, Volhynia, Operation Vistula; hatred dominated by historical issues.

The circumstances in which some of these criminal acts were committed indicates that they were not accidental, but coordinated, inspired, and organized (e.g. the destruction of the monument in Hruszowice). It is no coincidence that these events all occurred after the

Russian aggression towards Ukraine, Russia's annexation of Crimea, and the war in Donbass. The ZUwP intervened in this matter and the Internal Security Agency (ABW).

An appropriate and decisive response to hate speech on the part of state bodies (the courts, the police, public prosecutors, the ABW), which either perfunctorily close inquiries and investigations, or refuse to even open them, is sorely lacking. What is needed is a clear and decisive condemnation of this sort of conduct.

This attitude on the part of state bodies may be misinterpreted in the community, give the mistaken impression of there being acquiescence or even connivance in the face of behavior such as hate speech, be seen by perpetrators as a sign of weakness on the part of the responsible bodies, and may lead to an escalation of this kind of behavior.

THE INITIATIVE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND THEIR COMMITMENT TO TACKLING CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR

The crimes included in the project are/were prosecuted *ex officio*, even though the initiative of the ZUwP in filing a criminal complaint was a necessary prerequisite to having an inquiry or investigation opened.

In the case of a member of the Ukrainian minority being unjustifiably suspected of promoting a totalitarian regime and "promoting a symbol of hatred", which consisted in wearing a T-shirt with a Tryzub on it, law enforcement agencies exhibited a great deal of initiative and commitment – three officers searched his home for the T-shirt at 6:00 a.m.

By contrast, in the case of the musical work “Nie wybaczę”, the investigation was closed, as the perpetrator could not be identified, even though information about the composer and performer was publicly available online. The perpetrator was not discovered, despite there being an online interview with the composer and performer (who goes by the artistic pseudonym “S...”) at:

<http://wmeritum.pl/islamisci-w-polsce-trzeba-dzialac-zanim-bedzie-za-pozno-stopa-czestochowski-raper-wywiad/>,

complete with his photograph and an admission that he was the composer and performer of “Nie wybaczę”. Moreover, “S...” gave a concert, and the posters advertising it gave the date, address, and name of the club. The investigation was only reopened after the ZUwP lodged another application with the Prosecutor General. The case was closed on account of the conduct not bearing the indicia of a crime.

The case of damaging the monument in Hruszowice was similar. A film showing the scene was posted online, along with an email address for correspondence. This was captured by Ukrainian hackers from the groups “CyberHunta” and “Ukrainian CyberAlliance” and uploaded to:

<https://informnapalm.org/pl/kreml-finansuje-polskich-radykalow-zadania-wyplaty-raport-moskwy/>

Although the film and the email address could have led to the perpetrators, the people appearing in it were only questioned by law enforcement agencies after the film and email address were made available. The perpetrators, however, were not identified.

<https://informnapalm.org/pl/kreml-finansuje-polskich-radykalow-zadania-wyplaty-raport-moskwy/>

THE INITIATIVE OF PUBLIC BODIES IN OBTAINING EVIDENCE

The CC (Art. 9 § 1) provides that judicial bodies conduct proceedings and perform their functions *ex officio*. They are also required to obtain evidence without waiting for a request to do so (CPC, Art. 167). It is just as important that the ZUwP not be a party to proceedings, despite having filed the complaint, although it should be entitled to peruse the case file and lodge appeals. A judicial body may consider a motion to present evidence from the ZUwP, but is not obliged to do so.

Law enforcement agencies devote too little effort to obtaining evidence *ex officio*. The “Nie wybaczę” case, cited above, is a case in point.

In the case of destroying the monument in Radruż, it has not been explained why an exhumation was not conducted, even though the Association of Ukrainian Political Prisoners has argued that it is a burial site for UPA soldiers. Nor has this witness been questioned and its affidavit contested (i.e. not only not has an exhumation not been conducted, but verification of the fact has not been allowed).

Reasons for declining to open an inquiry or investigation and for closing them:

- ▶ perpetrator not identified;
- ▶ insufficient information to warrant suspecting that a crime had been committed;

► conduct not bearing the indicia of a crime.

Inquiries or investigations are either not opened, or perfunctorily closed when they are. Such is the lot of the vast majority of complaints. First, there is a refusal to open an investigation due to an inability to identify the perpetrator. This is admittedly difficult with Internet crimes, but difficult does not mean impossible. However, the case is closed even when the perpetrator is identified (either by the authorities or the ZUwP), usually on account of the conduct not bearing the indicia of a crime.

Most perpetrators, especially of Internet crimes, remain unidentified, even though law enforcement agencies have their usernames and photographs, films in which faces – apparently those of the perpetrators – have been uploaded, the events took place in small villages where everybody knows everybody else, and where nothing and nobody goes unnoticed by the authorities (ref. destroying Ukrainian monuments in cemeteries), and the events took place during the day, in border zones (ref. destroying Ukrainian monuments in cemeteries), and not far from non-EU, non-NATO borders, where the responsible government institutions are generally particularly scrupulous and assiduous.

Law enforcement agencies did not ask the domain administrator for the user's IP address when someone with the username gotan@gotan wrote the following about people of Ukrainian nationality on the www.kresy.pl website: *"By what right do these kinsmen of Bander live..."*, *"Driving that scum to their own in the east"*, *"The most disgusting criminals in the world"*, *"... So-called Ukrainian, is a savage without humanitarian inhibitions. The worse*

criminal dross!". The Warszawa-Praga Południe Regional Prosecutor closed the investigation as the perpetrator could not be identified (PR 4 Ds.471.2017). The Warszawa-Praga Południe Regional Court upheld an appeal from the ZUwP (III Kp 1355/17), stating that:



FOR REASONS UNKNOWN, law enforcement neglected to request the IP address of the user from the domain administrator, despite having determined the IP address of the kresy.pl domain name, and that the subject domain belonged to [...] of department [...]

Law enforcement agencies did not request legal assistance from the USA, as they assumed that it would not be granted.

In support of this, law enforcement agencies cite a letter (No. PG VMW082/12), dated Dec. 5, 2012, from the Department of International Cooperation of the Prosecutor General's Office, stating that the American authorities refuse to consider applications for legal assistance in proceedings based on the CC (Arts. 212, 256 and 257), as acceding to such requests would violate the constitutional order of the USA, and in particular, would be contrary to the principles enunciated in the First Amendment thereto. However, they omit to cite a letter from the Prosecutor General, dated Nov. 9, 2015 (No. PG VWM 084/11/15), stating that the US authorities will consider applications for legal assistance if "... the statement contains a threat to commit a crime."

NOT BEARING THE INDICIA OF A CRIME

Not bearing the indicia of a crime is the most common ground for closing an inquiry or investigation or declining to

open one in the first place. Criminal proceedings initiated by the ZUwP contain numerous examples of how the police, the public prosecutor, and the courts assess whether an act bears the indicia of a crime in a manner the ZUwP finds worrying.

The key word when assessing whether the phrases “inciting hatred”, and “defamation/desecration because of their national affiliation” bear the indicia of a crime has been “Banderite”. When this word is used, i.e. when it has appeared in particular cases (e.g. inscriptions, comments, opinions), the police, the public prosecutor, and the courts have interpreted it as not bearing the indicia of a crime, arguing that it has not incited hatred or defamed anyone by reason of national affiliation in the particular case, but has merely expressed disapproval and condemnation of the activities of the Banderites as manifested in views on the death penalty, and in referring to the presumed views of ZUwP president Piotr Tyma.

And so:

“SNEAKY UKRAINIANS, BANDERITE CATTLE...”
AS DISAPPROVAL AND CONDEMNATION, AS
BROADLY UNDERSTOOD, OF THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE “BANDERITES”

The following comments were posted under an article entitled “They’ll prosecute hate speech for Soros’s money” on the www.kresy.pl website: “*The effrontery of the riff-raff in this country has reached its zenith*”, “*... they’re destroying Poland and trying to browbeat Poles at every step... savages...*”, “*Sly and cunning UPA scum saturated with the sick ten commandments of Ukrainian nationalists...*”, “*Sneaky Ukrainian Banderite cattle... nothing’s changed. They’re sneaky,*

inhuman and arrogant”, “*And you Banderite fucks, the way you sound off about Poles and Russians you fucking scum / you allow yourselves too many scumbags*”, “*No true Pole would ever associate with fucking Banderites*”, “*Piss off to the Podlachian steppes, to your own Banderite kind, you Podlachian creep, nobody asked you to come to Poland, nobody’s forcing you to stay here, nobody promised you anything. I don’t want Banderite motherfuckers...*”. The Warszawa-Praga Południe (Warsaw) Regional Prosecutor declined to bring criminal proceedings, arguing that these comments did not constitute incitement to hatred, but were merely “*expressions, admittedly evincing strong feelings, but expressions of disapproval and condemnation, as broadly understood, of the activities of the Banderites and the UPA*” (Case Ref. No. PR 4 Ds.162.2017). The connection between Bandera and the article under which the comments were placed, Soros, or the prosecution of hate speech was not explained. The Warszawa-Praga Południe Regional Court upheld the decision, sharing the prosecutor’s position, and added that the comments did not refer to nationality.

“GET THE FUCK OUT OF POLAND, BANDERITE”
AS DISAPPROVAL AND CONDEMNATION, AS
BROADLY UNDERSTOOD, OF “BANDERITES”

Someone with the username “P... Z... B...”, referring to Piotr Tyma, posted the following comments on Facebook: “LISTEN BANDERITE, GET THE FUCK OUT OF POLAND...”, “LIKE A WHORE...”, and “YOU TRASH...”. The Warszawa-Praga Południe Regional Prosecutor declined to open an inquiry, deeming that these phrases did not bear the indicia of defamation or incitement to hatred, but rather “*... expressed disapproval and condemnation, as broadly understood, of the*

activities of the “Banderites” and the UPA” (PR 4 Ds.291.2017).

“DEATH TO BANDERITES” AS A WAY OF EXPRESSING CRITICISM, AND AN EXPRESSION OF STRONG FEELINGS, DISAPPROVAL AND CONDEMNATION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF BANDERITES

A photograph of a T-shirt with the caption “DEATH TO BANDERITES” was offered for sale on the “Przemyskie Bractwo” Facebook page. The Przemyśl Regional Prosecutor declined to open an investigation, arguing that the epithet did not refer to people of Ukrainian nationality, but only to “Banderites”, which was, in her opinion, a common appellation for those who committed mass murder in Volhynia and Eastern Małopolska, whatever their nationality, and moreover, that the epithet merely constituted “a way of expressing criticism”, *“an expression of strong feelings, disapproval and condemnation of the activities of the ‘Banderites’”* (PR 4 Ds.143.2017). The Regional Court declined to hear the ZUwP’s complaint, deeming the message to be *“an expression of strong feelings condemning the activities of the Banderites”*.

THROWING A MOLOTOV COCKTAIL INTO A UKRAINIAN SCHOOL AS A POLEMIC

Someone with the username “Przemyslanin” wrote the following on the www.nowiny24.pl website: *“There’s a Ukrainian school in ul. Spółki, Przemyśl. Poles should throw cocktails in there to balance our good neighborly relations”*. The Przemyśl Regional Prosecutor declined to open an investigation under the CC (Arts. 255 § 1 and 256 § 1). This decision was justified on the grounds that *“it is difficult to determine whether the writer was*

affecting the minds of others for the pleasure of arousing enmity towards Ukrainians in them. The subject post is in one sense a polemic – a debate in connection with a Polish school recently being burnt down in Ukraine” (PR 2 Ds.402.2017). The Przemyśl Regional Court declined to hear the ZUwP’s complaint, arguing that the author *“Was expressing his wishes, expectations [...] The aforementioned post can be treated as a wish”* (II Kp 497/17).

“RAPISTS AND BUTCHERS” AS AN ASSESSMENT OF HISTORICAL EVENTS

On Oct. 15, 2016, on the “RaPP” [Radio Press Review], a program broadcast by the station Polskie Radio Koszalin, Wojciech Cejrowski, who co-hosts the program, claimed: *“Ukrainians are rapists and butchers”, “So to your question: All Ukrainians? I say all”*. The Szczecin Regional Prosecutor closed the investigation, declaring that the statement concerned the controversy aroused by the film *Volhynia*, and that Cejrowski had made his own assessment of both the historical events presented therein and the moral standing of anyone who tolerated such unacceptable behavior (PR Ds.1413.2017).

“DEATH TO THE ENEMIES OF THE FATHERLAND” AS A HISTORICAL SYMBOL

An event titled “Gdańsk is going to Przemyśl, June 26, 2017” (the wrong date was indicated) was created on Facebook. The inscription read “DEATH TO THE ENEMIES OF THE FATHERLAND”. The information regarding the event read in part: *“...Przemyśl, June 26, when the Sons of Bander make their pilgrimage...”*. The Warszawa-Praga Południe Regional Prosecutor in Warsaw declined to open an investigation, claiming that

it was a “*patriotic logo of the event on the website...*” (Case Ref. No. PR 4 Ds.44.2017). The Warszawa-Praga Południe Regional Court upheld the decision, ruling that the comments were not directed against Ukrainian pilgrims “*but were in this case used in the context of the shibboleth used by the National Armed Forces. By the same token, the subject expression should be considered a symbol [...] that is [...] an invitation to make the trip*” (III Kp 550/17).

BEGGARS AND SHITBAGS

The following comments were posted on the www.dzienni.artystyczny.margines.pl website “*all Ukrainians are beggars and shitbags*”, and “*they don’t deserve the right to life*”. The Warszawa-Praga Północ Regional Prosecutor concluded that this did not constitute an insult or an incitement to hatred within the meaning of the CC (Arts. 256 § 1 and 257). The investigation was closed (PR 4 Ds.1341.2017).

<http://dziennik.artystyczny-margines.pl/zestawienie-362-metod-tortur-stosowanych-przez-upa-na-polakach/>

“UKRAINIANS” WITH A SMALL “U” AND THE INTENTIONS OF THE PERPETRATOR

The word “Ukrainian” is often written in entirely in lower case (“ukrainian”) in online comments, an example being the comment “*all ukrainians are beggars and shitbags*”, posted on the www.dzienni.artystyczny.margines.pl website. This spelling not only reflects on the intellectual or educational level of the writer, but also reveals something about his/her intentions, malice, and purpose. This is relevant when determining the degree of *mens rea* (intent), as the crimes defined in Arts. 256 § 1 and 257 of the CC require *dolus directus*. This spelling also shows

that the writer refers to Ukrainians in a derogatory manner.

MONUMENTS — INTERPRETING “MONUMENT” (CC, ART. 261)

The ZUwP has filed criminal complaints over the desecration and destruction of monuments in e.g. Hruszowice, Wierzbica, Radruż, i.e. under Art. 261 of the CC, which relevantly provides that “*Anyone who desecrates a monument or other public place set up to commemorate an historic event or honor a person shall be liable to a fine...*”.

The question as to what constitutes a “monument” within the meaning of the CC (Art. 261) has been raised in all these cases. At issue is whether every monument or object (architectural work) qualifies, or only those erected legally after obtaining the necessary permits and submissions. The police, the public prosecutor and the courts have declined to open cases or have discontinued proceedings (CPC, Art. 17 § 1 Pt 2), arguing that damaging an object does not bear the indicia of a crime under Art. 261 of the CC if it is not a monument within the meaning of this regulation by virtue of having been built illegally, i.e. without the necessary “licenses, permits, agreements, and submissions”. It was determined in the case of the monument in:

— Hruszowice that “the object was erected illegally and without a submission from the Council for the Protection of Struggle and Martyrdom Sites [...] and does not constitute a monument within the meaning of the relevant legal provisions (Przemyśl Regional Prosecutor, 4 Ds.502/14, RSD-M-116/14);

— Wierzbica that *“the object directly affected must be a legally built monument (in accordance with the legislation in force in Poland), i.e. after the builder has obtained the required permits, agreements and submissions from the relevant authorities. It is incontrovertible that a monument built contrary to the legislation in force does not have this virtue”* (Hrubieszów Regional Prosecutor, Ds.1121/15);

— Radruż that *“therefore a monument built in complete disregard of the legislation in force does not have any value as a monument, as is stated in Art. 261 of the CC, because it was not installed, i.e. designed, agreed to, built and planted, in accordance*

with the legislation in force...” (Lubaczów Regional Court, II Kp 48/15).

The ZUwP views the interpretation of “monument” on the basis of Art. 261 of the CC, accepted above, as invalid, as the wording of Art. 261 provides no justification for equating “monument” solely with a monument that has been legally erected. The provision says nothing about the legality of the erection of the monument, e.g. by using phrases such as “legally erected monument” or “monument erected in accordance with procedures”. For this reason, the ZUwP has applied to the HRO to lodge a cassation appeal.

DR MAREK TROSYŃSKI

Ukraine and Ukrainians in Polish Internet discourse. An analysis of the quality and quantity of social media posts

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1. INTRODUCTION

Ukrainians are the largest minority in Poland. While only 51,000 people declared Ukrainian nationality or ethnicity in the 2011 National Census, which placed them fourth, after Silesians, Kashubians and Germans, according to the Office for Foreigners (2017): “Ukrainian citizens possessed over 128,000 valid residence documents as at June 30, 2017”, and data cited on the money.pl website make mention of 2 million workers from Ukraine: “Personnel Service estimates that there will be approx. 2 million employment declarations from people from Ukraine by the end of the year” (<https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/unia-europejska/wiadomosci/artikul/ukraincy-pracujacy-w-polsce-pensja-liczba,118,0,2381430.html>; accessed Jan 12, 2018).

What this means in practice is that there are Ukrainian citizens in every Polish city. Frequency of contact also affects the attitudes of Poles towards Ukrainians. According to figures from the Centre for Public Opinion (CBOS), “more than a third [of Poles] have a positive attitude towards Ukrainians (36%) [...]. It should be noted that [...] attitudes towards Ukrainians are strongly polarized, with sympathy being declared only slightly more frequently than antipathy (2017:1).




Chart 1: Own elaboration based on 2017 CBOS data

CBOS can be cited again when comparing the attitudes Poles have towards their neighbors: “A significant improvement in attitudes towards all our neighbors has been noted over the past year [...]. In the

1990s and 2000s, roughly up until the Orange Revolution, we approached Ukrainians with the greatest possible distance, just as we do now the Russians (2017:6).




Chart 2: Own elaboration based on 2017 CBOS data

The chart shows that attitudes towards Ukrainians were decidedly negative in the early 1990s, when Ukrainians were deemed the worst of all Poland's neighbors. This gradually changed for the better in the 2010s. Ukrainians are not just judged positively, but have even overtaken the Russians to achieve a status approaching to that of Belorussians. This opinion poll should constitute an essential backdrop for the analyses presented below.

A study report summarizing analyses of texts in which Ukraine and Ukrainians are referred to, and which have been posted on social media, is presented below. The report opens with an abbreviated presentation of the results of the study and the conclusions drawn from the analyses. The central part of the paper comprises the methodology (Chap. 3), a detailed analysis of the results of the study with selected text excerpts (Chap. 4), and an appendix, containing:

☞ A report entitled “An analysis of the profiles containing Ukrainian topics” written by Radosław Pawlak and Maciej Baranowski for Sotrender. The report characterizes users with selected Facebook profiles. It therefore presents information of a completely different kind; information that is not related to the texts themselves, but to the readers thereof. This report constitutes an important supplement to the analyses presented herein;

☞ A report, generated by SentiOne, a social media listening tool. The report summarizes the information on the texts included in the works analyzed in the study.

2. ABBREVIATED RESULTS

The conclusions from the study are based on an analysis of social media texts. This means that:

(1) Only texts containing the key words “Ukraine” and “Ukrainian” were eligible for selection. This affects the contents of the selected posts. Texts based on national distinction are analyzed. None of the other texts that concern Ukrainians, but which describe them as “boy-friend”, “sales girl” or “Olga” were considered;

(2) the truth or falsity of the opinions, within the meaning of their correspondence with reality, is not addressed. The analyzed texts are “real” insofar as they actually appear on the Polish Internet, and thereby affect public discourse.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The most significant (i.e. appearing most frequently and evoking the strongest feelings) theme of the selected texts is the mass murder of Poles in Volhynia in the 1940s. This is firstly an appraisal of historical events, and secondly, the writers are referring to the present day and Ukraine's failure to condemn those events. This topic elicits most of the negative statements and considerably colors the tone of the entire discourse on Ukraine.

Stepan Bandera, recognized as a hero and freedom fighter in Ukraine, remains an extremely controversial figure. Online posters do not just see Bandera's significance to Ukrainian nationalist movements, but also his popularity in popular culture. The UPA and OUN are treated in a similar manner in Polish discourse.

Apart from providing glimpses from a national perspective, the comments contain descriptions of day-to-day interpersonal relationships. This, however, is where views built on stereotypes and a simple us (Poles) versus them (Ukrainians) dichotomy predominate. The need to distinguish us from them makes even the most trifling events worth writing about online, so long as a Ukrainian is involved.

The economic situation is mostly described in the context of migration. This has been very topical in public discourse in Poland over the last year or two. Two attitudes clearly stand out:

☞ Ukrainians are migrants, and migrants are an evil, non-Polish faction that threatens our national identity, culture, economy, labor market, etc.;

☞ Ukrainians are migrants, but they are emphatically different from migrants from other parts of the world who are completely alien to us (culturally, religiously and racially), and especially from Muslims. They are familiar, they belong to us, and they are hardworking. This makes them similar to Polish economic migrants.

Dissatisfaction with having to compete with Ukrainians on the labor market, and the increasing costs of apartment rentals, which are a considerable burden for workers, are recurring themes. This is especially conspicuous in small cities and villages.

Russia plays a crucial foreign policy role in texts devoted to Ukraine. It is the most frequently mentioned country, and the enormous significance of this subject for framing public discourse in Poland

is obvious. Two positions can be distinguished:

☞ The anti-Russian position is usually, but not necessarily, pro-Ukrainian. The writers argue that Russia is the greatest threat to Poland. This means that we should favor Ukraine, as it is in conflict with the Russian Federation;

☞ The pro-Russian position is definitely anti-Ukrainian. The writers appeal to historical and political arguments to show that Ukraine constitutes a threat to Polish identity and sovereignty.

The analyzed texts include posts warning against “online trolls”, i.e. people who write an inordinate number of posts in an attempt to disseminate specific opinions. This kind of activity, pursued as a matter of policy, is often ascribed to Russia.

Threads in which relations with Russia are valued higher than those with Ukraine appear in social as well as political contexts. Commentators point to the troublesome history between Poland and Ukraine, claiming that this has divided us, and disrupted our cultural fellowship and mutual interests with Russia. And while many writers try to discern shades of gray in our historical relations, a “litany of grievances” invariably dominates any description of Polish-Ukrainian relations. These tend to be general grievances, and they all are too frequently responses to specific arguments from particular individuals.

Being Ukrainian simply means being “other”, non-Polish, someone who does not know, does not understand, and has less experience and lower qualifications, in many of the analyzed statements. In

others, it means someone who will take any kind of work, no matter how difficult or poorly remunerated.

What used to be attributed to the Jewish minority is now attributed to the Ukrainian minority. The epithet “Ukrainian” is taken to be a pejorative.

Posts expressing aversion and/or hatred towards Ukrainians, and which are devoid of any substantive arguments, are relatively common in the “society” category. This is a major problem in online public discourse, and is driving the two communities apart.

Comments expressing aversion or downright hatred are often explicitly linked with right-wing discussions organized around opposition to “the left” and “multi-culti” policies.

Analyses of the Ukrainian community on social media are sometimes paternalistic in tone or simply dismiss the idea of a Ukrainian state governing its own territory as being temporary.

DETAILED CONCLUSIONS

Internet discussion texts can be divided into three groups based on emotional attitude:

☞ strongly negative texts:

- ▶ mainly referring to history, especially the 1940s, to the Volhynia murders, the UPA and the OUN, and stating e.g. “like grandfather, like grandson”;

- ▶ generally unfavorable towards Ukraine and Ukrainians without giving specific reasons;

- ▶ with opinions often written by people personally involved in Polish-Ukrainian relations, by virtue of e.g. residence, family history etc.;

- ▶ where hostility towards Ukraine carries over to people writing positively about Ukrainians.

☞ mildly negative texts:

- ▶ mainly about the Volhynia murders, but with more balanced arguments for both sides;

- ▶ containing observations from Poles on the day-to-day conduct of Ukrainians;

- ▶ concerning Ukrainian nationalism, especially in a historical context;

- ▶ where the Ukrainian-Russian conflict also receives negative comments.

☞ Texts with positive overtones:

- ▶ describing Ukrainians as “normal people”, neighbors, who migrate to Poland, work, and integrate into Polish society;

- ▶ where sport is the area where relations with Ukraine are mainly described positively.

Moving on to an analysis of the topics discussed in the texts, it can be seen that most posts on Ukraine and Ukrainians are about social topics, politics, history, and economics:

☞ texts on “social” topics:

- ▶ threads on personal relationships, family histories, and reciprocal Polish-Ukrainian grievances;

- ▶ the difficulties facing two nationalities that have to live side by side following the migration of Ukrainians, the feeling of superiority that Poles have as a result of being “at home”;

- ▶ the subject of Ukrainian migration is combined with the predominantly negative views on migration to Europe;

- ▶ texts written in Polish by Ukrainians – seeking advice, assistance, and less commonly, taking part in public discussions; the views of “ordinary people” writing about their successes and failures;

- ▶ posts showing the similarity in the manners, habits, and broader culture of Poles and Ukrainians;

- ▶ posts analyzing the internal mood of Ukraine, the sympathies and antipathies of Ukrainian society;

- ▶ Ukrainians as participants in Polish social life. Twitter paints Ukrainians as practitioners of elite professions (e.g. doctors and lawyers), and not construction workers and domestics;

- ☞ texts on politics:

- ▶ domestic politics with Ukraine as an add-on, constituting a yardstick against which Polish politicians are measured;

- ▶ Polish-Ukrainian relations: online discussions on current political events, references to what Russia is doing, which has a huge impact on regional politics, Ukraine as a country trying to follow the example of Poland in being

a transformational leader; the possibility of the civil unrest in Ukraine being repeated in Poland (which points to reciprocal political influence);

- ▶ foreign policy – the Russian Federation as an alternative (to Ukraine) partner for Poland in the East, or alternatively, as a greater threat to Poland; Ukraine, as a weak country, being vulnerable to hostile actions on the part of Russia;

- ▶ texts combining politics with other fields, e.g. economics (e.g. the gas trade);

- ▶ issues connected with the conditions of minorities in the two countries, especially the rights of the Polish minority in Ukraine;

- ▶ Twitter tweets: official announcements from politicians, who use Twitter to communicate with each other and/or their constituents, issues concerning minorities in the two countries.

- ☞ texts concerning “history”:

- ▶ the overriding issue is the massacre of the Polish population of Volhynia, and more precisely, how that event is to be remembered. The phrase “we won’t forget and we won’t forgive” appears in many posts. The UPA, OUN, Bandera, and these words can be found in the majority of posts;

- ▶ references to Poland and Ukraine’s earlier history also appear. Contiguity has given rise to many shared major historical moments over the centuries, and we are happy to revisit them;

► some posts try to analyze history more accurately by showing the complexity of human destiny and comparing different outlooks on the past.

☞ texts on “economics”:

► the main problem is economic migration and having to compete with Ukrainian workers on the labor market;

► descriptions of the Ukrainian economy, which reveal a situation similar to that of Eastern Europe;

► general views on the world economy that take the positions of Poland and Ukraine, as well as the impact of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict on the economic situation in Poland, into account;

► classified ads on running a business in Ukraine; these point to considerable trade between the two countries.

☞ texts on other topics:

► law – issues connected with common offenses (most often to do with road accidents) and the penalties for hate speech. The former shows that, paradoxically, mutual relations have been normalized and that Ukrainians play a significant role in Polish society;

► military affairs – the Ukrainian-Russian conflict and its consequences for the areas under dispute are the main issues; Ukraine as a place where world powers (mainly the USA) do business, the business conducted by US arms concerns;

► art – discussions of Wojciech Smarzowski’s film “Volhynia”, numerous

descriptions of books published in Ukraine, as well as Polish books whose plots feature Ukraine or have Ukrainian characters;

► media – references to pop culture (e.g. Eurovision) and Ukraine as a topic that distinguishes left-wing from right-wing discourse in Poland;

► sport – there is typically a lack of really negative posts, and lots of mentions of football and tennis.

Results of the automatic quantitative analysis:

☞ the quantitative analysis shows that 35% of all posts published on social media evince a negative attitude (and 5% of them are strongly negative);

☞ the vast majority of posts concern politics, history, society, and economics;

☞ when comparing particular subject areas, the highest percentage of negative opinions appear in history, followed by society, media, the military, and politics;

☞ the least negative posts appear in sport, art, the natural environment, science, economics, and religion.

A summary of post topics, with their corresponding percentages of negative posts, is presented in Table 1:

Subject Area	No. of Texts	Percentage of Negative Texts
Politics	480 680	32.7%
Economics	204 661	22.6%
Society	230 356	39.0%
History	258 269	48.1%
Sport	45 481	9.4%
Military	10 437	33.3%
Other	9 007	30.2%
Art	5 540	18.0%
Media	7 019	36.4%
Natural Environment	2 767	19.4%
Education	2 885	23.1%
Law	2 479	25.9%
Religion	724	23.1%
Science	496	20.2%

Table 1. Source: own studies, Dec. 2016–Nov. 2017

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1. CONTENT ANALYSIS

The report is based on a content analysis of texts taken from Polish social media sites.

What is a content analysis? Three definitions can be cited for the purposes of this study.

The most classical definition was coined with the first computer analysis trials of text subjects. Content analysis was “a new research for making inference by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics within a text” (Stone, Dunphy, Smith, Oglivie 1966: 5). The second definition, created by a classic of content analysis says that it is a “research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context” (Krippendorff 1980: 21). Finally, the third definition refers directly to analyzing media texts: “a research technique based on measuring the amount of something in a representative sampling of some mass-mediated art form” (Berger 1991: 25). The “something” could be e.g. violence or negative images of women.


We took two approaches in our study: qualitative content analysis and quantitative content analysis. Alexander George combines both methods as follow (1959: 7):

Qualitative content analysis	Quantitative content analysis
Preliminary communicative reading materials for the purposes of formulating hypotheses and discovering new relations.	Systematic content analysis to test hypothesis.
Subjective (impressionistic) procedure of creating observations concerning the contents.	Systematic procedure for using precise, objective and reliable data.
Dichotomic attributes (i.e. attributes that can only be predicated as dependent or independent of the subject).	Attributes enabling precise measurement (using quantitative variables) or ordered rankings.
"Flexible" procedure for creating descriptive observations and/or "coded" evaluations.	"Rigid" procedure for coding evaluations.

Table 2: Own elaboration on the basis of George, 1959.

Given the enormous number of texts (1.2 mln) involved, the quantitative analysis was based on an automatic subject coding methodology (See Chapt. 3.4).

The apparent paradox that Marek Czyżewski so aptly describes is clearly visible in any analysis of social media discourse:

 **ON THE ONE HAND** the variability of public discourse is quite marked, and calls to mind the effects of intercultural communication. On the other hand, public discourse is becoming increasingly uniform. There is, however, no actual contradiction in this paradox, as the variability and uniformity occupy different areas. The variability resides in the area of opinions and meta-communication parameters, whereas the uniformity lies in the accumulating – in a sense “beyond divisions” – medialization and politicization of debates (2008: 121).

When reading the results, it has to be constantly borne in mind that the purpose of the study is not to check the veracity of the analyzed texts. Whether particular writers are right or wrong is of no interest to us. An analyzed statement is only “true” in the sense of actually being on the Internet. Those who participate in


public discourse in Poland have created a miscellany of opinions.

3.2. MONITORING THE MEDIA, OR BUILDING A TEXT CORPUS

As stated above, content analysis involves analyzing contents in a systematic, objective and replicable manner. In order to approach a systematic analysis, we first have to determine the media (i.e. messages created on them), the frequency, and the period over which we will be monitoring them.

If Internet discourse is to be analyzed, then the texts that constitute it have to be selected and saved in a database. There are many methods and tools that enable a corpus of statements to be built systematically.

The object of the analysis are texts on social media, i.e. user-generated content (UGC). This is defined in OECD reports as:

 **1) CONTENT MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE** over the Internet, 2) which reflects a certain amount of creative effort, and 3) which is created outside

professional procedures and practices (OECD 2007).

The study includes those types of social media texts, whose remoteness from the classical model of media communication, i.e. where a privileged sender (professional journalist) broadcasts a message to a group of receivers, can be categorically confirmed.

The following types of messages fulfill these criteria:

- ☞ comments on blogs. A significant proportion of bloggers (who we treat as a type of broadcaster) have comments enabled for their posts. These are included in our body of texts;

- ☞ Facebook profile comments. Facebook profiles are created by specific institutions or online citizens. We similarly treat them as a type of broadcaster. Comments on fansites have been included in our body of texts;

- ☞ Internet forums. These are websites created so that users can exchange texts. Statements on these forums are included in our body of texts;

- ☞ Comments on websites. User comments posted under articles by professional journalists are included in our body of texts;

- ☞ Twitter. This is a simple matter of short texts (tweets) by users with equal rights. They are all included.

HOW WERE THE TEXTS PUBLISHED ON THE MEDIA DESCRIBED ABOVE COLLECTED?

One option is to create a dedicated tool (e.g. a web crawler) especially for the project. Experience (cf. Troszyński, Wawer 2017) shows, however, that using the available social media monitoring services is far more effective.

Once a commercial solution had been chosen, the following remained to be addressed:

- ☞ The scale of enterprise. An attempt to describe the entire social media discourse with no restrictions on selecting URLs, profiles, and Internet forums;

- ☞ The ease of using commercial tools in terms of the specifics of key words (proper nouns, unambiguous, a small number of key words).

After analyzing the commercially available solutions, we decided on those offered by SentiOne.

Their range of databases includes statements from social media services, microblogs, Internet forums, blogs, websites, video services, and opinion comparisons. The results were obtained from monitoring over 12 181 000 statements from the European Internet.

HOW DO THE SENTIONE SERVICES WORK?

This is explained on the company's website: <https://sentione.com/pl/wiedza/czesto-zadawane-pytania> (accessed Dec. 22, 2017).

WHAT AREAS DOES SENTIONE MONITOR?

SentiOne monitors both statements and articles from the whole Internet. The reach of its monitoring covers: social networks (like Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Google+, YouTube, Foursquare and many more), blogs, forums and online portals.

HOW IS SENTIMENT EXAMINED?¹

SentiOne's analysis of the subjective tone (i.e. the sentiment) of statements is based on studies conducted by British academics John R. Crawford and Julie D. Henry, who analyzed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). As a result of their research, we can define the emotional relationship of the writer of a statement to a given project in SentiOne.

PANAS (POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE AFFECT SCHEDULE)

The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule is used to examine the frequency and intensity of experiencing the positive and negative emotional states (affects) that comprise one of the fundamental components of the feeling of happiness and subjective wellbeing. Negative people look on the dark side of everything. The PA and NA scales reflect

those aspects of the disposition of the person being studied. A high NA indicates subjective anguish and unpleasant obligations, while a low NA indicates a lack thereof. Per contra, PA represents the extent to which an individual experiences a pleasant connection with his/her surroundings. Emotions like enthusiasm and vigilance are signs of a high PA, whereas lethargy and sadness are typical of a low PA. In a word, if a statement contains negative expressions that indicate negative emotions on the part of the writer, it is highly likely that the statement is negative, and vice versa.

The PANAS scale consists of 10 statements that refer to positive emotional states and 10 referring to negative emotional states. This 20-descriptor questionnaire was devised by Watson, Clarke and Tellegen in 1988.

The Internet is monitored on the basis of the designated keywords. Texts in which the keywords, along with fragments of the surrounding text, are added to the database. Metadata (author, place of publication, date of publication etc.) are also collected and used in analyses.

Two factors were considered when choosing keywords:

☞ the requirement that the largest (complete) set of texts referring to Ukraine and Ukrainians (completeness of the set) be collected;

☞ the requirement that only those texts that referred to the designated area (precision) be collected.

Finally, we decided that precision was the key criterion. Our keywords would therefore be unequivocally sent to the

¹ The method described here was not used in the quantitative approach. The combination showing the sentiment described when using this approach can be found in Appendix II.

thematic area of the study. We settled on entering the following 5 components into the monitoring tool: Ukraine, Ukrainian (male), Ukrainian (female), Ukrainians (male or mixed gender), Ukrainians (female).

SentiOne functionality can consider all the grammatical forms of the designed phrases, be case-sensitive or case-insensitive, and ignore missing Polish diacritics.

The monitoring was launched in Oct. 2016 and lasted until Dec. 2017. The first two months were treated as a test run for the tool, so that, ultimately texts collected from Dec. 2016 to November 2017 were subjected to analysis.

This allowed over 1 200 000 social media statements to be collected. A more detailed description of this body of texts can be found in Part 4.6 “Quantitative Collection of Statement Topics”.

Approx. 1200 statements were selected on the basis of the date and time of publication for the quality analysis. This ensured that particular quarters of the year were properly represented. The texts were then grouped by place of publication. This led to the creation of 24 documents that were then submitted to the quality analysis (e.g. D 1: 17_01_blogi, D 8: 17_04_fb). The original spellings in the source materials were retained and included in the results.

3.3. CODE SHEET — DESCRIPTION

Coding is the basic function associated with quantity analysis.



CODING IS A WAY OF INDEXING or categorising the text in order to establish a framework of thematic ideas about it (Gibbs 2011: 80).

Coding requires that a coding sheet be drawn up. This is a list of all the codes used in the analysis.

The coding sheet shown below was constructed by drawing on the experience gained in previous studies on Internet discussions about minority issues and hate speech (Troszynski 2015, Troszynski 2016, Troszynski, Wawer 2017).

From the perspective of the research goals of the project, the two most important areas of the coding sheet are negativity and thematic area.

The code “negativity” allows us to ascribe that affect to a given text fragment. As this coding sheet has its origins in hate speech studies, we focus here on a detailed description of the downside of the affect. This variable can take 3 values, viz:

☞ 0 (negatywne_0). This code is applied to texts that are not negative, i.e. when the affect is positive or neutral;

☞ 1 (negatywne_1). Mild negativity. This is applied to texts that are not offensive;

☞ 2 (negatywne_2). Strong negativity – offensive texts, vulgarisms, hate speech.

The distinction between mild and strong negativity is crucial to analyzing the discourse. This follows from the social implications of shaping public discourse. Negative opinions at the negatywne_1 level are an inevitable part of living in society. We like some people more than others and can express our views on this subject. On the other hand, strongly negative (hateful) opinions are a symptom of

hate speech, and may be deemed contrary to the CC (Arts. 255 and 256).

The other important part of the coding sheet is thematic area. Using these categories to analyze statements on social media allows us to pinpoint those areas most closely associated with negative opinions on Ukraine and Ukrainians. The combination of thematic threads presented in the project is modeled on the

classification presented in the General Inquirer project realized at Harvard University (cf. Stone, Dunphy, Smith, Ogilvie 1966).

The coding sheet also contains a third part, viz. “Other Codes”. Additional categories, treated as binary variables (on/off), are placed here. This enables additional information about particular chunks of text to be coded.

Code	Name	Definition	Full Definition (Exclusive Criteria)
1	2	3	4
1	negativity	Whether a given piece of text has a negative affect	
1.1	negatywne_0	No negativity	Positive and/or neutral texts
1.2	negatywne_1	Mild negativity	Texts that are not offensive, but which evince aversion towards minorities
1.3	negatywne_2	Strong negativity	Offensive texts, vulgarisms, hate speech
2	Thematic Areas		
2.1	obsz_educacja	education	teaching children and/or adults, schools as institutions & places, teachers, educators, pupils, pre-schoolers
2.2	obsz_nauka	academic (matters)	learning as an ensemble of academic disciplines; discovery & experimentation; academic controversies; information & reports; academic publications; replacing academic disciplines
2.3	obsz_sztuka	art	artistic disciplines, works of art, artists, art history, aesthetics, beauty etc.
2.4	obsz_ekonomia	economics	money, economic mechanisms, the economy, economic trends & forecasts, the labor market
2.5	obsz_sport	sport	sports disciplines, sports competitions, sports journalism “tangential” issues (scandals, contracts, doping etc.)
2.6	obsz_prawo	law	legal professions, courts & their functioning, legal documents, statutes, regulations, tender conditions, competition rules
2.7	obsz_militaria	military	the army, military affairs, war, defense; uniforms, armaments, tactics & strategies
2.8	obsz_polityka	politics	1) political parties, politicians, political movements 2) the state as an institution, including Ukraine, Poland & Russia
2.9	obsz_spoleczenstwo	society	community (nation, gmina & housing estate community), working for the community (its welfare, children, history etc.), migration, nationality, people as group members (Ukrainians, Poles, etc.)
2.10	obsz_religia	religion	religions & faiths, churches, clergy, components of cults and doctrines, information about mass & carol singing
2.11	obsz_historia	history	historical references, dates, “historical entities” (institutions, figures, etc.)

1	2	3	4
2.12	obsz_środowisko_naturalne	natural environment	nature
2.13	obsz_media	media	press, radio, television, editorials, titles, journalists, media personalities
2.14	obsz_podroze_geografia		miejsca traktowane geograficznie (w tym państwa, miasta, regiony)
2.15	obsz_inne	other	candidates for other thematic categories (not present in our collection)
3	other codes		
3.1	narod_obywat	nationality or citizenship	quoted directly in the text
3.2	migracje	description of migration movements	migration movements (population) to & from a specified country/territory
3.3	zrodlo	citing the source	The source of information is cited directly in the text (e.g. as reported in "Rzeczpospolita")
3.4	osoba	designating a specific person	forename/surname, function (e.g. President of Ukraine)
3.5	ukr-ros	Ukrainian-Russian relations	both current & historical
3.6	ukr-pol	Ukrainian-Polish relations	both current & historical
3.7	wolyn	"Volhynia"	references to Volhynia in the 1940s & Smarzowski's film
3.8	inwektywy		words and/or phrasemes
3.9	pozytywne		particularly positive statements that are worth repeating

Table 3. Coding sheet, own elaboration

This coding sheet was imported into Atlas.ti 8.0 (CAQDAS). This program enabled the standardization of the coding and facilitated the analysis of the results.

3.4. QUANTITY PERSPECTIVE — SEMI-AUTOMATIC CODING

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The first step in the quantity analysis was preparing a collection of texts for further analysis. URLs were deleted and non-literal characters were replaced with spaces.

The texts were then tokenized and lemmatized, and the parts of speech of the individual tokens marked using WCRFT2 (Radziszewski, 2013).

The next step was to convert every piece of text into a standard bag-of-words vector representation. This involved counting the frequency of particular

words in each document (Boulis & Ostendorf, 2002).

A thoroughly tested technique for thematically classifying Polish texts (Walkowiak & Malak, 2018) that uses the thousand most common lemmatized nouns was deployed to limit the size of the feature vector. A multilayer perceptron was selected for the task to classify the texts into thematic areas (Hastie et al., 2013). The cross-validation method was employed to explore the possibility of automatic classification (Hastie et al., 2013). For a selected subset of areas (with the most frequently appearing areas being selected), a four-step cross-validation gave an average of 64% correct responses. The results, which illustrate the identification of particular classes for a random division into user data (75%) and test data (25%), are presented in Table 4.

	precision	recall	1-score	support
obsz_ekonomia	0.50	0.43	0.46	28
obsz_historia	0.55	0.53	0.54	43
obsz_militaria	0.56	0.51	0.54	35
obsz_polityka	0.69	0.71	0.70	70
obsz_spoleczenstwo	0.59	0.67	0.63	48
average/total	0.60	0.60	0.60	224

Table 4. Classification results for bag-of-words features and multilayer perceptron as the classifier.

Other classifiers (e.g. SVM, decision trees) and other sets of features (i.e. other pools of words), yielded comparable or worse results. On the other hand, increasing the size of the feature vector (by using all the words in the body of the texts) considerably prolonged the process of instructing the classifier.

The analysis of the lemmatizer and tagger results revealed a relatively high error rate, due to spelling mistakes in social media texts. It was therefore decided to use techniques that dispensed with language knowledge and treated texts as strings of letters.

FastText (Joulin et al., 2016) was used for the second approach. This requires that the Word2Vec (Mikolov et al., 2013) model and the linear classifier be built simultaneously. A multidimensional vector is designed for every word in the texts (in our case the Word2Vec model uses 100 dimensions). These vectors are averaged to create a feature vector for the linear classifier.

The teaching data were cleaned up analogically, as in the first approach, and tokenized. The data were randomly divided into training (75%) and test data (25%). The test collection accuracy was 92% for thematic areas (15 classes), and 95% for classification on the basis of

negative statements (3 classes). Detailed results are presented in Tables 5 and 6. These Tables present a confusion matrix, where the rows present the data for a specific tagged class and the columns contain the results of the classifier. The number of elements in a row indicates the number of texts from that data class in the test collection. If accurate, all the values should only appear on the diagonal. As an example, the values in the second row of Table 5 indicate that, of the $4+83+3+1$ texts pertaining to the thematic area of history, 4 were incorrectly classified as politics, 3 as military and 1 as society, with the remaining 83 being classified correctly.

Labels rows and column:

obsz_polityka obsz_historia obsz_militaria obsz_ekonomia obsz_spoleczenstwo obsz_sport obsz_inne obsz_media obsz_edukacja obsz_prawo obsz_religia obsz_sztuka obsz_srodow_naturalne obsz_edu obsz_nauka

Confusion Matrix:

```

122 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
4 | 83 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
3 | 3 | 98 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
3 | 0 | 1 | 88 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 81 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
3 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 |
0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

```

Table 5. Results for the fastText method and classification into thematic areas.

The results of the classification for indicating negativity are presented in Table 6:

	negat_0	negat_2	negat_2
negat_0	156	2	5
negat_2	2	94	0
negat_1	3	5	78

Table 6. The results of the fastText method and classification by negativity.

The experiments were repeated once the second portion of the data (labeled by the team members and volunteers) had been used. Unfortunately, the results obtained were considerably worse (Table 7). This was most likely due to the huge disparity in the number of classes, the data collection being smaller than the previous one, and the ambiguity assigned to the thematic areas. The volunteers' coding of classes was also evidently inferior.

As several criteria have to be applied when classifying data into thematic areas, the solution that uses a set of binary classifiers was tested as well.

	Team	Volunteers
Negativity	63%	54%
Thematic Areas	40%	36%

Table 7. The results for the second group of data (precision for specific classification tasks and label groups).

Finally, the results of automating the coding built into the first and second data collections were evaluated by qualified and experienced judges. As a result, the algorithm learnt in the second collection was chosen as the coding tool. Coding precision was measured at 0.68 for negativity and 0.44 for thematic areas.

4. ANALYZING SOCIAL MEDIA DISCOURSE

This chapter presents the results of the research in detail. First, the qualitative interpretation of the texts is described in the section on individual communication channels. The collection analyzed in terms of quality is a body of texts containing approx. 1,200 statements as per the methodology described in Chapter 3.1. And while this is an unrepresentative (quantity) study, the individual texts

were analyzed very precisely. The sizes in the collections below are therefore important exemplifications of the remaining results.

Table 8 shows the distribution of negativity in individual communication channels. The highest percentage of negative texts are found on Twitter and in blog comments, although extremely negative texts were not found in either type of media. Most of the extremely negative texts appear on Facebook and in the comments on web pages.

		% negat0	% negat1	% negat2
blogs		41.4%	58.6%	0.0%
Facebook		50.0%	37.1%	12.9%
Internet forums		63.9%	33.7%	2.4%
websites		48.9%	38.9%	12.2%
Twitter		38.9%	61.1%	0.0%
Total		51.3%	41.7%	7.0%

Table 8. Source: own studies

4.1. COMMENTS ON BLOGS

The topics of entries on the blogs analyzed mostly had to do with society, politics, and history. Approx. 60% of them had negative overtones.

SOCIETY


Personal accounts concerning family histories, and, only in this context, national affiliation and mutual Polish-Ukrainian grievances, frequently appear in the posts in question.




Well, Pole, if I could really get to know the history of this part of my family, which came from around Przemyśl (now on the Ukrainian side), they would turn out to be more Ukrainian than Polish, and something of a mixture of Ukrainian

and Polish genes. Even my grandmother used to use Ukrainian words... I remember it well... This would definitely explain why the Stalinists sent them to Siberia and tortured the weakest to death. If it comes to that, the Stalinists killed more Ukrainians than Poles. A lot, lot more. And for what? They had a reason to attack Ukraine too? As for Dzerzhinsky and his fellow travelers, I'm really glad they wanted Poland to be a Soviet Republic. This is the Pole's natural love of Poland – to praise Poland's invaders and want to liquidate Poland... Yes, Pole, be loyal and defend the Soviets attacking Poland together with Hitler... (D 1: 17_01_blogi)


In response to the feeling of having been wronged, built on generalizations and stereotypes, the writers invoke the fates of their own families, thereby showing that history affects ordinary people and their decisions. This does not, however, always mean hatred and death.

 We can, and certainly have some right to, view Ukraine, Bander, and Ukrainian nationalism with suspicion. We have... But we also have to see and understand that in contrast to us, they're some 400 years behind the times and only just coming to grips with defining themselves as an independent nation with their own identity and with building their own statehood. One of my grandfathers was posted to Volhynia "for his service". He went there, took up the position, sussed out what was going on, and went back to where he came from. He was a clever person and understood what was happening. As usual, the choice was between reason and myths. I'm for reason. (D 7: 17_04_blogi)

Posts full of aversion or hatred towards Ukrainians, but with no substantive arguments, are fairly common. This is a significant problem in online public discourse, and pushes the two communities apart.


 2311 Ukrainians demand the return of Przemyśl from Poland as their territory and their city. They're right about it being a Ukrainian city, as it's such a brothel and shithole, and so many of them live there that their national character is visible to the naked eye. (D 7: 17_04_blogi)

Threads in which relations with Russia are valued more highly than those with Ukraine appear in social as well as political contexts. The difficult and divisive history between Poland and Ukraine is alluded to, and while many writers try to discern varying shades of gray in our historical relations, a "litany of grievances" generally holds sway in these discussions. These tend to be general grievances and they are all too frequently responses to specific arguments from particular individuals.

 Whether the Ukrainians have made such a gesture, "ethnic cleansing" reaching well into the tens of thousands, not of officer prisoners, but of civilians in Volhynia, including women, children, and old people, comes more under genocide. There's just one more detail that really makes a huge impression on me. Execution with a shot in the back of the head is – whatever you say – more "humane" than the cruel, barbaric, and perverted killings that Ukrainians inflicted on Poles. I'm afraid that Smarzowski's film won't be overdone if it's about reality. Ukrainian intellectuals, supposedly fostering our good neighborly connections, are scared of conflicts somehow flaring up. I don't want to reopen old wounds or rub salt into them, but they're never going to heal if we pretend that none of this ever happened, and that Bandera is a hero and an icon, because he fought for a free Ukraine (D 7: 17_04_blogi)

POLITICS

This thematic area had a lot of posts referring to the international situation, where the writers offered their own interpretation of European governance. Some referenced substantive arguments, but others merely gave the writer's point of view.


 2223 Maciek.g Many thanks for the opportunity of getting to know Czech President Zeman's position and opinion on contemporary Ukraine. The Polish elites quietly accepted that march, with those Banderite torches. They looked as if they were under anesthetic and just waiting to sign up for their next commitment on behalf of US interests (Schetyna's recent US visit), which are alien to Poland's, and legible – because p_ko of Russia, there'll always be a lot of noise about Katyn, but Volhynia is brushed off in the name of what?? _POLSKA does stupidity have to win again? Why the fuck do we care about Ukraine – it's only preventing our country from integrating faster with the European Union. THEM. The "Elites" and Ukrainian citizens in their current state aren't fit to be seriously interested in Unification with us. If SOMEONE important on the "Scene" would only say it clearly. We Need Zeman, Our ZEMAN. (D 1: 17_01_blogi)


THE ROLE OF RUSSIA (THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION)

The analyzed posts included texts hostile towards Russia and others hostile to Russia's adversaries. However, unequivocal sympathy for the Russian Federation is seldom openly expressed. This seems to be connected with historical processes that have affected Polish society.

Russia is perceived as an alternative (to Ukraine) partner in relations with the East, or, considerably more frequently,

as the greatest threat to Polish independence.


 At the same time, the proposal to restrict cooperation with Ukraine is practically a recognition of Russia's sphere of influence east of the Polish border. The argument that Russia won't be willing to risk a clash with a united Europe and the West is completely bogus, we had Georgia after just a few months, and now, after 3 years, a war in Ukraine. Either because we support the independence of these countries in the way of their active attraction to Poland and that are in favor of us mediating with the West, or else by meddling with contacts with Russia, we actually guarantee an imperial and aggressive Kremlin policy. (D 1: 17_01_blogi)

 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has disclosed a memorandum from March 2008 that – according to departmental head Witold Waszczykowski – “was the start of Donald Tusk's government's abandoning a pro-ukrainian policy in favor of a pro-russian policy”. In the document, released by PAP, we read that “the options for Russian economic, political – and especially, military – expansion – are fairly limited; they are meeting considerable obstacles in CIS countries like Ukraine and Georgia (D 1: 17_01_blogi)


There are still strong vestiges of post-sovietism in Ukraine, as manifested in its peculiar political culture and provincial politicking, its oligarchic coteries (modeled on Russian +clans+), and its debauched corruption. Our influence seems to be relatively shallow in Ukrainian soil, and, until 2005, their main axis was the trust and friendship between presidents A. Kwaśniewski and L. Kuchma. The view that the +breakthrough+ in policy towards Russia, mythologized in political and especially media discourse, should not be expected has to be spread. Despite appearances, Polish-Russian relations are not encumbered with any

big contentious issues that are purely bilateral. The issue of energy security has a remarkably multilateral dimension, and in the context of the Northern Gas Pipeline, our measures should be, and are, addressed to Germany and the EU in general, rather than to Russia. It is easy to get the impression that Poland, in its relations with Ukraine, has too readily capitulated to the tactics of their elites, no praise or promises for its ties to the West (D 1: 17_01_blogi)

Unambiguous assertions to the effect that enmity or poor relations with Ukraine is a policy that benefits Russia appear to be important in the collected texts.


 At the same time, the proposal to restrict cooperation with Ukraine is practically a recognition of Russia's sphere of influence east of the Polish border. The argument that Russia won't be willing to risk a clash with a united Europe and the West is completely bogus, we had Georgia after just a few months, and now, after 3 years, a war in Ukraine. Either because we support the independence of these countries in the way of their active attraction to Poland and that are in favor of us mediating with the West, or else by meddling with contacts with Russia, we actually guarantee an imperial and aggressive Kremlin policy. (D 1: 17_01_blogi)

Bilateral Polish-Ukrainian relations is a completely separate issue. Mutual records of both political friendship and aggression are reflected in online discussions. References to the Russian Federation and its (potential) influence in the region can also be found here.

 Destroying the monument was a Russian provocation, according to the Ukrainian group, Right Sector. Artiom Skoropadski, a spokesman for the group, ruled out the possibility that his


members might have destroyed it. Right Sector regards Poland as a strategic partner. According to the spokesman, the operation could have been a provocation on the part of the Russian special services, which want to divide Poland and Ukraine – said Paweł Bobołowicz, TVP Info's Kiev correspondent. (D 1: 17_01_blogi)

There are also posts referring to the situation in Poland (politics, society) in which the Ukrainian minority is only a subject of discussion/opinion, but is not treated as the subject of the post.

 the “right” side of society is especially prone to these activities, due to certain political myths, that it professes (endekoidism, saying that the greatest threat are Germany/Jews/Ukraine, not perceiving Soviet threats). (D 1: 17_01_blogi)

HISTORY

The Volhynia murders is the most significant historical topic, as well as the one that appears most frequently and evokes the strongest emotions. First, there is a review of the historical events. Then there is a reference to the present and Ukraine's failure to condemn these events. This topic elicits most of the negative statements, and considerably colors the tone of the entire discourse on Ukraine.

 Whether the Ukrainians have made such a gesture, “ethnic cleansing” reaching well into the tens of thousands, not of officer prisoners, but of civilians in Volhynia, including women, children, and old people, comes more under genocide. There's just one more detail that really makes a huge impression on me. Execution with a shot in the back of the head is – whatever you say – more “humane” than the cruel, barbaric, and perverted killings that Ukrainians inflicted on Poles. I'm afraid that Smarzowski's film won't be overdone if it's about reality. Ukrainian

intellectuals, supposedly fostering our good neighborly connections, are scared of conflicts somehow flaring up. I don't want to reopen old wounds or rub salt into them, but they're never going to heal if we pretend that none of this ever happened, and that Bandera is a hero and an icon, because he fought for a free Ukraine (D 7: 17_04_blogi)



1552 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W-fuUuZaaGmU> ...a forgotten genocide... "NOT OF REVENGE, BUT OF THE VICTIMS CRYING OUT FOR REMEMBRANCE" ps ... prolog July 11, 1943 Ukrainians from the UPA attacked 99 Polish villages in Volhynia. They brutally murdered 10-11 thousand Poles in July alone. (D 13: 17_07_blogi)

Stepan Bandera, recognized as a hero and freedom fighter in Ukraine, remains an extremely controversial figure. On-line posters do not just see Bandera's significance to Ukrainian nationalist movements, but also his popularity in popular culture.



3004 Yeah... and Ukrainians worship criminals... I recently saw the film *There Once Was a Town* on TVP Polonia. It's the story of Kisielina, which was a target of Ukrainian nationalists. The ruins of the church in which Poles were murdered is still scary. One of the Ukrainian squads, for whom Stepan Bandera is a hero, even shot a film there. (D 13: 17_07_blogi)



We can, and certainly have some right to, view Ukraine, Bander, and Ukrainian nationalism with suspicion. We have... But we also have to see and understand that in contrast to us, they're some 400 years behind the times and only just coming to grips with defining themselves as an independent nation with their own identity and with building their own statehood. (D 7: 17_04_blogi)

Ukrainians appear as a component of Polish history. In this context, the Ukrainian minority is also described as citizens

and members of society in interbellum Poland. This is so positive a phenomenon that it "reframes" discussions on the history of the unswerving path that leads inexorably to the crimes of Volhynia in a broader context in which both positive and negative events can be found.



What background did the pre-war professors at the Lviv and Vilnius academies have? I don't know the statistical data, but not just ethnic Poles, but also Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Jews were associate professors at those academics. As we know, the Soviets and later the Nazis, didn't just murder Jews, but the Polish intelligentsia also sustained enormous losses. Maybe it's not true? I don't want to detract from the achievements of those post-war people and their contributions to the cities in what is now western Poland. But we would have had a high enough "intellect" in Gliwice, Germany, before the war. It's just that our "intellect" was evacuated before the advancing victorious Soviet army, murdered or sent to Siberia. (D 1: 17_01_blogi)

ECONOMICS

Economics is another important topic on social media.


Most posts generally advert to economic migration, or to put it bluntly, more workers from Ukraine. This sort of comment is often accompanied by a description of Polish migration along the lines of either "Ukrainians work in Poland, just like Poles in Germany and England", or, more negatively, "[the government] forces us to leave, now we have to let the Ukrainians in". This second perspective generates a lot of negative opinions about Ukrainian migrants in Poland.




Poland prepared the ground for nearly 3 million young people to leave the country in search of work, and at the same time, the administration is

elated that more than a million Ukrainians have come here for the same purpose and plans to increase Ukrainian immigration. Poland should be supporting the establishment of advanced production that requires expert knowledge and guarantees high earnings. Workers could then comfortably ensure a high standard of living for themselves and pensioners. Sadly, Poland still has simple work that can be done in countries like Ukraine and Albania. (D 1: 17_01_blogi)

Dissatisfaction with having to compete with Ukrainian workers is a recurring theme. There are also posts pointing to the increase in apartment rentals. This is another thing that makes life more difficult for wage earners, and is especially noticeable in small towns.

 I feel like a foreigner in Oława, even though I've lived here all my life. I can't afford to rent an apartment, prices have gone through the roof, and people prefer to rent to workers from Ukraine. There are only Ukrainians at work and you can't communicate with them. It's hard to find something better... conversations were full of joy until I had the baby. That's actually something to be ashamed of here. I didn't slave away for 12 hours so that I could be ashamed in the delivery ward or hide the fact that I had a baby. The hints that I should sit at home with the baby are weak and have probably made me such a disgraceful mother that I dare to dream about self-actualization. (D 19: 17_10_blogi)


Some commentators note that Poland is not Ukraine's major economic partner. This means that Ukraine prefers to work with other European countries.

 Mud Docteur — it's completely understandable that Ukraine prefers Germany, it's a rich country and doesn't bang on about Voyhynia (D 1: 17_01_blogi)

Isolated posts describe the most common negative effects of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict on the Polish economy.


LAW

Two topics are commented on here. The first are the issues associated with hate speech towards Ukrainians, and the broader issues associated with online discussions, freedom of expression, and the attitudes and manners of people in the public sphere. Here, there are references to numerous discussions and disputes, debates on the statements of public figures and theoretical considerations on freedom of speech.

 980 I can't agree with Fr. Isakowicz, when he compares cases that are not symmetrical. Saying that a country only exists theoretically, and is generally "... a pile a stones" in a bugged and illegally recorded private conversation is not the same as a Tweet on the web, applauding crime and violence in obscene language, regardless of whether a Ukrainian is killed by a Russian "separatist" out of hatred or a Ukrainian "Banderite" kills out of hatred. This is not just my impression, but "Freedom of Speech", in the professor's publication, carries the same weight as "Jews to the gas chamber". That's what qualifies it to be investigated by the public prosecutor, as the provisions apply to it. So what's all this talk about lynching? Don't forget that Fr. Isakowicz, although he is largely correct in his critique of Polish-Ukrainian relations, and in reproaching the Polish side for bad policy, doesn't manage to hide his deep-seated, not to say traumatic (no doubt due to family reasons), aversion to Ukrainians, and therefore can't see anything untoward in the conduct of Prof. Paż. (D 1: 17_01_blogi)


The second topic concerns common offenses (most often to do with road accidents). Paradoxically, this can be analyzed as the "normalization" of relations

with the Ukrainian minority. Ukrainian citizens have become a permanent component of social relationships in Polish society.


 892 If I was a judge, the Elk killer would have gotten 10 years in jail, and the Ukrainian who killed two teenage girls, more than ten years interest. So much for that. (D 1: 17_01_blogi)

OTHER THEMATIC AREAS

There are not many posts about “art”. Those that were analyzed were mainly about films, most frequently Wojciech Smarzowski’s film *Volhynia*, which provoked discussions about Ukrainian-Polish relations in the 1930s and 1940s. Other films, e.g. *There Once Was a Town*, are also mentioned.


 3004 Yeah... and Ukrainians worship criminals... I recently saw the film *There Once Was a Town* on TVP Polonia. It’s the story of Kisielina, which was a target of Ukrainian nationalists. The ruins of the church in which Poles were murdered is still scary. One of the Ukrainian squads, for whom Stepan Bandera is a hero, even shot a film there. (D 13: 17_07_blogi)

Texts referring to Ukrainian media and journalists are even fewer and farther between, and usually appear in sensational circumstances, e.g. the death of a journalist.

 16 Ukraine – the journalist Oles Buzina was eliminated in the courtyard of his home... comment with source links not found I might provide it another way. (D 7: 17_04_blogi)

When specific people do appear in the texts, they are most often politicians, although historical figures, e.g. Bandera and Shevchenko, are also mentioned.


 Waszczykowski observed that “the writers have appraised the situation in Ukraine very negatively in their memorandum, citing post-Sovietism, corruption, clans, and a non-transparent political process”. The Head of Foreign Affairs stressed that “the argument that Polish-Ukrainian relations are shallow and based on personal relationships, e.g. between Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Leonid Kuchma, is completely unfounded. This is sheer ignorance, as these relations were highly developed, e.g. on the military level, even then”. (D 1: 17_01_blogi)


 My Russian language teacher was a Ukrainian named Shchuka. I might have gotten an “F” so I could take private tuition. Now that I think about it, it might have been half tuition, that was no-nonsense Russian learning. The other half, she taught me Russian by “immersing” me into the poetry of Taras Shevchenko. Mr Shchuka was in thrall to Shevchenko, and after drinking his way through two hours of tuition, would recite him by heart with more skill than a professional actor. I don’t remember anything about all that tuition and “Russian learning”, but I remember all the recitations, or more accurately, my fascination with them... I feel embarrassed, as would anybody, to write that I succumbed to the magic and “flew” in thoughts and impressions after those drunken recitals. But the truth is that I flew, I survived, and I experienced. I was 15 and those experiences still stick in my memory. They’re still there and they influence my observation and judgment. That’s the magic of Shevchenko as listened to by a teenager for hours on end. (D 7: 17_04_blogi)


4.2. POSTS ON FACEBOOK PROFILES


The Facebook social media platform is used by 18 million Poles. This chapter presents a quantity analysis of Facebook posts. An additional report showing the make-up of people who read Facebook profiles referencing Ukrainian topics is presented in the appendix.

Roughly half the posts on the analyzed Facebook profiles were marked negative, and one in eight had a strongly negative affect (negat2). As with blog comments, history, especially the history of the 1940s, evoked extremely negative feelings. Texts that raise the frightening possibility of a repetition here and now by recalling those times attract a great deal of attention. The old saw “like grandfather, like grandson” is often cited in posts that broach the topic of Volhynia.

 155 If glorifying murderers is OK with you, then we have nothing to discuss. Murderers who planned to kill all the Poles in Kresy. There's absolutely no difference... Let the Germans walk around with pictures of Hitler and you still wouldn't see the difference. (D 2: 17_01_fb)


 617 now everyone can see the sorts of positions they have in our country they are literally free to do whatever they want and we look on waiting for a repeat of the fun they're going to have cutting and slicing this can now be remedied only by brutally deporting these savages they wanted UPAaine well let them stay there. (D 8: 17_04_fb)


 1310 It bothers me because that Banderite brood will be looking for an ass to hug in Poland, and that treacherous nation will manage to stick a knife in your back. (D 8: 17_04_fb)

 1948 Germans, Russians, Muslims, Ukrainians... who else is going to teach us how to put our own country and own homes in order. They've

got a “brothel on wheels” back home, but they're so keen to teach others. And let's not whitewash the Banderites. Statements are now popping up in company strength, talking about taking back land from Poland and giving Poles the chop. A journalist appeared. Go back to your own country, guard the border, and don't do a “Maidan” on the streets of Warsaw. As the grandfather was a Banderite, it's very highly likely that the grandson will follow in his footsteps, it's the same here with the commies. (D 14: 17_07_fb)

By way of balance, it is worth noting that there are also positive and neutral posts. The writers simply see Ukrainians as neighbors who do an honest day's work and integrate into society when they come to Poland.

 210 Fucking great just have a drink with normal people. And you'll suddenly find that you don't have to fight in the UPA, defend Przemyśl or praise Putin ;) (D 2: 17_01_fb)

 606 The great thing about Ukrainians is that they're keen to come here for work and they learn quickly :-) (D 8: 17_04_fb)

When the subjects of the collected posts are analyzed, we can see that they mostly concern society, politics, history and economics.

SOCIETY

Most of the marked posts are about migration, and the trials and tribulations of two nations living next to each other. The feeling of superiority that Poles have from being “at home”, combined with a stated desire to “order” Polish society, are encoded into these statements. Strong feelings of identity and belonging to a group (“Us” vs “Them”) are also common.



1178 To Whom It May Concern Ukrainians are guests here, and as such, it behooves them to behave as guests and not as hosts. They can demand not to be kept in line back home, but not here. It really pisses me off that some newcomer has more rights here than us Poles. They're not picked on for their beliefs, but for their boorish behavior towards their hosts. They should be thankful they only got a punch in the face. Well done Poles no foreign monster is going to impose his views on us, if he's not happy, he can go back to Ukraine and basta. (D 2: 17_01_fb)

At the same time, we can see an awareness that migration is not an exclusively Polish phenomenon, but one that affects every country in Europe, and one that is most often viewed negatively.



1365 The Ukrainians are showing their teeth. There are as many of them here as there are Bedouins in W. Europe. (D 8: 17_04_fb)

Comments expressing aversion or downright hatred are often explicitly linked with right-wing discussions organized around opposition to “the left” and “multi-culti” policies.



287 The younger generation of Poles are being driven out of the Fatherland, so it can be populated with Polish Jewry and Ukrainians. That's Eastern multi-culti. (D 8: 17_04_fb)

In addition to offering glimpses from a global and national perspective, the posts contain descriptions of everyday interpersonal relationships. These, however, as based on stereotypes and a simple us (Poles) vs them (Ukrainians) dichotomy. More importantly, the prevalence of this kind of post is a result of how the texts were collected. As the key word was “Ukrainians”, posts concerned with national distinctions made it to the

collection, whereas those where Ukrainians were simply boy/salesman/Oleg did not.



320 Not all such things again a good my husband had two Ukrainian women after him after he married me they were only after cash looking for a sucker to super set up some for cash will do anything in Warsaw full of them in Ukraine they are so poor when they come to Poland or the West it shows what they can afford for any old work such do not go because they break their poor nails. (D 8: 17_04_fb)

There are also texts written in Polish by Ukrainians. Here again, it is worth noting that the way the texts were collected affects their topics. Texts posted by Ukrainians have to satisfy the following conditions: be written in Polish; be published on Polish media (on Polish-language Facebook profiles); and contain the key words.

These posts seek advice and assistance, and contribute to public discussions:





672 Hi, I have a problem, I lodged the documents for a temporary residence permit and a work permit (at the moment, I'm waiting for the residence permit without a visa valid to today) on the day of lodging the application I was working at the same employer on the basis of a visa and a type a permit. Can I work at the same employer from which I got a type A permit and a residence permit if I don't have a valid visa and I'm waiting for a residence permit? (D 8: 17_04_fb)

POLITICS


National politics and politicians take up a lot of space in the analyzed texts. Ukraine and Ukrainians often “incidentally” intrude into deliberations about the Polish political world. These are


a benchmark that is often positive (and this is worth stressing) for the work of Polish politicians on behalf of Poles.

 837 Let people on the lower rungs earn a reasonable amount and we won't need Ukrainians. Then Poles would be happy to work and not flee across the border for work. And you're always making fools of us by telling the union how Poles earn so much. I'd take those rag-pickers from the sticks and those from the union and I'd take them around the streets and ask people how much they earned and how long they had to vegetate in Poland, with the prices in the shops constantly increasing. (D 14: 17_07_fb)

 848 Polish Darek, don't talk shit, because you're only sinking in it. Ukrainians, Germans, Belarusians, and even Russians are our neighbors, and I feel closer to them than to a lot of Poles – especially those PiS and ONR thugs. And Poland will be at the tail end of Europe for a long time with its backwardness, only the left can bring it up to speed, because PO, and especially PiS, are just right-wing crap. (D 14: 17_07_fb)

The writers ascribe a central role to Russia when it comes to foreign policy (from Poland's perspective). Russia is the country most often written about, and its enormous significance in shaping public discourse in Poland is all too readily apparent. Two positions are distinguished in the analyzed texts:

 anti-Russian. This is usually, but not necessarily, pro-Ukrainian. The writers argue that Russia is the greatest threat to Polish interests. This means that we should favor Ukraine, as it is in conflict with the Russian Federation;

 pro-Russian. This attitude is decidedly anti-Ukrainian. The writers cite historical and political arguments to show


that Ukraine constitutes a threat to Polish identity and statehood.

 661 Torpedoing every initiative to bring Poland and Ukraine together at its inception is of vital interest to Russia. Any arguments likely to achieve this end are used. Russian policy simply forces supportive thinking. Poland without Ukraine is condemned to close cooperation with Germany, and Ukraine without Poland to Russia. Does anything from monitoring every kind of conspiracy call to mind the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth? And which territorial changes signaled its decline? Sadly, thinking with a "map" is alien to our "patriots". (D 8: 17_04_fb)

The analyzed discourse contains posts that point out and/or warn against the machinations of "internet trolls", i.e. people who post an inordinate number of comments in an attempt to disseminate a particular viewpoint. In the political sphere, this type of activity is very frequently attributed to Russia.

 They often post [Russian trolls – Ed. M.T.] their comments under articles published in the three largest and most popular information portals, viz. Wp.pl, Onet.pl and Interia.pl, and they focus on topics like NATO, Ukraine, the European Union, and Russia. (D 14: 17_07_fb)

A lot of other topics that commonly associated politics with other areas, e.g. economics, appear in the texts, a case in point being the sale of gas to EU countries and Ukraine's role therein.

 1926 The problem is not even in the price, but in the fact that Ukraine will be relaying the gas gratis. Polish politicians are worried that a Ukraine cut off from gas will be "starved". (D 14: 17_07_fb)

HISTORY

Here, the sticking point in Polish-Ukrainian relations is plain for all to see in the very first text. At issue is the massacre of the Polish population of Volynia, and more precisely, how that event is remembered. The phrase “we won’t forget and we won’t forgive” appears in a lot of posts.



155 If glorifying murderers is OK with you, then we have nothing to discuss. Murderers who planned to kill all the Poles in Kresy. There’s absolutely no difference... Let the Germans walk around with pictures of Hitler and you still wouldn’t see the difference. (D 2: 17_01_fb)



1200 We were taught history at home, so that the truth could be passed on... This is not a matter of dispute... Poles who really know their history will never forgive the Ukrainians and will definitely never forget... (D 2: 17_01_fb)

The writers appeal to historical issues in their demands for the Polish government to adopt an unequivocally negative position on closer relations between Ukraine and the EU.



914 There is no reason why the Polish government, parliament and president shouldn’t simply say that Banderite Ukraine is never going to join the European Union. Poland should always oppose resurgent Ukrainian nationalism, because the citizens of the Second Republic paid the supreme price for it. (D 14: 17_07_fb)

Discussions on the historical determinants of the statehood and sovereignty of the nations of Eastern Europe are another historical thread.



2091 Mariusz Dadaś doesn’t it make you think that, as Ukrainians have preserved a national consciousness, their own language, and have

as many heroes as history has allowed, even though Ukraine has never existed as a state, and despite the population having been oppressed by Poles and Russians for centuries, that they deserve their own state? Ukraine has greater national awareness than Belarus, where not many know the national language, and where they’ve meekly submitted to whoever happened to rule over them for centuries. (D 8: 17_04_fb)

ECONOMICS

Ukraine crops up in the wider context of migration and refugees. This issue has been much discussed in Poland over the past year or so. Two positions clearly stand out here:

☞ Ukrainians are migrants, and migrants are all part of an evil un-Polish faction that threatens our identity, culture, economy, labor market etc.;


☞ Ukrainians are migrants, but are clearly distinguishable from migrants who are foreign to us (culturally, religiously, racially), who come from other parts of the world, and especially from Muslims. Ukrainians are familiar, they are like us, and they work hard. This makes them similar to those Poles who have left the country to find work.




2113 But for that you can blackmail us with penalties for not accepting dirtbags that union is funny and I hope that it finally comes to an end because that’s what it’s aiming for. Luckily those Polish politicians think a little and don’t let in the worst shit Ukrainians whom I’d personally drive out are bad enough. NO TO THE ISLAMIZATION OF POLAND!!! If the Germans and French are that stupid they can fend for themselves! (D 8: 17_04_fb)

Economics is mainly topics associated with the labor market. There are

Ukrainian workers in almost every city, town and village. They associate with Polish workers, and compete with them on the labor market. All this is reflected on social media.


 1145 A quote from the article “Contrary to accepted opinion, Ukrainians are not invading our labor market either”. No, not at all, the writer obviously has no idea of what he’s on about. Let him take the SKM [Szybka Kolej Miejska – ed. MT] around the Tri-City at around 5 am, there are so many Ukrainians in the Tri-City, it’d be like suddenly finding himself in Ukraine. (D 2: 17_01_fb)

There are also posts that take a more global look at the economy, the economic situation of the country, and Poland’s economic relations with Ukraine.


 1926 The problem is not even in the price, but in the fact that Ukraine will be relaying the gas gratis. Polish politicians are worried that a Ukraine cut off from gas will be “starved”. (D 14: 17_07_fb)


OTHER THEMATIC AREAS

Most of the posts that come under the “military” heading are taken up with the Ukrainian-Russian conflict in eastern Ukraine.


 2201 Ukrainian army: the separatists have broken the ceasefire agreement Pro-Russian separatists in Donbass in Eastern Ukraine have broken the ceasefire agreement in force since April 1, Oleksandr Motuzianyk, a Ukrainian Defense Ministry spokesman in Kiev, has announced. (D 8: 17_04_fb)

Official announcements from both the Ukrainian and Russian governments and press dispatches from the front attract comments, as do accounts of everyday life in the conflict zone.

 364 “Explosions are our normality”. Avdiivka: an industrial gem in the center of the Ukrainian war Today, Oct. 12 (07:49) “Explosions and shots are our normality. We’ve already grown accustomed to those sounds”, a resident of Avdiivka, 14 km from Donetsk, told Patryk Michalski. Avdiivka was in the news at the beginning of the year, when it was shelled by Pro-Russian separatists. A special correspondent for RMF FM in Donbass reports on what life is like in the region after more than three years of conflict. Avdiivka three years after the outbreak of the Donbass War. (D 21: 17_10)

 2201 Ukrainian army: the separatists have broken the ceasefire agreement Pro-Russian separatists in Donbass in Eastern Ukraine have broken the ceasefire agreement in force since April 1, Oleksandr Motuzianyk, a Ukrainian Defense Ministry spokesman in Kiev, has announced. (D 8: 17_04_fb)

In the realm of art, Ukrainians appear as members of Polish society, i.e. people met casually in situations connected with artistic events. Their separateness (especially their language of communication) makes them easily identifiable, and this is reason enough for their conduct to attract comments on social media.

 221 I also had a case, being at an ac/dc concert in Warsaw... everyone around me had phones and watched the whole concert through a phone display... But that was nothing... There was a Ukrainian a little farther on... He had his back to the stage for half the concert, because he was recording his face with the concert in the background... (D 14: 17_07_fb)

In the world of social media, similarly as with other topics, Ukrainian issues are often part of the worldview battle being waged between those on the left and right of the public debate in Poland. We

therefore have “left” and “right” versions of events in the comments.



1222 The leftist media say that it was a terror attack on symbols of the heroic Ukrainian Insurgent Army. (D 2: 17_01_fb)

4.3. INTERNET FORUMS

Every third post on an Internet forum is marked negative. There were few extremely negative (negatywnosc2) texts in the entire collection, and those that qualified concerned historical and political issues.



1695 Bandera also lived with animals, also had the nickname Baba, because he served as a woman in jail. Ukrainians have the hero they deserve. That one only copied bandera. (D 9: 17_04_fora)



1475 Anyone ...who treats Ukraine as a state organism is making an unforgivable mistake! Ukraine is a mafia creation... that's how it's organized and that's how it's run! Maidan only reinforced this structure. The Banderites are nothing more than an ideology and a myth – to hold it together... Anyway, one day soon it'll all fall apart like a rotten log. Even the PiS government seems to have finally come to its senses... whether they were educated... about how it really is. (D 15: 17_07_fora)

Other moderately negative opinions, as with the communication channels mentioned above, mainly concern the murders in Volhynia. There are also many comments on the everyday behavior of Ukrainians, as observed by Poles. Negative posts are often about current events, e.g. the Football World Cup Elimination Final (Ukraine lost, which generated a lot of negative comments).



The anniversary of the apogee of the Volhynia Murder is coming up in ten days. This is an excellent gauge of the level of Polish-Ukrainian relations. Join the discussion on whether these 2–3 mln Ukrainians, still doing work that Poles refuse to do for the pay being offered were worth it, to ostentatiously shit on the graves of the approx. 100,000 Poles murdered in Volynia. Actually – the Ukrainians working here for semi-slave rates can leave and no amount of courtship will help. And what then? (D 15: 17_07_fora)



2498 On a pedestrian crossing in Kraków, a Ukrainian, realizing that he hadn't pressed the button to change the lights, bombarded the woman next to him with a lot of crap that meant Polish whore and bitch followed her to the stop and waved his fists! (D 15: 17_07_fora)



A bevy of American senators, mainly with a commercial background, was pushing for war. This overseas “empire of good” was going to bring democracy to the vanquished. That their taxpayers, like us, would have to pay for it was obvious!!! The stakes were Crimea, where the American dogs of war were stationed, surrounding the RF and having the whole black sea in view... Unfortunately the plan shat itself out, Putin said he was going to puncture it, and then it was checkmate in one. (D 9: 17_04_fora)



595 Ukraine world cup in Russia without them, rubbish tips. (D 21: 17_10_fora)





628 A criminal who killed two teenage Polish girls while driving a car under the influence of ethyl alcohol is a Ukrainian. This happened in Jelenia Góra yesterday. Why doesn't TVP report it? Because of PiS's collaboration with Ukraine? (D 3: 17_01_fora)

It is also worth quoting a few positive opinions. Two thematic areas in which it is not enough that there are relatively few negative opinions, there are a lot of

positive statements about Ukraine and Ukrainians, are sport and work.


SOCIETY

 2025 Stępień is going to fight the Ukrainian Artem Redko. Right now, this whole situation should work out for the best. While Redko is a much more experienced boxer than the previously announced Kameruńczyk, and even though he hasn't had the best run of late, he should put up a good fight. This now makes two Ukrainians on the Pole's CV, so he might soon be tempted to add Yevgeniy Makhteyenko, a tough motherfucker and recent rival of Sęk and Soldra. Paweł could prove quite a bit in this fight, although he's risking a lot... D 3: 17_01_fora)


 947 I live in Piekary and I've been watching Ukrainians working on the insulation of a building in ul. Bieszczadzka. BOLIX (there's a large poster) is doing it all. They're working like people work in the West (I can make that comparison, because I worked there myself in communist times). The group comes to work before 7 and finishes after 17. Nobody bums around. They're all on the go the whole time. I think that Poles could learn a lot from them. When you work in the west and earn 4X what you earn here, you're also motivated the way Ukrainians are here. (D 15: 17_07_fora)

Most of the texts taken from Internet forums were assigned to the following categories: Society, Economics, History, Politics, Sport, and whatever did not appear on other communication channels.

The first question is the status of Ukrainians in Poland. These are sometimes described as occupying a privileged position, as a group that is given special treatment, better even than the citizenry of the Republic of Poland.

 On the contrary, nobody should be made to feel inferior by virtue of being German, Lithuanian, Polish, or Ukrainian. The whole problem boils down to the fact that people who come here from Ukraine, get a lot more from their hosts, i.e. Poles. It's easier for them to get into university (and once there, they have far fewer problems in staying there), and to get all sorts of welfare. I don't know about the others on this thread, but I have nothing against Ukrainians being in Poland. I'm just against the favoritism they get, let everyone start from the same position – meanwhile, I, as a kind of host, am doing it harder than a stranger in my own home. Apart from that, I'd like you to tell me when Poles have not been able to manage independently. (D 9: 17_04_fora)

Ukrainian Voices. The voices of ordinary people, who propose not looking at grand narratives and ways of describing minorities. They simply write about their problems, tasks, successes, and failures.

 My husband and I are Ukrainian, and, it really gets me down to see how limited people are in their outlook when I read comments with statements like these. I know the owners personally, they're a married couple – a Ukrainian woman and a Russian man (!), and despite all the political upheavals in their countries, they love each other and are above accusing anyone of being a banderite, a pile of rubbish, or a Putinite traitor. They decided to open a shop with articles close to their heart. And they've been treated like shit. You and the others commenting here, who write bullshit about Bandera and the UPA, whenever they hear about anything Ukrainian,

they also insult me personally. And what gives you the right??? What do you know about me or the owners? (D 21: 17_10_fora)

Posts related to commercial relations, agency options, or assistance in Ukraine. These kinds of comments also show that, despite official relations not being the best, life goes on; people continue to work, trade, and do business.



177 Ukraine – I provide assistance in obtaining driver's licenses in Poltava. Categories depend on those already possessed. To two categories simultaneously. Knowledge of Ukrainian not required. All details provided over the phone. (D 15: 17_07_fora)

Texts about issues associated with national identity and the fate of individual families beautifully illustrate the troublesome history of Eastern Europe.



1189 Do you feel Ukrainian? If you do, you are, if you don't, you aren't. If your father doesn't feel Ukrainian, he's not. Alternatively, you're Poles of Ukrainian descent in these circumstances. It's even hard to talk about Polish genes, because we're close to each other – both in this respect and historically. (D 9: 17_04_fora)

Posts about male-female relationships cast light on the next area of social interaction.



There are heaps of guys interested in picking up girls – even completely average ones – everywhere. Women really can – and do – have their pick of guys, but don't count on Ukrainian women ;-). I've been writing about fairytale princes :-). and not Ukrainian or e.g. Chinese, Korean, Japanese etc. women... Rich guys with above-average appearance and a completely acceptable character, want a faithful woman, who'll sit at home, bear children, and show support for her husband. None of those outlandish ideas would

ever enter a European woman's head nowadays. (D 21: 17_10_fora)

Interpersonal relationships. The main topic here is “being Ukrainian”. This need to distinguish (our own from foreigners) means that the most insignificant event is worth putting on the Internet and writing a post (albeit a short one) on if a Ukrainian is involved.



There are a lot of Ukrainians at work. One of them told us about his life once. He was a police officer. He happened to buy a driver's license later. Other friends said that bribery was really common there. A friend who bought a driver's license, is short-sighted, other friends said that ran a red light They feel exempt from punishment here. I see the same attitude in many of them at work; he wouldn't do it because he didn't come here to get fucked over And because he's Ukrainian, his nationality is smeared. (D 3: 17_01_fora)



1310 Maybe she just doesn't understand this expression, because she's Ukrainian? Or she doesn't even know that there's something on FB somewhere Disregarding the properties it can be stated that healthy parsley is simply tasty parsley. (D 3: 17_01_fora)

ECONOMICS


Economic topics begin with the similarity in the fate of migrants – Poles emigrate to work in Western Europe, while Ukrainians work in Poland.




56 I'm not in the least proud of our countrymen. But I understand that money has to come from somewhere. Manual labor is better than having to live on handouts. Ukrainians now work in Poland just like Poles work in the West, although quite a few of them have higher education, such


is the lot of people from poor countries. (D 3: 17_01_fora)

Labor shortages. These appear for many reasons, e.g. emigration, early retirement, the 500+ program. The dependence of our economy on Ukrainian workers very frequently comes up in this context.


 2718 Zulus writes: In May, the Civic Institute estimated that 20,000-33,000 women had withdrawn from the labor market as a result of the 500+ program. The "Family 500+" program, as formulated by the PiS government, is flawed. One of the consequences of the program's poor design is that some 20,000-33,000 women have withdrawn from the labor market <http://www.institutobywatelski.pl/27062...> The Institute for Structural Research puts a higher figure on it. These are curious data in the face of the country's manpower shortage. Can the Ukrainians manage it? (D 21: 17_10_fora)


As stated above, the labor market tends to be rated positively in these texts. Clearly, however, the fact that Ukrainians are taking up permanent employment, thereby making the market more competitive, is not always welcomed by contributors to the discussion.

 1827 Is a Ukrainian any worse than a Pole? They don't want to work, but at least they do ... apart from that, they both look at the wallets of the boys from C or at the list of pay rates, so that they can be sure that they are getting that much cash? Let each of them look at himself, at how he works and whether he is doing his job reliably and only then judge others. (D 3: 17_01_fora)


 I work in an IT company. Most of the 140-member team in the Lublin branch consists of Ukrainians and Russians. What's more, I was the first Pole in "production" in the company and probably 2nd or 3rd overall. I don't have a problem

with that. For the first year, I used to laugh that I felt as if I lived in Lublin, but worked in Kiev. The team I lead has 4 Ukrainians, 3 Poles and a Russian. (D 9: 17_04_fora)

 Because it's only OK in Poland now. There wasn't even work for everybody a few years ago, but now employers are scrambling for workers – there's nobody to do anything. Half of them are Ukrainians where I am :-). But I like them – they're really sincere and probably more kindhearted than Poles. We're already permeated with the West and we're starting to treat each other like garbage. (D 15: 17_07_fora)

 947 I live in Piekary and I've been watching Ukrainians working on the insulation of a building in ul. Bieszczadzka. BOLIX (there's a large poster) is doing it all. They're working like people work in the West (I can make that comparison, because I worked there myself in communist times). The group comes to work before 7 and finishes after 17. Nobody bums around. They're all on the go the whole time. I think that Poles could learn a lot from them. When you work in the west and earn 4X what you earn here, you're also motivated the way Ukrainians are here. (D 15: 17_07_fora)

There are many classified ads related to running a business in Ukraine, and services for Polish businesspeople. Goods and services, from simple wood products to apartments, and general real estate are advertised.

 2729 Ukraine. Boxes, packaging, wooden EUR-pallets. From PLN 5 ea. Top quality wooden pallets, transport packaging, boxes, EUR-pallets, industrial own production. To required dimensions as per specifications after heat treatment. Phytosanitary wood used dried in drying kilns. Pine, spruce, alder, beech, poplar, aspen, maple etc. Our factories have extensive maintenance facilities and large warehouse areas. We

look forward to doing business with you. Ph: (D 21: 17_10_fora)



Ukraine. For sale: agricultural land, construction and development sites. 3,500 PLN/ha. Riverside and lakeside properties in peaceful and picturesque locations. Land on international routes with old homes, stables, and barns. Blocks of land near recreational facilities (from 0.5 ha to 50+ ha) in the vicinity of a large forest. (D 9: 17_04_fora)



3070 Ukraine. Unlimited quantities of agricultural timber, easily obtainable from local farms. Production lines for converting biomass into fuel. (2 MT/h). For sale or lease. Highly efficient wooden pellet machine (2 MT/hr). Permanent access. For sale: factories, leasing from PLN 350/mth. Shredders, granulators for sawdust fuel pellets, suitably prepared woodchips, small wooden chips, carpentry waste. (D 15: 17_07_fora)

HISTORY

Historical issues clearly focus on the 1940s. This delineates the entire discourse on Ukraine on Polish social media. The shibboleths UPA, the OUN, and Bandera crop up in most posts.

Reflection and criticism, however, are not entirely lacking. Some posts discuss the condition of Poland and Poles very critically, and at length, without omitting Ukraine. Others clearly state that Russia is the main beneficiary of the conflict between the two nations.



On the other hand, Operation Vistula, was conducted by people like Gen. Mossor, who could hardly be said to have had communist convictions. The same holds true for the soldiers who carried it out. Apart from that, ethnic cleansing, expulsions and resettlements were considered par for the course in those days. And the Ukrainians gave the Poles hell too (as did the Poles to

the Ukrainians, not as much, but still). Generally, this is a festering sore that threatens dire consequences for both countries, and the Russians, i.e. the mortal enemy of both countries, stand to benefit most. (D 9: 17_04_fora)



2520 j-k wrote: >well you see drivel... >> you can't own up to not knowing that marshall Piłsudski in 1920 for > like Kiev > not to occupy it, only at the request of the Ukrainians in Ataman Petliura's circle. << You're can be uneducated or a public liar. >> the choice is yours. (D 15: 17_07_fora)


There are obviously earlier historical references to the coexistence of Poles and Ukrainians as well. Living cheek by jowl for centuries has produced many common historical moments of major import to which we are only too happy to return.



1648 is considered a watershed in the history of Polish Jews. That's when the Cossack-Peasant uprising, led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1595–1657), broke out in Eastern Ukraine. Khmelnytsky addressed with Cossacks with the words: "We have been sold in bondage to the cursed Jewish seed by Poland". This unleashed the horrendous butchery of Jews and Poles that followed. Many communes were completely obliterated. Four Jewish communes, numbering approx. 3,000 people, only escaped martyrdom by surrendering themselves, and all their belongings, to the Tartars as slaves. Prisoners were sold as slaves in Turkey. The Istanbul commune obtained finance from the Amsterdam commune to purchase the freedom of Jews enslaved in Turkey. In Nemyriv, the Cossacks entered into an agreement with the Orthodox population and murdered 6,000 Jews. During the siege of Tulchin, the Poles made a deal with the Cossacks and abandoned 2,000 Jews to certain death. (D 9: 17_04_fora)


Ukraine is also depicted as a "normal" territory (i.e. one that does not trigger extreme emotions), where wars have been

fought, and trade and production have flourished.

 The fact is, however, that an awful lot of these coins, probably most in the Commonwealth, are in what is now Ukraine. We also know, however, that whole shipments of counterfeit money were transported to that remote and relatively backward region in the 17th century. From written sources, we only know of one mint in Ukraine whose production can be called imitative – for Hetman Doroshenko (c. 1669-1674) in Lysianka. We also know about several gangs of counterfeiters (e.g. the producers of copper longswords in the Poltava region) being caught by the Cossack authorities in the 1650s and 1660s. Obviously, the possibility that Cossacks were also counterfeiters cannot be ruled out – after all, the borderland conditions forced them to become efficiency in various handicrafts, as detailed in Vol. 1 of *With Fire and Sword*. The catalogue of *Nechytaylo* is largely a collection of loose assumptions. Ukrainians really want to find as many past traces as possible of traditions that might be considered exclusively theirs. Hence the exploitation of things “Cossack”, sometimes so intense as to be comical, e.g. their attempt to convince themselves and others that the *hopak* (a folk dance) is the Cossack answer to kung fu or rather capoeira. (D 9: 17_04_fora)


POLITICS

Ukraine is described, in a foreign policy context, as a country that is trying to model itself on Poland. Poland is portrayed as a regional leader; one that has efficiently and effectively transformed itself.


 Austria has expressed interest in joining the Visegrád Group, and is similarly a potential Intermarium candidate. Moldova – interested! Ukraine – unstable, but also looking towards Poland, where, like it or not, we’re currently acting as its attorney. Belarus is under a question mark,


but is also designated as the last Intermarium member. (D 15: 17_07_fora)

Those threads in which a replay of the Ukrainian revolution is mooted for Poland against a backdrop of social rebellion are revealing in that they imply a two-way flow of cultural and political inspiration.

 243 ha ha People completely divorced from reality might be dreaming about a Polish Maidan I know I repeat this every time the Polish Maidan slogan comes up. But I’ll say it once more: For a revolution, you need hunger, anger, and money. The money’s there, the anger’s there, but the hunger’s not. Poles don’t earn 500 PLN per month like Ukrainians, and unemployment is low. They live modestly, they don’t go to the theater because it’s dear, but their children don’t go hungry. (D 3: 17_01_fora)


Ukraine also appears in international politics independently of any Polish connection.

 309 Got an interesting email: “UN announcement – there is no Ukraine and never was April 7, 2014 the eight UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon made the bewildering announcement, which has been prohibited from being distributed in the Ukrainian media, including the Internet... the conflict between the two countries had been placed on the agenda of the UN Security Council session. The result was that the following motion was passed: “Ukraine has not registered its borders since Dec. 25, 1991. Ukraine’s borders as a sovereign state have not been submitted to or registered in the UN...” The webpage on which the entirety of this fairly tendentious text can be found, however, it is worth approaching various sources of information with caution and an analytical approach. (D 15: 17_07_fora)

 the result of 20 wasted years of state building in Ukraine, which is more corrupt than Russia

– says security expert Mark Galeotti, who is particularly critical of President Petro Poroshenko. (D 3: 17_01_fora)


A variety of questions concerning the rights of the Polish minority in Ukraine are raised in the analyzed statements. The rights of the Ukrainian minority in Poland, however, are not addressed. This topic is nevertheless worthy of attention, as it allows the perception of the two countries to be balanced (how Ukraine is perceived as a partner).


 1343 The President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs have once more abandoned Poles on the other side of the Bug Others are protesting this strong topic, but not us...: Many Central and Eastern European countries were seething when Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko signed the extremely controversial education bill, which strikes at the schooling of ethnic minorities, into law. This statute is shocking for two reasons. First, a lot of the ethnic groups living in the country on the Dnieper and the Dniester have felt threatened by the actions of the central authorities in Kiev for some time, so any step towards limiting the rights of minorities risks sparking dangerous social unrest. And separatism in Donbass and Crimea is a small problem? Is the ruling party (which is strongly built on the oligarchy) that desperate for more internal conflict? Second, Ukraine might have declared its willingness to join the European Union, but has distanced itself from international standards on this issues. And how. (D 21: 17_10_fora)

SPORT


Similarly to other media, sport does not engender strong feelings here. Ukraine is treated as a European player, and there is nothing discriminatory or offensive in these statements. Football is mentioned a lot, and there is a fair

amount on tennis (especially women's tennis).


 Analyzing the Croatian situation has convinced me that it hasn't changed. The draw in Kiev has given them a play-off. Obviously, if they win today, they'll go to Ukraine and immediately advance, but I can't see them winning there. My tips for the final round: Iceland to beat Kosovo, and Ukraine to draw with Croatia. (D 21: 17_10_fora)

 She is fairly capable, but extraordinarily regular tennis players, of Switolina's stamp, give her a lot of grief, because she can't keep the ball in court that long. The Ukrainian eliminated Angelique Kerber to reach the semi-finals in Brisbane, so she's starting the season mentally strong. Switolina should win easily and we advise an under bet (- (D 3: 17_01_fora)

Not-so-popular sports, e.g. motor racing, are also featured.

 The Czech round was the next one to see RGTs on the track. Juan Marzoa was behind the wheel of the powerful Porsche for the 4th time in 5 starts. Once more, the fans had to pick their jaws up off the floor when the Spaniard took his 911 to 8th place overall, beating all the R5s. Alex Drive was only slightly slower than the fast special stages. The Ukrainian finished 11th, only 20 seconds slower than his rival. After a short, one-off interruption, there was a return to form in the team classification. (D 21: 17_10_fora)


“Sports” texts also cover Ukrainians participating in non-competitive sports events. That's when the important social relations and the previously mentioned mechanism of perceiving the otherness associated with not being Polish appear.

 It's just that I go to a “trendy” gym in an office building in the center of town where only corporate types, celebrities and Ukrainian women go


:-) But I don't particularly mind, I sometimes feel stupid when I meet colleagues from work while I'm bench-pressing a ridiculously light weight. (D 9: 17_04_fora)

OTHER THEMATIC AREAS


“Military” posts mostly concern the Ukrainian-Russian conflict. These contain the accounts of Polish journalists, the mainstream media, and people living in the conflict zone.

 364 “Explosions are our normality”. Avdiivka: an industrial gem in the center of the Ukrainian war Today, Oct. 12 (07:49) “Explosions and shots are our normality. We’ve already grown accustomed to those sounds”, a resident of Avdiivka, 14 km from Donetsk, told Patryk Michalski. Avdiivka was in the news at the beginning of the year, when it was shelled by Pro-Russian separatists. A special correspondent for RMF FM in Donbass reports on what life is like in the region after more than three years of conflict. Avdiivka three years after the outbreak of the Donbass War. (D 21: 17_10)


A lot of the opinions take war to be an integral part of the capitalist order, where the main aim is to generate profits for the rich and powerful of the world. This makes the United States a key player. Questions concerning the openness of documents, unsolved mysteries, and business games, which typically come up in military discussions, appear frequently in the analyzed texts.

 A bevy of American senators, mainly with a commercial background, was pushing for war. This overseas “empire of good” was going to bring democracy to the vanquished. That their taxpayers, like us, would have to pay for it was obvious!!! The stakes were Crimea, where the American dogs of war were stationed, surrounding the


RF and having the whole black sea in view... Unfortunately the plan shat itself out, Putin said he was going to puncture it, and then it was check-mate in one. (D 9: 17_04_fora)

 1101 Oh boy, Katyn already. Focus on those shootings. You’re right, the Russians won’t own up to it. Truthful Ukrainians freely admit that they had a rocket in the magazine and someone stole it. ;-) What losers. You wrote before that it was an accurate report giving the who, what, how. I ask you again, where? (D 21: 17_10_fora)

This thematic area has some negative (even extremely negative) information on crimes and misdemeanors committed by Ukrainians living in Poland.


 628 A criminal who killed two teenage Polish girls while driving a car under the influence of ethyl alcohol is a Ukrainian. This happened in Jelenia Góra yesterday. Why doesn’t TVP report it? Because of PiS’s collaboration with Ukraine? (D 3: 17_01_fora)

A comparison of the court systems in the two countries which includes the circumstances that have determined their different transformational paths. This is the next thematic area where texts analyzing and comparing the Polish and Ukrainian situations show that the experiences of one can benefit both. They also show that the Polish and Ukrainian legal (i.e. court) systems are comparable (according to the writers) in this case.


 I’ve read what Ukrainians and even oppositionists from Belarus have been saying and it beggars belief. The Ukrainians have adopted almost all of our court system since the Yanukovych era, and they’re happy because they can see the improvement, while we’ve adopted the Yanukovych system!!! The Belarussians are warning us that Lukashenko implemented the same procedures 11 years ago. Maybe now we can see why

Karczewski went to Belarus. To learn. An individual, me, you, has no chance in a clash with the authorities. We can feel it in our bones, unfortunately. Cheos writes a lot about decommunization here (efe no doubt too), but they're not bothered by commies in the ruling party. (D 15: 17_07_fora)


Some posts on Internet forums talk about Ukrainians in the context of the education system, and the participation of children in class. This attests to a permanent Ukrainian presence in Polish society at the discourse level.

 M has been talking about a new friend at our place since yesterday – she only showed herself yesterday, and today was the first day in school for the Ukrainian girl and her Polish is probably bad (I'm not jealous – I know that children learn quickly, but new surroundings, a new language, new people...) M also had a Korean girl (born in Poland) in class, so she has an international class. (D 3: 17_01_fora)

This also concerns higher education. The main thing is that these statements are not always about students: there are also comments on lecturers.


 Please help because I can't cope with this. We have a lecturer who doesn't explain much, just reads from slides and in *very* weak Polish (he's Ukrainian) which is why I don't know anything... help! (D 3: 17_01_fora)

There are also plenty of references to pop culture, including the Eurovision Song Contest.


 The 58th Eurovision Song Contest held in Malmö is summarized in the 2013 Domenico plebiscite. The best female vocalist in the Prima Donna category: UK Bonny Tyler from the UK (final) AUSTRIA Natália Kelly (semi-final) ESTONIA Birgit (final) SLOVENIA Hannah (semi-final) DENMARK

Emmelie de Forest (final) RUSSIA Dina Garipova (final) UKRAINE Zlata Ognevich (final). (D 21: 17_10_fora)


The realities of online life are similarly reflected in comments and posts.

 And a Polish girl explained to him what we write on the forum so I complimented her Was she definitely Polish or Ukrainian and did she explain it to him properly? (D 9: 17_04_fora)

Ukraine is often described as a travel destination for Poles, who later share their impressions on social media.


 2652 I've been to Crimea (but it's not in Ukraine any more). I thoroughly recommend it, it's a really interesting and diverse part of the world. I was only there for 3 weeks, so I only went to the beach twice after an hour. The beach is poor (stony), if your idea of a holiday is lying on the beach, you'll be disappointed, but if it's visiting and getting to know "other worlds" and food, then you'll be in heaven. (D 21: 17_10_fora)


References to Ukrainian books and the Ukrainian heroes of the collective imagination take pride of place when it comes to art.

 Nadia Prisoner of Putin – Nadiya Savchenko "Nadia: Prisoner of Putin" is the frightening autobiography of the Ukrainian Nadiya Savchenko, abducted by the Russians and sentenced to 22 years in a penal colony after a show trial. The story of this soldier and MP has become a symbol of the lawlessness of the Kremlin, which is providing armed support for the separatists in Eastern Ukraine. The audiobook has additional sound. (D 9: 17_04_fora)


Ukraine and Ukrainians are finally a fixture of Polish literature. We come across Ukrainian characters or settings associate with Ukraine in a lot of texts.

We also find discussions about political fiction describing a future Russo-Ukrainian war.


 Olena was in Ukraine for two weeks. I became pleasantly warm between the legs at the memory of those moments with a friend of her sister's. But nothing apart from that. No unnecessary sentimentality. I found it even easier to archive my memories of her sister Marta. I noticed that once I'd changed my attitude, I didn't get horny, my head was free of erotic fantasies, and women, being a part of them starting to behave normally. (D 21: 17_10_fora)

 2553 The Third World War: The Fight for Ukraine - Y. Felshtinsky, M. Stanchev "The Third World War" by Yuri Feltshinsky and Mikhail Stanchev is the first book published on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which – in the authors' view – can only go global. They cite a great deal of evidence, going to the sources to draw on little known and completely unknown historical analogies. Felshtinsky and Stanchev lay the blame for the war squarely on Vladimir Putin and his KGB cronies, but they also recognize serious errors on the part of the Ukrainian political elite, which effectively set the scene for a Russian invasion during the first quarter century of the country's independence. Format: pdf, epub, mobi Size: 5.3 MB published: 2015. (D 21: 17_10_fora)

We have included the many mentions and memories of artists associated with Ukraine or those parts of Poland in present-day Ukraine under the heading of "art".

 Makuszyński was born in Stryj (now in Ukraine) on Jan. 8, 1884 and died in Zakopane on Jul. 31, 1953. He had a "very beautiful" burial in Pęksowy Brzyzek, as befitted an Honorable Zakopane Landowner. There was nobody from the Polish government or literary world present – they were busy... Friends and acquaintances – in exile – remembered him.


The discussion devoted to Anna Walentynowicz is a separate thread; one that illustrates the importance of the issues taken up. The subject of the debate is the Ukrainian origin of the "Solidarity" legend.

 408 The IPN is lying – Walentynowicz WAS NOT Polish <https://www.facebook.com/dobrodziejca/posts/1979042642376600> Anna Walentynowicz was born into a Ukrainian family. Her father did not die on the front. His name was Nazar, not Jan. He lived long after the war, and died in 1995. Her mother died before the war (1937). There was no bother Andrzej, and any talk of family members being arrested by the Soviets refers to cousins – for their Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists activities. The 12-year-old Anna was taken out of Ukraine by a Polish family (a classic case of child abduction), who convinced her that her village (including her family) had been wiped out by the Germans. Once in Poland, the girl was intimidated by being told "They'll kill you if you tell them you're Ukrainian" That's the truth – as confirmed by Anna Walentynowicz's biological sister, and also her son and grandson. This has also have confirmed by other people, who, unlike the IPN, have been able to verify the background of Anna Walentynowicz. (D 21: 17_10_fora)

4.2. COMMENTS ON WEBSITES


Half the analyzed texts placed on websites were marked negative, and one in eight were marked extremely negative.

The extremely negative texts concerned Ukraine as a whole. Many of them were nothing more than examples of a general aversion to our neighbors.


 1915 It'll probably be war. The thing is that Ukraine, as a country that has never existed, always and everywhere wants to blame everything. That's because of the state ideology to which the psychopath Bandera subscribed.


This ideology establishes robbery and murder as a means of enrichment. The European Union can open its borders, but it will be inviting crime and banditry along with the adherents of this ideology. And, as usual, politicians will claim that they weren't aware of any threat. Then they'll walk off into political oblivion, leaving EU countries with the problem of eliminating the banditry they've invited in. (D 10: 17_04_portale)

Curiously, some entries equate Ukraine and Russia, pointing out their otherness and separateness from Poland.

 1211 Ukraine and your rotten RuSSia are the same dog. The same commie cesspit. (D 22: 17_10_portale)


Some of these statements not only refer to Ukraine as a country, but also to people and society. They often have a historical context and/or refer to particular negative events, which are then generalized for the whole country.

 1398 all Ukrainians are bandits to Poles, the banderites beat us up at every step, but when the Poles turn on the banderites, there's one big WTH. (D 22: 17_10_portale)


 2630 Ukraine might be in Europe, but Ukrainians are wild people, very dangerous, violent, and inclined to murder. Their murderous tendencies can reveal themselves when, e.g. a sudden crisis causes them to lose their jobs – they can become banderized, and form gangs and various thieving organizations. – there's massive corruption in Ukraine. Marchuk claimed that she took a commission on the sale of PWKiK or something like that. She was the wife of that famous actor. Apparently, when there were visas, the whole family obtained them. That sort of deal. (D 22: 17_10_portale)

These texts are written by people who are personally involved (more so than the


average Pole), e.g. by virtue of their place of residence.

 I come from around Przemyśl, so I know how Ukrainians feel about Poles... I know their attitude towards those who live in Western Ukraine. I've been there myself several times and I can say a thing or two about them... and one thing's for sure... I don't believe that the Russian services have been manipulating it. Ukrainians simply hate us. I think the government will stop fraternizing with them, but as a TVP journalist said recently, they'll pay more attention to Belarus, which has never been a problem for us. We owe it to those murdered in Volhynia to ensure that the perpetrators of this heinous crime don't get away with it. Those people are crying out for justice... That's why I'm against having any relations with Ukraine and Germany. (D 16: 17_07_portale)

Hostility towards Ukrainians is transformed into aggression towards anyone who portrays our neighbors in positive terms.

 2652 What are you fighting them for – pro-UPA reader? For writing the truth that they dismembered people alive, and killed little kids with stones. What are you fighting them for well come out and say. And today that we've been overrun that by that riff-raff and they've taking all the jobs because they're cheaper? I just don't know what business our government has in protecting them. That's why Russia slapped an embargo on our products, and recently cut the gas, get with it and listen to people you'll get the Ukrainian picture answer. (D 16: 17_07_portale)

Texts referring to specific people in public life, e.g. politicians.


 342 Kowal go back to Ukraine, nobody's stopping you, but don't speak on behalf of Poles, because they don't want you to. Unlike you, we know our history and hope that God spares us a repeat of it (especially the Ukrainian part). With

patriots like you, who needs Ukrainians? Our fathers warned us against those thugs, 'coz they were the only ones worse than the Germans. I can't look at your face and others like you any more I won't even mention listening remember he's a foul Ukrainian. (D 4: 17_01_portale)

Some comments target the Association of the Ukrainians in Poland directly.

2234 How about that ZUwP – Ukrainian ass lick-ers led by Petro Tyma? (D 4: 17_01_portale)

Texts marked moderately negative basically concern all the current topics associated with Ukraine and the Ukrainian minority in Poland. As with many other media, the most common topics are the UPA, Bandera and Volhynia.

 those words, or words of that kind, the attitude is the quintessence of Kaczyński's "depth of thought"; the old Banderite narrative, which makes the victims of the Volhynia-Galician butchery out to be bards of Soviet propaganda, is common in the public realm in Ukraine. It's not the quantity of a monuments to the leader of the OUN or the quantity of presidential decrees in which the name "Bandera" indicates the strength and scale of the subconscious cult of Ukrainian nationalism. The widespread acceptance of the OUN narrative of the history of WWII, which is criticized the world over, to say nothing of the outstanding figure of Prof. T. Snyder, is indicative of the level of "Banderization". These subtle nuances could be discerned during the Ukrainian IPN conference, during which Mr. Viatrovych recounted the heroism of the UPA – of their first military campaign, which was waged against the Germans in Volodymyrets, without mentioning a word about the UPA attack on Parośla (which Banderite propaganda blamed on Soviet partisans, a story belied by basic historical facts) or the earlier OUN collaboration with the German occupiers (the phase during which the OUN was

counting on Hitler's support for an "independent Ukraine") There's the rub Dear Sir. ;-) (D 10: 17_04)



386 I've already stopped believing that Poland and Ukraine will ever come to any sort of agreement over Volhynia. We won't live to see anything!!! Murderers can't be heroes, murderers don't make us right and they don't settle anything for us. We'll put up monuments with the names and dates of the murdered, as this sacred earth of ours joins us. Help us do that Sir!!! (D 22: 17_10_portale)

The topic of Ukrainian nationalism, especially in light of historical events, is covered in the analyzed texts.




133 Unfortunately, there has been a resurgent nationalist politics in the west of Ukraine for many years. I experienced this personally in Truskavets, during a trip to Lviv, the guide told us that Lviv was built by German and Italian architects. What's more, during the national holiday celebrations on August 26, a stage was erected in the centre of town, and yellow-and-blue and black-and-red flags were flown. There was an Orthodox priest and a man in folk costume. When I asked the man about the black-and-red flag, he told me that it was the Cossacks for Donets...? I learned that Poles are scared to admit to being Poles. (D 4: 17_01_portale)




For us and e.g. Russia, the UPA was nothing more than a gang from day one. But it was actually an army in the underground framework of the self-appointed Ukrainian state. The UPA also murdered all non-Ukrainians and any Ukrainians they deemed traitors on the orders of their government, which was not recognized by anybody. And nobody today would call the UPA bandits if it weren't for their ideology of ethnic cleansing aided by genocide. And now they're known outside Ukraine as bandits organized in bands. (D 10: 17_04_portale)


There are also negative comments on the Russo-Ukrainian war.


 1464 Avakov has given the Russians a pretty good pretext to occupy Donbass and create a land connection with Crimea. The Ukrainians are pretty good at being played by the Americans. Instead of resolving the issue peacefully, they're prodded into war. Then again, this situation cannot last forever. But we're at war with this Russia and we either agree to its terms or we keep fighting. Overall, this is good for Poland. More banderites get killed and Ukraine loses about 1/3 of its territory, which it got from Lenin anyway. It won't constitute such a danger for Poland as it does now. (D 4: 17_01_portale)

Importantly, the Ukrainian minority has been assigned the same function once fulfilled by the Jewish minority. The very appellation "Ukrainian" is taken to be pejorative.

 452 The result of the vote was easy to predict. Shrek Schetyyna should be being investigated by the public prosecutor for the notorious criminal and unlawful "Widelec" [Fork] campaign, and not standing as a candidate for premier. Useless Ukrainian. (D 10: 17_04_portale)

Very often, being Ukrainian simply means being "foreign", non-Polish, someone who doesn't know, doesn't understand, and is less qualified and experienced. Either that or someone who will take any job, no matter how strenuous and poorly remunerated.

 617 Did any of you take one of those cards promoting how they gave back (i.e. had to give back) 200 PLN to anyone who spent 1000 PLN during the first month? It's been two months and the infoline seems to have mostly Ukrainians or something similar, because no way can you communicate with them, and all you can hear is maybe, I think so, probably, etc. (D 16: 17_07_portale)


 Now that's balls / There's butchery in a neighboring part of the city. The stench will be out of this world. Afterwards, you'll be able to breathe in the remains or the bony dust flying around everywhere. This will be the work of UKRAINIANS. All tax-free. That's an investor – they travel all over Poland looking for gminas where people agree to an illusion of prosperity to rot the surrounding city and the environment. 4 million pigs per year works out to 10,958 per day. (D 16: 17_07_portale)


THEMATIC ANALYSIS

The most common themes covered are society, economics, politics, history, and the military.


SOCIETY

The society category contains posts pointing out the similarities in the conduct, customs and broader culture of Poles and Ukrainians.

 3059 Poles, just like Bulgarians and Ukrainians, love old rubbish the Germans don't want. (D 4: 17_01_portale)

 1222 Yeah, Yeah. From the Kędziorki District. Learn after registration. A Ukrainian can't travel in a car registered in Kędzierzyn? People like you can travel with a Bangladeshi registration. Some dickhead above wrote straight off that he can be stopped 'coz he's a Ukrainian, yet I see Poles parked almost in the doors of Lidl every day. (D 22: 17_10_portale)

Sometimes there are fairly non-standard parallels that reveal a common destiny and a similar geopolitical situation.

 1651 Nazism in Poland is just as funny as Banderites in Ukraine. What are you fascists going to achieve for Poland with that? Just that nobody

will give a shit about Poland when Putin attacks. 'Coz that's exactly how we look now with this Nazism of yours. Like Banderite Ukraine, which Putin will do a favor when he wants to subjugate them. That's why NATO is letting Putin do it. 'Coz they prefer Putin, who they know, to Nazisms they know nothing about. (D 10: 17_04_portale)

Citizenship, migration, and the way(s) in which formal (legal) restrictions affect interpersonal relations are important issues.

540 What should be banned? Marriages between Poles and Ukrainians? That doesn't make sense... I could possibly extend the period of obtaining citizenship, but it's only a matter of time before Germany opens its market to Ukrainians and we'll be saying goodbye to half of them. (D 16: 17_07_portale)

Some are sharply critical of the Ukrainian minority and call for an ethnically homogenous Poland.

2927 With the involvement of Ukrainians. It'll be even worse, because where don't you move or where don't you go it's a Ukrainian. It's not enough that we have our own element that we have to import more? (D 16: 17_07_portale)

Statements referring to historical grievances, which the writers say, cannot be forgotten.

386 I've already stopped believing that Poland and Ukraine will ever come to any sort of agreement over Volhynia. We won't live to see anything!!! Murderers can't be heroes, murderers don't make us right and they don't settle anything for us. We'll put up monuments with the names and dates of the murdered, as this sacred earth of ours joins us. Help us do that Sir!!! (D 22: 17_10_portale)

Other posts show features of the contemporary world that, in the opinion of the writers, confirm the negative side of the Ukrainian character.

2630 Ukraine might be in Europe, but Ukrainians are wild people, very dangerous, violent, and inclined to murder. Their murderous tendencies can reveal themselves when, e.g. a sudden crisis causes them to lose their jobs – they can become banderized, and form gangs and various thieving organizations. – there's massive corruption in Ukraine. Marchuk claimed that she took a commission on the sale of PWKiK or something like that. She was the wife of that famous actor. Apparently, when there were visas, the whole family obtained them. That sort of deal. (D 22: 17_10_portale)


Posts analyzing the inner feelings of Ukrainians, and the sympathies and antipathies of Ukrainian society.

1167 Drastic, but in one sense, the guy was telling the truth about the people in Donbass hating Kiev (and vice versa). That's the truth. But as Donetsk residents will tell you, the shells raining down on their heads non-stop, destroying their homes, and killing and wounding their friends and family, are coming from the Ukrainian, not the Russian, side. The blockades are likewise being organized by the Ukrainian, not the Russian, side. All their hardships are coming from the Ukrainian side. The people of Donbass have no illusions as to what the Kiev government and the Banderites are all about. They know they'd be exterminated if they stopped fighting and defending themselves. (D 10: 17_04_portale)


12 Most people in Eastern Ukraine are Russian-speaking. And they're not migrants, but people who've lived there for many generations. Donbass has ended up in Ukraine through the vagaries of history. But that doesn't give Ukrainians the right to murder and exterminate the population simply because they're not ethnic

Ukrainians. Ukrainians are now doing to the Russian-speaking population of Donbass exactly what they did to our countrymen in Volhynia. (D 16: 17_07_portale)

These analyses of Ukrainian society are often written from a paternalistic standpoint. Either that or they simply refer to Ukraine's control of its own territory as being temporary.


 2102 We have Ukrainians on the western fringes of Poland, as we do elsewhere, but here the Russian language holds sway, even in typically Ukrainian stores – Russian rules in “Ukrainochka”, as the store actually imports some of its goods from Germany, where the labels are exclusively in Russian. A lot of the Ukrainian youth here are from Eastern Ukraine, where Ukrainian is not spoken, just Russian. KFC and McDonald's outlets had posters advertising job offers, but they quickly disappeared, as our eastern neighbors speak Russian, and prefer not to speak Ukrainian. Gazeta Wyborcza in Ukrainian would not be a success here. It'd have to be written in the language of Pushkin. (D 22: 17_10_portale)


Some posts call for an improvement in relations between Poles and Ukrainians while revealing the party that is stoking the disputes and in whose interests a worsening of relations between the two countries lie, viz. Putin's Russian.

 stop writing bullshit nationalist troll. (2) It's you – Nazis from the national movement you hate Ukrainians but they don't hate us. Anyone who's had contact with Ukrainians knows that they're really nice, friendly people. Putin is paying you to cause a quarrel between us and our neighbors. And we have nothing but contempt for you, understand. (D 16: 17_07_portale)


ECONOMICS

We begin with posts that make an honest attempt to describe the Ukrainian economy from the macro level.

 As for investment, nor is it completely true that this money would be especially useful here. Ukraine is still very cheap to invest in, with not much capital required. And the profits would be considerable. The country is keen to get ahead, and if there's growth, then we'll extract considerably more out of it. The example of foreign banks and aid institutions clearly shows that it was profitable for them to help Poland. Transfers in the billions are going to e.g. Italy, France, the UK & the USA. That might not be entirely good for us, but it gave us a monetary shot in the arm during that critical period following the fall of communism when there were serious cash shortages. And it saved us Ukr is going through exactly the same phase, as commie clans governed there until quite recently. That's still the case, but we have to hope for the best, that they'll pull through. And our assistance would not be altruistic, as you'd have to be a mug not to want to benefit from it. (D 10: 17_04_portale)


 1134 Ukraine is completely bankrupt and the cost of loan repayments exceeds this monstrosity's budget. It's already short of money to pay pensions. The City has therefore hit upon the idea of spreading these expenses among neighboring countries. Poland, for example, is meant to “take care of” the 8-10 million living in the western provinces of Ukraine. (D 22: 17_10_portale)

Some posts treat Eastern Europe as a homogeneous market, i.e. as countries whose economic situation is similar.


 1002 Whirlpool 20 years ago and today is like heaven and earth. Today, it is such a Manta among washing machines that you'd be hard pressed to find anything worse. Obviously, they


also try to force scrapped series and models onto the third world, i.e. the eastern bloc, e.g. Poland, Czech Republic, Ukraine, Slovakia etc... it's just like washing powder bought in the west and here. They know full well that price, backed by a company name, and matching marketing, is the sole purchasing criterion for 3/4 of the people in these poor countries. This swindling will continue as long as it works. I say no!!! (D 4: 17_01_portale)

Workers from Ukraine. While often praised for their industriousness, a lot of posts paint them in a very bad light.


 1651 Well now, the backup are Ukrainians and outside companies. It's just too bad that nobody sees how most of these people work. A complete brothel, they cause losses, and destroy goods 'coz they're not responsible. The workers are responsible they just take the money. Sometimes, I can't even bear to look. How can anyone be satisfied with all that. It's just too bad that they can't publicly tell Auchan workers how little they matter. Things need to change. Now. (D 4: 17_01_portale)


The point is often made that workers from Ukraine, because of their low expectations, drive wages down.

 1915 why the surprise? Anyone who doesn't want to die in this country goes where the money is... the next few years will be even worse, but don't worry, Ukrainians will replace Nowy Targians, because employers are keen to take them on for 4-5 PLN per hour. (D 4: 17_01_portale)


 144 This Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers is even protesting the European Parliament suspending visas for Ukrainians, because then they'll go to France and Germany for better paid work and entrepreneurs and employers will have to employ Poles, and consequently be lumbered with higher wages than what they've been paying Ukrainians. (D 10: 17_04_portale)

On the other hand, the writers have not forgotten that Ukrainians working in Poland generate a certain income. And their work bolsters the Polish economy, even if they're not paying taxes here. Moreover, because migrants, wherever they are from, are more mobile and enterprising, there is hope that they will have a positive impact on economic relations in Poland.


 He put us all on a factory production line to make us the China of Europe, but you don't earn enough in a factory to pay off a franc loan. So I left, and now, instead of spending 1/2 my pay for 400 francs, I pay 1/10, and live on the next 1/10, while 4 Ukrainians are fixing my franc problem, working in a tax-free zone and living in a "franked" home. Ukrainians are the only ones who pay practically no taxes in Poland. I'll just add that there wouldn't be so many people leaving this 500+ paradise if the zloty went up (D 4: 17_01_portale)

 It's never been easy for us professionally it's thankless manual labor, and at the same time very responsible and dangerous. Let the Ukrainian women come here maybe they won't stand for being bossed around, much less let a patient raise his hand to a nurse which was recently seen and heard in our Hospitals Where is the GOVERNMENT and our RIGHTS? Ukrainians don't like being jerked around I know something about that ha ha and I wish our nurses would stand up for themselves not looking at education but to defend their dignity as Polish citizens. Healthy self-interest is not sickness :) (D 16: 17_07_portale)

Some writers believe that employers treat Ukrainian workers better, although this view should probably be ascribed to people who refer to the difficult circumstances of Poles – other people are always better off, no matter who they are.


 2993 The Ukrainians got a raise and better working conditions, but the Poles are still considered trash, if that isn't pathological. There's nothing for it but to pick up the shifts together and not wait for manna from heaven. (D 16: 17_07_portale)

A lot of texts express the view that Ukrainian workers are indispensable to Polish companies at the moment, and that the economy would not be able to keep growing at its current rate without them.


 2487 That brilliant Polish logic, deport them! No wonder this country is the way it is when people have such idiotic ideas, you might not like Ukrainians but if Poland wants to get rid of its workforce then we're ruining our own economy which barely exists. Who's going to work in low but necessary industries like the Ukrainians do now? Poles in England? Germans? Ukrainians will soon be leaving for Germany, and as I see after the comments many Poles when it suits. Deport them! (D 10: 17_04_portale)

POLITICS

Three players, viz. Ukraine, Poland and Russia, stand out when posts commenting on foreign Policy are analyzed. As with many other topics, some are friendly, and others not-so-friendly towards Ukraine. But the Russian connection is ever present.


 705 That's just what I wanted to write. Unfortunately, the policy is the same as it was 80 years back, no understanding between Poland and Ukraine is admissible under any circumstances, in the past it was a great threat to the USSR, now the threat is to you know who. There's a full-blown information war being waged in both Poland and Ukraine. A nation is just a nation, what they show on TV, and what they write on the forum, we take further. Especially as Polish

and Ukrainian youth mainly get their knowledge from Internet forums and not books. The information war has been won for now, it's just too bad that victory is not on the side of Ukraine and Poland. (D 4: 17_01_portale)


 2091 Ukraine, i.e. the "Frontier" between Poland and Russia. And that doesn't change anything. It's not good for either Poland or Russia to have such a large frontier. (D 4: 17_01_portale)

1640 Russia is the only beneficiary of the "monument war" between Poland and Ukraine. (D 10: 17_04_portale)

Ukraine is seen to be a weak country susceptible to hostile activities on the part of Russia in these posts.


 1156 this bombardment wouldn't be happening if Ukraine was as totalitarian as Russia, because nothing happens in a country like that without the secret services knowing about it. Only in Ukraine could armed Russian groups roam at will and carry out their provocations undetected. (D 4: 17_01_portale)


Ukraine also appears as a backdrop or supplement in posts devoted to Polish politics. These often mention the "fear" of Ukrainians coming to Poland and taking jobs from Poles, or argue that Ukrainians have to come to Poland, because Poles have been emigrating to the West.


 Does the government know or not? They seem to be unaware of the machinations of Soros and Co. But Mr. Lewandowski, EU commissioner and leading Polish asset salesman, has long been saying that Poles (the best educated experts courtesy of Polish taxes) are emigrating to Germany etc. and being replaced by Ukrainians. No Polish government can resolve this issue given the differences in pay scales. The medical profession is now being brought into the game. Time will tell who's next. (D 22: 17_10_portale)

HISTORY


In the historical context, we can see the memory of WWII and the totalitarian takeover of the 20th century, and their consequences, remain strong.


 2113 Russia is a threat to the world. This is reminiscent of the situation in 1939. Putin is going the way of Hitler. We might soon have a war on our doorstep, and Ukraine might cease to exist. (D 4: 17_01_portale)


 1431 @ Dorota # 584I have a different opinion on the superiority of Breslau. It would have been better to have stayed in familiar Lviv. But none of us was asked for our opinion, and it is impossible to change this situation. There is no longer even a need to change it. The population has been replaced and no normal person wants to change it today. The Germans no longer want to either. They don't need Breslau with its current ethnic composition (Germans 0%, Poles 90%, Ukrainians 10%). (D 16: 17_07_portale)

 1816 Ukrainians forget how Gen. Anders did not hand over the Ukrainians and objected to them being handed over to the Russians. They would only have been a memory. (D 16: 17_07_portale)


Most of the posts on history concern the 1940s, the UPA, and Bandera, exactly as they do on other social media.

 848 @hu-nows: The UPA perpetrated one of the most, if not the most, brutal undocumented genocides in the history of humanity. Łukaszko committed a war crime against dozens of civilians. He should in no way be praised, because, for me, one crime like that cancels out any good he might have done. But to compare Łukaszko with the UPA is like comparing a pogrom in a small village with the holocaust. The UPA flag is like the Nazi flag, horrendous crimes were committed on a massive scale under both. (D 10: 17_04_portale)

 For us and e.g. Russia, the UPA was nothing more than a gang from day one. But it was actually an army in the underground framework of the self-appointed Ukrainian state. The UPA also murdered all non-Ukrainians and any Ukrainians they deemed traitors on the orders of their government, which was not recognized by anybody. And nobody today would call the UPA bandits if it weren't for their ideology of ethnic cleansing aided by genocide. And now they're known outside Ukraine as bandits organized in bands. (D 10: 17_04_portale)

 2652 What are you fighting them for – pro-UPA tskiś reader? For writing the truth that they dismembered people alive, and killed little kids with stones. What are you fighting them for well come out and say. And today that we've been overrun that by that riff-raff and they've taking all the jobs because they're cheaper? I just don't know what business our government has in protecting them. That's why Russia slapped an embargo on our products, and recently cut the gas, get with it and listen to people you'll get the Ukrainian picture answer. (D 16: 17_07_portale)

Some posts try to analyze history more accurately by showing the complexity of human destiny and comparing different outlooks on the past.

 For the sake of historical accuracy, Petliura was murdered by a Russian agent named Schwarzbart in Paris on 5/15/1926. Petliura did not betray Ukraine or Ukrainians, the peace that Poland signed with Russia in the Treaty of Riga on March 18, 1921 altered the fate of Ukraine, as it rendered the Warsaw Agreement of April 4, 1920, mentioned in this publication, inoperative. As a result, the Ukrainian People's Republic had no allies in its confrontation with Bolshevik Russia, which it lost – along with its independence. No matter how much we dislike Ukrainians for the crime of Volynia, we have to admit that what happened in Ukraine in 1921 contributed to the hostile nationalistic sentiments towards Poland

and Russia that resulted in the creation of the UPA and its extreme OUN wing, led by Bandera. Please don't call me a Russian troll until you've checked the basic historical facts on this topic. I'm only alive because my parents escaped a Banderite pogrom, so I have no reason to sympathize with Ukrainians. I'm only trying to understand their complicated history and the source of their extreme nationalism. (D 10: 17_04_portale)

OTHER THEMATIC AREAS

A lot of the military-related posts talk about US-Russian rivalry and the often difficult relations between EU countries and the American superpower.

518 so long as the Americans don't start a war, because they'd be fighting it in Poland, not on their own territory. And what the fuck would we get out of it? And the Ukrainians are probably getting ready to take back Donbass. If that happens, Russia won't stop at protecting the people of Donbass from aggression. (D 4: 17_01_portale)

1354 If NATO thinks the US is going to die for countries like Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Poland, they're mentally unbalanced and should seek psychiatric help! A conflict with Russian or China would be the end of the US, and the US and the rest of the world know it! (D 4: 17_01_portale)

Conventional warfare is giving war to informational warfare. Russia is plays a hugely significant role in every regional conflict.

705 That's just what I wanted to write. Unfortunately, the policy is the same as it was 80 years back, no understanding between Poland and Ukraine is admissible under any circumstances, in the past it was a great threat to the USSR, now the threat is to you know who. There's

a full-blown information war being waged in both Poland and Ukraine. A nation is just a nation, what they show on TV, and what they write on the forum, we take further. Especially as Polish and Ukrainian youth mainly get their knowledge from Internet forums and not books. The information war has been won for now, it's just too bad that victory is not on the side of Ukraine and Poland. (D 4: 17_01_portale)

1156 this bombardment wouldn't be happening if Ukraine was as totalitarian as Russia, because nothing happens in a country like that without the secret services knowing about it. Only in Ukraine could armed Russian groups roam at will and carry out their provocations undetected. (D 4: 17_01_portale)


As with other communications channels, and among comments on websites, posts on sport can be broken down into individual likes and dislikes, which do not necessarily translate into negative stereotypes affecting particular communities.


Joshua is a pig fed growth hormones and dope. Vladimir is a self-made man, a brilliant athlete, who looks like he was chiseled by Phidias. You only have to look at his shoulders, bones and muscles. Vlad will destroy him I agree 100%. (D 10: 17_04_portale)


2399 Which match are you going to watch? Ukraine-Croatia strikes me as the most interesting, and I might have a peek at Wales. :P #mecz #pilkanozna #sport #kiciochpyta. (D 22: 17_10_portale)


4.5. TWITTER


Only 40% of the analyzed statements were marked positive or neutral. Negative examples:

 881 RT @dziejepl: #Ukraina: a monument honoring the Poles murdered in 1944 in the village of Huta Pieniacka has been vandalized. (D 6: 17_01_twtt)

 67 RT @__Andrzej__: 17.04.45 Slobodka Mushkatovyetska-Ukrainians murdered 34 Poles, including 3-people.family-parents and 8-month-old daughter poured gasoline over them and burnt them alive. (D 12: 17_04_twtt)

 2443 People, fuck, Ukrainians will be able to go to the EU without visas?! Poland's fucked. (D 12: 17_04_twtt)


 1684 RT @LeszekDabrowa: @pikus_pol 1.5 Ukrainians are "wrecking" the Polish labor market. This is causing some places to stagnate. Ukrainians from Western Ukraine support Banderism. (D 18: 17_07_twtt)


 2597 @semperkresy I hope that Ukrainians finally repeat the rewards of all their lies! (D 24: 17_10_twtt)

A decided majority of tweets were marked "history", and fewer "society" and "politics".


HISTORY


Twitter is the only social media communication channel analyzed on which most of the posts were about history. Many of them recalled the events of the 1940s, and a considerable proportion came from one account or were written by one person.

 67 RT @__Andrzej__: 17.04.45 Slobodka Mushkatovyetska-Ukrainians murdered 34 Poles, including 3-people.family-parents and 8-month-old daughter poured gasoline over them and burnt them alive. (D 12: 17_04_twtt)

 1464 RT @opole_andrzej: 8/9.04.44 r. Kresy People Ukrainians Bronisława Kostyszyn was 8 months pregnant when her belly was ripped open with a knife and her 3 children burnt alive. (D 12: 17_04_twtt)


There are also posts on current events associated with history.


 100 RT @SynRopucha: The Ukrainians are preventing the victims of UPA genocide from being exhumed, but they're only too happy to take Polish money and jobs! <http://www.radiomaryja.pl/informacje/wywiad-dr-leon-popek-ukraina-blokuje-ekshumacje-ofiar-rzezi-wolynskiej-rozebranie-pomnika-upa-hruszowicach>. (D 18: 17_07_twtt)

 56 RT @marcinsiembida: Ukraine expects us to rebuild a UPA monument in Subcarpathia – they have no shame in admitting to that ideology. They want the UPA, we want our churches back. (D 24: 17_10_twtt)

SOCIETY

Ukrainians as participants in Polish social life. Twitter paints Ukrainians as practitioners of elite professions (e.g. doctors and lawyers), and not construction workers and domestics.


 947 @MateuszGotz I know one Ukrainian woman, Victoria. A beautiful, stylish journalist. (D 6: 17_01_twtt)


 67 In the last month of my mother-in-law's life (93 I.), I had a lot to do with doctors... the only one who was nice and showed any empathy was a Ukrainian. (D 6: 17_01_twtt)

POLITICS


Political tweets are, firstly, official announcements from politicians, who use

Twitter to communicate with their constituents.


 969 RT @MSZ_RP: Min. #Waszczykowski meeting re #Ukraina #WEF17 in #Davos: The message was positive and pro-Ukrainian — We have to help Ukraine. (D 6: 17_01_twtt)

 1288 RT @MEN_GOV_PL: Meeting @_AnnaZalewska with przedst.organizacji. Polish in Ukraine and participating in the celebrations re presenting Polish Card @PLinUkraine @MSZ_RP. (D 24: 17_10_twtt)

Politicians also use Twitter to communicate with each other.


 1266 @ZalewskiPawel Paweł here's another example of the Ukrainian government being friendly. Is that what you had in mind? <http://www.tvp.info/34579668/ukraina-oczekuje-od-polski-budowy-pomnika-upa-w-hruszowicach>. (D 24: 17_10_twtt)


THERE ARE A LOT OF MESSAGES ON MINORITY ISSUES

 782 @Temidor @NiemcywPolsce @Amb_Niemiec @MSZ_RP The “founding fathers” of the electoral system didn't notice that we have other minorities in Poland too – Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and others. Germans were more important. (D 12: 17_04_twtt)

ECONOMICS


Work is the most common economic topic on Twitter in Poland. Many people point out that Ukrainian workers are organizing, and have already established their first trade unions and professional associations.


 771 RT @MarionBrrr: Ukraine: the Union of Ukrainian Workers in Poland has commenced operations. (D18: 17_07_twtt)

 1684 RT @LeszekDabrowa: @pikus_pol 1.5 Ukrainians are “wrecking” the Polish labor market. This is causing some places to stagnate. Ukrainians from Western Ukraine support Banderism. (D 18: 17_07_twtt)

THE MILITARY

These posts are mostly about whether Ukraine or Russia is Poland's greatest foe.

 1750 RT @LeyteTT: #Minęła20 We'll be going to war with Ukraine, not Russia, which is the only one not to have territorial claims. And Russia isn't Slavic? (D 24: 17_10_twtt)

 1398 RT @Defence24pl: Ukrainian soldiers killed in Donbass #Donbas #Ukraine @Defence24pl <http://www.defence24.pl/633792,ukrainscy-zolnierze-zgineli-w-donbasie>. (D 18: 17_07_twtt)

4.6. QUANTITATIVE COLLECTION OF STATEMENT TOPICS

In the final part of this analysis, we present a set topics, statements and emotional attitudes formulated on the basis of the semi-automatic coding described in Chapter 3.4.


This methodology made it possible to analyze 1 200 000 posts in terms of emotional attitude and thematic area. Finally, an average precision of 0.6 was obtained for emotional attitude and 0.44 for thematic areas.

More than 800,000 of those 1 200 000 were distinguished as either neutral or positive. The remaining 400 000 were either negative or strongly negative. Table 9 shows the breakdown.

	Texts	Percentage
Neutral or positive texts	827 234	65.6%
Moderately negative texts	365 936	29.0%
Strongly negative texts	67 631	5.4%
Total	1 260 801	100.0%

How are the negative posts broken down by month? The graphs below show that they were correlated with the overall number of posts. There was no noticeable increases in the number of posts relative to the whole.


Table 9. Source: own studies.



Graph 3. Source: own studies.

On the other hand, a breakdown by thematic category shows that most of the negative posts were assigned to “politics”,


followed by “economics” and then “society”.



Graph 4. Source: own studies.

It is similar with moderately negative posts. The thematic arrangement is

constant and uniform, as it is in the case of strongly negative statements.



Graph 5. Source: own studies.

The most important quantity data that could be obtained from are shown in the table below.

Thematic area	Texts	Percentage of negative texts
Politics	480 680	32.7%
Economics	204 661	22.6%
Society	230 356	39.0%
History	258 269	48.1%
Sport	45 481	9.4%
The military	10 437	33.3%
Other	9 007	30.2%
Art	5 540	18.0%
Media	7 019	36.4%
Natural environment	2 767	19.4%
Education	2 885	23.1%
Law	2 479	25.9%
Religion	724	23.1%
Science	496	20.2%

Table 10. Source: own studies, Dec. 2016 to Nov. 2017

The highest percentage of negative texts come under “history”. Almost half the references have negative overtones, a figure that far exceeds the percentages of negative statements in other areas. Once the large number of texts in this area is factored into the equation, the origin of the problems in cultivating public discourse become all too apparent.

At the other end of the spectrum, we have sport (9% negative statements), and from a category with a lot of texts, viz.

economics (23%), especially texts that refer to the labor market. These are the areas in which attitudes towards Ukrainians are generally positive and which should therefore be promoted in order to positively influence the image of the Ukrainian minority in Polish Internet discussions.

Warsaw, January 2018

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6. ANNEX

6.1. REPORT SOTRENDER

ANALIZA PROFILI OBEJMUJĄCYCH TEMATYKĄ UKRAIŃSKĄ



Warszawa, 12.01.2018r.

AUTORZY



Radosław Pawlak - posiada bogate doświadczenie zdobyte podczas udziału w wielu projektach badawczych w charakterze członka zespołu badawczego oraz koordynatora działu realizacji. Ponadto konsultant przedsiębiorstw w zakresie budowania strategii rozwoju, marketingu oraz działań proekologicznych. W wolnym czasie realizuje swoje pasje w postaci biegania oraz piwowarstwa domowego.




Maciej Baranowski - Absolwent historii i socjologii na Uniwersytecie w Białymstoku. Zawodowo powiązany z branżą mediów społecznościowych od czterech lat. Obecnie Junior Analyst w firmie Sotrender. W wolnych chwilach staram się przebywać jak najdalej od komputera spędzając aktywnie czas biegając oraz jeżdżąc na rowerze, a także czytając książki. Mam jeden maraton i półmaraton za sobą, aktualnie przygotowuję się do zdobycia korony półmaratonów polskich.

ANALIZA WSPÓŁAKTYWNOŚCI

Nasza baza profili, tworzona od 2011 roku obejmuje obecnie ponad 40 tysięcy stron. Analizując dane z Facebooka, jesteśmy w stanie wskazać gdzie również poza wskazanymi postami angażują się poszczególni fani. Badanie zainteresowań pozwoli poznać, czym interesują się poszczególni użytkownicy, gdzie się angażują oraz z jaką częstotliwością. Analiza zainteresowań może być namiastką dużo droższych badań konsumenckich – w niektórych kwestiach nawet dokładniejsze, ponieważ bazuje na danych behawioralnych.

Wspólne zainteresowania użytkowników fanpage'a Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem z innymi stronami.

Ilu użytkowników poszczególnych stron angażowało się również na stronie fanpage'a Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem (01.01.2017 - 17.12.2017)



Liczba wspólnych zaangażowanych: liczba użytkowników aktywnych zarówno na stronie "Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem" jak i na wybranej, innej stronie.

Procent wspólnych zaangażowanych: liczba wspólnych zaangażowanych w stosunku do liczby wszystkich zaangażowanych na danej stronie.


Liczba zaangażowanych użytkowników: liczba wszystkich użytkowników zaangażowanych na danej stronie.

Osoby, które angażują się na fanpage'u **Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem** interesują się głównie stronami, które są powiązane z polityką. W zestawieniu pojawiają się też fanpage'e rozrywkowe (takie jak **Demotywatory**) oraz rozrywkowo-sportowe (**Ekstraklasa Trolls**).

Strony takie jak: **Janusz Korwin-Mikke**, **Nie dla Islamizacji Europy** i **Demotywatory** dzielą z analizowanym fanpage'm największą liczbę wspólnych zaangażowanych użytkowników.

Wspólne zainteresowania użytkowników (względne) fanpage'a **Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem** z innymi stronami.

Ilu użytkowników poszczególnych stron angażowało się również na stronie fanpage'a **Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem**
(01.01.2017 - 17.12.2017)



Liczba wspólnych zaangażowanych: liczba użytkowników aktywnych zarówno na stronie "Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem", jak i na wybranej innej stronie.

Procent wspólnych zaangażowanych: liczba wspólnych zaangażowanych w stosunku do liczby wszystkich zaangażowanych na danej stronie.


Liczba zaangażowanych użytkowników: liczba wszystkich użytkowników zaangażowanych na danej stronie.

W zestawieniu, które w ujęciu względnym pokazuje liczbę wspólnych zaangażowanych użytkowników innych fanpage'y z stroną **Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem**, podobnie jak w ujęciu bezwzględnym, znajdują się głównie pozycje powiązane z polityką. Warte zauważenia jest to, że są to profile na których prezentowane treści powiązane są z prawą stroną sceny politycznej.

Warto też jest się przyjrzeć wartościom bezwzględny. O ile wykres skupia się głównie na procencie wspólnych zaangażowanych użytkowników poszczególnych stron z analizowanym fanpage’em, to bezwzględne liczby wspólnych zaangażowanych są w tym przypadku stosunkowo niskie. Tylko jedna strona przekracza tysiąc wspólnych zaangażowanych użytkowników (**Magna Polonia**).

Wspólne zainteresowania użytkowników fanpage'a Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem z branżami.

Ilo użytkowników poszczególnych branż zaangażowało się również na stronie fanpage'a Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem (01.01.2017 - 17.12.2017)



Liczba wspólnych zaangażowanych: liczba użytkowników aktywnych zarówno na stronie "Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem" jak i na wybranej, innej stronie.

Procent wspólnych zaangażowanych: liczba wspólnych zaangażowanych w stosunku do liczby wszystkich zaangażowanych na danej stronie.


Liczba zaangażowanych użytkowników: liczba wszystkich użytkowników zaangażowanych na danej stronie.

Osoby, które polubiły fanpage **Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem** interesują się przede wszystkim polityką. Na pierwszym miejscu w zestawieniu znajduje się kategoria **Ludzie** (10 850 wspólnych zaangażowanych użytkowników). Drugie miejsce zajęła **polityka i partie** (ta kategoria ma niewiele mniej wspólnych zaangażowanych użytkowników, bowiem 10 571). Trzecia kategoria dotyczy **organizacji pozarządowych i akcji społecznych**.

Zestawienie zamykają takie kategorie jak: **stacje radiowe, kluby piłkarskie i muzyka**. Warto też zauważyć, że o ile liczba wspólnych zaangażowanych użytkowników w przypadku prezentowanych branż jest wysoka, to w zestawieniu procentowym wskaźniki nie przyjmują już dużych wartości. Branża, która względnie ma najwięcej wspólnych zaangażowanych użytkowników z analizowaną stroną to **NGO i akcje społeczne**.

Wspólne zainteresowania użytkowników (względne) fanpage'a Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem z branżami.

Ilo użytkowników poszczególnych branż zaangażowało się również na stronie fanpage'a Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem
(01.01.2017 - 17.12.2017)



Liczba wspólnych zaangażowanych: liczba użytkowników aktywnych zarówno na stronie "Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem" jak i na wybranej, innej stronie.


Procent wspólnych zaangażowanych: liczba wspólnych zaangażowanych w stosunku do liczby wszystkich zaangażowanych na danej stronie.

Liczba zaangażowanych użytkowników: liczba wszystkich użytkowników zaangażowanych na danej stronie.

Jak już zostało wspomniane, branże, które względnie mają najwięcej wspólnych zaangażowanych użytkowników z stroną **Ukrainiec Nie jest moim bratem** dotyczą **organizacji pozarządowych i polityki**. Poza tym w zestawieniu wysoko, bowiem na trzecim miejscu, plasuje się kategoria **Ubezpieczenia**. Pozostałe branże nie przekraczają jednego procenta wspólnych zaangażowanych użytkowników.

Wspólne zainteresowania użytkowników fanpage'a Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem z kategorią "społeczności".

Ilu użytkowników poszczególnych stron angażowało się również na stronie fanpage'a Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem (01.01.2017 - 17.12.2017)



Liczba wspólnych zaangażowanych: liczba użytkowników aktywnych zarówno na stronie "Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem" jak i na wybranej, innej stronie.

Procent wspólnych zaangażowanych: liczba wspólnych zaangażowanych w stosunku do liczby wszystkich zaangażowanych na danej stronie.


Liczba zaangażowanych użytkowników: liczba wszystkich użytkowników zaangażowanych na danej stronie.

Strony typu *społeczności*, których fani angażują się też na analizowanym fanpage'u dotyczą głównie **polityki** oraz **rozrywki**. Warte zauważenia jest to, że strony polityczne pod względem publikowanych treści skupione są wokół prawej strony sceny politycznej.

W analizowanym okresie najwięcej wspólnych zaangażowanych fanów z FP **Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem** miały strony takie jak: **Patrioci**, **Lemingopedia** oraz **Repostuj**.

**Wspólne zainteresowania użytkowników (względne)
fanpage'a Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem z kategorią "społeczność".**

Ilu użytkowników poszczególnych stron angażowało się
również na stronie fanpage'a Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem
(01.01.2017 - 17.12.2017)




Liczba wspólnych zaangażowanych: liczba użytkowników aktywnych zarówno na stronie "Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem" jak i na wybranej innej stronie.

Procent wspólnych zaangażowanych: liczba wspólnych zaangażowanych w stosunku do liczby wszystkich zaangażowanych na danej stronie.

Liczba zaangażowanych użytkowników: liczba wszystkich użytkowników zaangażowanych na danej stronie.

Na wykresie przedstawiającym w ujęciu procentowym wspólnych zaangażowanych fanów innych stron z fanpage'm **Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem** można zauważyć, iż większość profili dotyczy polityki i są one głównie powiązane z prawą stroną sceny politycznej.

Profile takie jak: **Roman Dmowski – Architekt Wielkiej Polski**, **Popieram Grzegorza Brauna** oraz **Żądamy w szkołach nauki o Polskich bohaterach** procentowo najwięcej dzieliły wspólnych zaangażowanych użytkowników z analizowaną stroną. Warto jednak zauważyć, iż wymienione trzy strony mają stosunkowo małą bezwzględną liczbę wspólnych zaangażowanych użytkowników z analizowanym profilem (a także stosunkowo małą ilość polubieni w ogóle). Strony, które mają większą ilość wspólnych użytkowników oraz liczniejszą ogólną liczbę polubień strony znajdują się w środku lub w drugiej połowie rankingu.



Na prezentowanym wykresie można zauważyć, iż fanpage **Ukrainiec NIE jest** moim bratem ma rzadką sieć powiązań z innymi stronami i znajduje się poza główną linią sieci zainteresowań. Jednakże warto zanotować jest to, że strona ta, pod względem liczby fanów jest mniejsza od pozostałych analizowanych FP i biorąc pod uwagę wielkość strony to znajduje się ona w dolnej części zestawienia. FP **Polska jakiej jeszcze nie znacie** dzieli wspólną sieć zainteresowań z największą liczbą innych stron. Strony takie jak **Historia jakiej nie znacie**, **Polska, Poland**, czy **Patrioci** są jednymi z największych w prezentowanym zestawieniu i mają dość dużą liczbę wspólnych zainteresowań z innymi FP (oraz między sobą). Warto też jest przyjrzeć się stronie „**Niezależna.pl**”, której sieć zainteresowań pod względem liczbowym jest także silna. Ciekawym zjawiskiem natomiast jest to, że prawie wszystkie prezentowane na wykresie strony są w mniejszym lub większym stopniu ze sobą powiązane (każdą z nich łączy

sieć zainteresowań, a różnice w powiązaniach można obserwować jedynie w liczbie użytkowników, którzy tworzą te powiązania).

Zainteresowania fanów strony **Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem** skupiają się głównie wokół polityki. Strony, które są śledzone przez osoby lubiące analizowany FP ideologicznie powiązane są z prawą stroną polskiej sceny politycznej. Poza stronami politycznymi fani analizowanego fanpage'a śledzą również FP organizacji pozarządowych i społecznych. Interesują się także sportem (ogólnie), w tym klubami piłkarskimi. Śledzą oni też strony prasy oraz stacji telewizyjnych. Swoją uwagę skupiają także na FP powiązanych z rozrywką (takie jak: **Wiocha.pl** czy **Klasyczne Memy**).

ANALIZA PORÓWNAWCZA PROFILI

Wielowymiarowa analiza profili na Facebooku w oparciu o dane uzyskane z API i przetworzone przez autorskie algorytmy. Analiza pozwala na porównanie wielu profili oraz wskazanie tych najlepszych w poszczególnych kategoriach.

Profile o opisującą tematykę ukraińską - Fani

2017-01-01 - 2017-12-17



www.sotrender.com

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Pod względem liczby fanów największym z analizowanych FP jest **Historia jakiej nie poznasz w szkole** (342 803 fanów). Drugie miejsce zajmuje **Polska, Poland** (256 564 fanów), a za nią plasuje się **Niezależna.pl** (246 707). Zestawienie zamykają strony takie jak: **Magna Polonia** (18 753 fanów), **Ukraińiec NIE jest moim bratem** (69 223 fanów) oraz **Mariusz Max-Kolonko na prezesa TVP** (84 076 fanów). W analizowanym okresie największy przyrost liczby fanów osiągnęła strona **Magna Polonia** (wzrost liczby fanów o 62%, warto jednak zauważyć, że jest to

FP, który w prezentowanym zestawieniu ma najmniejszą liczbę fanów). Natomiast FP, który miał największy wzrost liczby fanów oraz jednocześnie wysoką liczbę polubień to **Polska, Poland** (przyrost o 53%). Pod względem procentowego przyrostu użytkowników trzecie miejsce zajmuje strona **Patrioci** (wzrost o 52%). Najmniejszy przyrost nowych użytkowników zaliczyły strony takie jak: **Ukraińiec NIE jest moim bratem** (spadek o 3 punkty procentowe, była to jedyna z analizowanych stron która nie osiągnęła wzrostu liczby fanów), **Historia jakiej nie poznasz w szkole** (brak przyrostu) oraz **Kresy.pl** (w analizowanym okresie strona ta uzyskała 1% nowych fanów). Średnia liczba fanów dla wszystkich prezentowanych FP wynosi **158 427**, a mediana: **124 792**.

Profile o opisującą tematykę ukraińską - Zaangażowanie

2017-01-01 - 2017-12-17

Rank	Profil	Storyfeed (mediana)	Przyrost
1	Polska, Poland	77 752	53%
2	Patrioci	28 406	52%
3	Niezalezna.pl	26 632	3%
4	Historia jakiej nie...	24 848	2%
5	Portal Fronda.pl	15 231	-9%
6	Polska jakiej jeszcze nie...	12 960	-46%
7	Mariusz Max-Kolonko na...	9 319	12%
8	KRESY.PL	7 506	-32%
9	Magna Polonia	2 980	-28%
10	Ukraińiec NIE jest moim...	1 400	-10%

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W odniesieniu do wskaźnika **Storytellers**¹ największymi stronami w przedstawionym rankingu są: **Polska, Poland; Patrioci** oraz **Niezalezna.pl**. Zestawienie zamykają: **Ukrainiec NIE jest moim bratem, Magna Polonia** oraz **Kresy.pl**. Warto zauważyć, iż profile te znajdują się na podobnych pozycjach w klasyfikacji, która skupia się na liczbie fanów danej strony. Wśród trzech pierwszych stron pod względem analizy wskaźnika **Storytellers** jedynie strona **Patrioci** znajdowała się na niższej pozycji w rankingu fanów (5 pozycja), a wśród trzech ostatnich FP w zestawieniu badającym zaangażowanie to **Kresy.pl** znajdowała się na wyższej pozycji w hierarchii zależnej od liczby fanów (6 pozycja). Skupiając się na przyroście liczby zaangażowanych użytkowników można zauważyć, że wśród sześciu analizowanych stron wskaźnik ten przyjmuje wartości ujemne. Największy procentowy przyrost zaangażowanych fanów osiągnęły strony takie jak: **Polska, Poland; Mariusz Max-Kolonko na prezesa TVP** oraz **Niezalezna.pl**. Największy spadek osiągnęły FP: **Patrioci, Polska jakiej jeszcze nie znacie**, a także **Magna Polonia**. Warto też jest zwrócić uwagę na to, iż procentowy przeciętny spadek liczby zaangażowanych użytkowników jest zdecydowanie wyższy niż ich przyrost (średni spadek: 29%, średni przyrost: 11%).

¹ uwzględnia osoby, które mówiły o stronie („People Talking About This” / PTAT; storytellers) – czyli mogli polubić Stronę, zamieścić post, coś polubić, skomentowały, udostępniły, odpowiedziały w zamieszczonej przez Stronę ankiecie, ale też odpowiedziały na zaproszenie na wydarzenie, wspomniały Stronę, oznaczyły ją na zdjęciu, zameldowały się w miejscu biznesu. PTAT zatem ma dużo szerszy wymiar niż samo zaangażowanie. Ponadto może też obejmować aktywności zachodzące w wyniku sponsorowania np. wydarzeń czy wokół postów sponsorowanych (dark/unpublished page posts).

Profile o opisującą tematykę ukraińską - Aktywni użytkownicy

2017-01-01 - 2017-12-17

Rank	Profil	Aktywni użytkownicy	Procent	Interactivity Index
1	Polska, Poland	141 212	55%	12 733 181
2	Historia jakiej nie...	101 781	+14%	8 627 394
3	Polska jakiej jeszcze nie...	66 871	8%	4 509 902
4	Niezalezna.pl	58 634	18%	16 941 438
5	Patrioci	30 376	-5%	8 760 200
6	Mariusz Max-Kolonko na...	18 910	+4074%	1 971 338
7	Portal Fiondia.pl	15 023	-42%	2 050 271
8	KRESY.PL	11 474	-15%	3 621 804
9	Ukraińiec NIE jest moim...	2 988	+3782%	217 102
10	Magna Polonia	2 843	78%	797 656

www.sotrender.com

sotrender

Pod kątem aktywnych użytkowników zestawienie otwierają strony: **Polska, Poland**; **Historia jakiej nie poznacie w szkole** i **Polska jakiej jeszcze nie znacie**. Trzy ostatnie miejsca zajmują **Maga Polonia**, **Ukraińiec NIE jest moim bratem** i **Kresy.pl**. Strony te znajdowały się na podobnych pozycjach w prezentowanych już rankingach. Natomiast pod względem procentowego przyrostu aktywnych użytkowników strony, które osiągnęły najwyższy wskaźnik to: **Mariusz Max-Kolonko na prezesa TVP** (wzrost o 4074%), **Ukraińiec NIE jest moim bratem** (przyrost o 3782%) oraz **Magna Polonia** (wzrost o 78%). Warto zauważyć, iż mimo, że strony te mają stosunkowo niższą liczbę fanów, to względnie osiągają jedne z najwyższych przyrostów (pod względem liczby fanów i aktywnych użytkowników). Najmniejszy przyrost lub spadek osiągnęły strony: **Kresy.pl** (spadek o 15%) **Patrioci** (spadek o 5%) oraz **Polska jakiej jeszcze nie znacie** (wzrost o 10%). Pod względem wskaźnika **Interactivity Index** strony, które w analizowanym okresie osiągnęły najwyższą jego wartość to: **Niezalezna.pl**, **Polska, Poland** oraz **Historia jakiej nie poznasz w szkole**. Najmniejszy **Interactivity Index** osiągnęły: **Ukraińiec NIE jest moim bratem**, **Magna Polonia** i **Kresy.pl**. Warto zwrócić uwagę na to, że są to FP, które

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14

zamykają tabelę aktywnych użytkowników, natomiast strony, które osiągnęły wyższy wskaźnik Interactivity Index² znajdują się w pierwszej połowie przedstawionego rankingu.





Z wszystkich analizowanych stron jedynie trzy FP angażowały się w dyskusje z fanami pod postami. Najwięcej publikacji z odpowiedzią strony pojawiło się na fanpage'u **Ukraińiec NIE jest moim bratem**. Administratorzy tej strony najszybciej też odpowiadali na komentarze fanów, jednak tutaj względnie odpowiedzi pojawiły pod najmniejszą liczbą postów (5% wpisów z wszystkich opublikowanych na stronie to były posty z odpowiedzią). Najwolniej odpowiadali administratorzy fanpage'a **Magna Polonia** (prawie 30 godzin). Odpowiedzi pojawiły się pod trzema postami, co stanowiło 12% wszystkich wpisów całego fanpage'a. Natomiast strona, na

² Interactivity Index to wskaźnik zliczający wszystkie aktywności dziejące się w obrębie fanpage'a. Aktywności mają następującą wagę: Like = 1, Komentarz = 4, Post (status tekstowy lub status multimedialny, np. zdjęcie, link do YouTube) = 12, Udostępnienie = 16. Różne wagi odzwierciedlają różne znaczenie poszczególnych rodzajów interakcji z treścią, różne wagi dla Edge Ranka oraz proporcje w występowaniu poszczególnych aktywności na Facebooku – ogólnie rzecz biorąc, użytkownicy znacznie częściej i chętniej „lajkują” czy głosują niż np. wrzucają własne multimedia.

której w analizowanym okresie pojawiło się najmniej publikacji z odpowiedzią (poza tymi stronami, gdzie takich wpisów w ogóle nie było) to **Mariusz Max-Kolonko na prezesa TVP**. Strona zaangażowała się pod jednym tylko swoim wpisem i zajęło jej to około 20 godzin.

Przykładowe najbardziej angażujące wpisy z analizowanych profili
(pod względem aktywności użytkowników):





Polska, Poland

15 września · 🌐

"The Unconquered" - "Niezwyciężeni" ---


POLUB - UDOSTĘPNIJ - SKOMENTUJ!

To zwiększy zasięg filmu. My znamy naszą historię, teraz pokażmy ją całemu światu! 🤔


LIKE - SHARE - COMMENT THIS VIDEO!

This will increase the reach of movie. Let's show it to the whole world! 🤔


Nagranie na YouTube: <https://goo.gl/F1kaik>




Wyświetlenia: 618 tys.





Lubię to!



Komentarze



Udostępnij





7.1 tys.

Najlepsze komentarze ▾


14 909 udostępnień

266 komentarzy



Patrioci

15 listopada · €

Jaki naprawdę jest Marsz Niepodległości?  Niesamowite nagranie. To trzeba zobaczyć!

POLUB, UDOSTĘPNIJ - BĄDŹ PATRIOTĄ - DAJ ODPÓR ZAKŁAMANEJ PROPAGANDZIE! 🇵🇱

NIECH TO NAGRANIE ZOBACZY CAŁA POLSKA A NAWET CAŁY ŚWIAT!

😊 Fantastyczna robota, brawo dla autora! >>> Dar0s

Wyświetlenia: 764 tys.

Lubię to!

Komentarze

Udostępnij

10 tys.

Najlepsze komentarze ▾

16 254 udostępnień

574 komentarzy



Historia jakiej nie poznasz w szkole

4 stycznia · €

Co o tym myślicie?

Jak powinno wyglądać więzienie?



Do każdego więzienia, powinny należeć pola uprawne, na których pracowaliby więźniowie. Brak pracy skutkowałby brakiem jedzenia... Węzienie powstało po to, aby być karą, a nie darmowym utrzymaniem przez podatników!

— @KRYSTIAN —

Koniec wylegiwania, spełniania zachcianek więźniów i darmowego utrzymania!

👍 Lubię to!

💬 Komentarze

🔗 Udostępnij

👍👎🗨️ 14 tys.

Najlepsze komentarze ▾

 Polska, Poland

1 sierpnia · €

PAMIĘTAMY!
UDOSTĘPNIAMY!



 Lubię to!  Komentarze  Udostępnij

   3.5 tys.

Najlepsze komentarze ▾

7243 udostępnień

31 komentarzy



6.2. REPORT SENTIONE

UKRAINA I UKRAIŃCY W POLSKIM DYSKURSIE INTERNETOWYM

MAREK TROSZYŃSKI

senti^{one}



DLA OKRESU OD 01.01.2017 DO 31.12.2017

Niniejszy raport powstał w oparciu o analizę treści pochodzących z monitoringu Internetu.

Badane dane pochodzą z okresu: [01.01.2017](#) - [31.12.2017](#)

Zakres badanych danych obejmuje wypowiedzi z serwisów społecznościowych, mikroblogów, forów internetowych, blogów, portali, serwisów wideo oraz porównywarek opinii. Wyniki zostały pozyskane na podstawie monitoringu ponad 21 181 milionów wypowiedzi pochodzących z europejskiego Internetu.

Raport przygotowany za pomocą:




[senti**one**.com/pl](https://sentione.com/pl)


WYNIKI MONITORINGU INTERNETU DLA UKRAINA

LICZBA WYPOWIEDZI:	1288014	POZYTYWNE:	72845	NEGATYWNE:	173436	NEUTRALNE:	1041649
ZMIANA:	-18%	ZMIANA:	-37%	ZMIANA:	-5%	ZMIANA:	-19%


ILE MÓWIONO NA TEMAT UKRAINA




JAK MÓWIONO NA TEMAT UKRAINA




SENTYMENT WYPOWIEDZI




GDZIE PROWADZONO DISKUSJE NA TEMAT UKRAINA




ŹRÓDŁA WYPOWIEDZI




SENTYMENT W PODZIALE NA GRUPY



TOP 10 DOMEN




ANALIZA PŁCI AUTORÓW W CZASIE DLA TEMATU UKRAJNA



ANALIZA SENTYMENTU



ŹRÓDŁA WYPOWIEDZI



LISTA WYPOWIEDZI

WYBRANE POZYTYWNE WYPOWIEDZI

bestiachis | forum.gazeta.pl |

18.11.2017 15:31

[illegible]

PSi poprawia dobre stosunki z: **Ukraina!** PSi poprawia dobre stosunki z: **Ukraina!** - Kraj - Forum dyskusyjne | Gazeta.pl

pozytywna	nieokreślona
-----------	--------------

429paulina | cl.tripadvisor.com |

07-05-2017 00:00 日

Rewelacyjna obsługa, doskonała lokalizacja, super pokoje, czysto, ładnie i wygodnie, wysoki poziom świadczonych usług i przepiękny widok z okna = Najlepszy hotel ! = Ibis Styles Lviv Center ! :) serdecznie polecam! Witamy! Bardzo dziękujemy za świetną odpowiedź! Bardzo wielką przyjemność dla nas ze zostawiście zadowolony z usług hotelu. Mamy nadzieję na szybkie spotkanie w hotelu Ibis Styles Lviv Center. Pozdrawiam! Richard Siklosi
Rewelacyjna obsługa, doskonała lokalizacja, super pokoje, czysto, ładnie i wygodnie, wysoki poziom świadczonych usług i przepiękny widok z okna = Najlepszy hotel ! = Ibis Styles Lviv Center ! :) serdecznie polecam! Witamy! Bardzo dziękujemy za świetną odpowiedź! Bardzo wielką przyjemność dla nas ze zostawiście zadowolony z usług hotelu. Mamy nadzieję na szybkie spotkanie w hotelu Ibis Styles Lviv Center. Pozdrawiam! Richard Siklosi

the Styles Luv Center the Styles Luv Center (Lwów, **Ukraine**) - nocleg o hotel oraz porównanie cen - TripAdvisor

Pozytywna	nieokreślona
-----------	--------------

cleave / bimes interior of /

20.01.2017 06:01 100%

A jak to jest pani ru chalska ze **ukrainka** z 1 dzieckim dostaje 500+ a polak ju nie hm hnhmhm:-):-):-):-):-):-):-):-):-):-):-)

Rafalek: Mamry zagwarantowane finansowanie programu 500 plus Mam zagwarantowane pełne finansowanie programu 500 plus w tym rólki koszt finansowania 12 miesięcy programu to około 23 mld 166 mld zł

pozytywna	nieokreślona
------------------	---------------------

Jadwiga Wadolowska (www.facebook.com)

19.03.2017 19:58

Haha

[illegible]

„Dobrze zasmioną jest nie tylko **Ukraina**, ale także jej sąsiedzi – Polska i inne kraje Europy – całego kontynentu europejskiego. Jeżeli **Ukraina** straci niepodległość, to następuje ofensywa

Przytywna	Kobieta
-----------	---------

Anna N (pl.tripadvisor.com)

13.01.2017 00:00

Rewelacyjne jedzenie - polecam cięciecine . Miła obsługa. Przystępne ceny. Świetna lokalizacja. Miejsce do którego wróć z przyjemnością.

Shevtskaya St., 8, Lviv, **Ukraine** Shevtskaya St., 8, Lviv, **Ukraine** Bachevski Restaurant Bachevski Restaurant, Lviv - recent restaurant - TripAdvisor

Poszytwna **Kobieta**

WYBRANE NEGATYWNE WYPOWIEDZI

Kacper Rochowiak (www.youtube.com)

28.12.2017 18:22

[*] klawatura!!!! Była jeszcze taka młoda :(((

...skryś go ocenę i tak możesz wspomóc mój kanał - https://goo.gl/z4lccQ % Zostań członkiem Kalichowej Republiki Ludowej... Miłomilum Dawen : Polska - Zadzyna na granicy z Ukrainą! #3

Negatywna Męczyzna

brak autora (www.hip-hop.pl)

05.12.2017 19:21

KURWA LUDZIE POCZYTAJCIE SOBIE O JEBANYCH UKRAINCACH TE KURWY ZARABIAJĄ U NAS WIĘCEJ NIŻ POALCY JEBANE NIEROBY KURWA ALE DLACZEGO SPRAWA JASNA KURWA BO UKRAIŃCY POTRAFIĄ SIE BUNTOWAĆ KURWA A POLACY JEBANE NUDNE GÓWNO CIESZY SIE ŻE W OGÓLE PRACUJESZ CHUJ ŻE ZA NIĆ KURWA JAK JA GARDZĘ TYM KRAJEM KURWA MAC JEBAC ICH W DUPSKA KURWA CHUJOWO SIE URODZIŁ TAM GDZIE BECEL

CHUJNIA NA BEZROBOCIU CHUJNIA NA BEZROBOCIU - Lootne Gatti - Rap Hip-Hop.pl

Negatywna nieokreślona

Daniel Tompkowski (www.facebook.com)

19.11.2017 14:43

Największy szkodnik w historii Polski ostatnich 30 lat. Nikt taka władza nie dysponował jak Tuśk! Przypominam, obsadził cały Trybunał Konstytucyjny, NBP, Sąd Najwyższy, Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich, Rzecznik Praw Dziecka 90%, Prezesów i wice sądów powszechnych! Miał rząd „Sejm „swojego Prezydenta „samorząd w tym 15 sejmików samorządowych i większość dużych miast w Polsce. Tuśk miał władzę absolutną gdzie Kaczyński z PiS nawet nigdy się nie zbliżył do tego poziomu władzy! Za rządów Tuśka była demokracja a za rządów PiS dyktatura! Obluda „obluda „obluda! Za rządów Tuśka ABW weszło do siedziby WPROST „za rządów Tuśka zniszczono ostatni opozycyjny tygodnik Uważam Rze „zniszczone Rzeczpospolita „dziennikarzy zamykano! Red Sumlińskiego doprowadzono niemal do śmierci! Służby wchodziły do domów krytykujących internautów itp itd 100% mediów wspierało Tuśka! Wtedy kwitła demokracja i Timmermans był zadowolony!

...Ostry spór z Ukrainą „inaczej w Unii Europejskiej „odchodzi od rządów prawa! „Donald Tuśk „Alam! Ostry spór z Ukrainą „inaczej w Unii Europejskiej „odchodzi od...

Negatywna Męczyzna

Napisał(a) KASIA (forum.interia.pl)

13.06.2017 09:06

I TEŻ RZĄD BĘDZIE DOPLACAĆ Pracodawcom po 800 zł za ich zatrudnianie , tak jak w przypadku UKRAIŃCÓW JAKIM PRAWEM RZĄD DOPLACA dla PRACODAWCÓW po 800 zł za zatrudnianie UKRAIŃCÓW w POLSCE . Dlaczego UKRAIŃCY nie chcą studiować w KIJOWIE-bo musieli by PŁACIĆ za STUDIA a w POLSCE MAJĄ DARMOWE, SKANDAL??? Mają DARMOWE Akademiki, mają DARMOWE ZASIŁKI, mają darmowe mieszkania z dopłatą na wynajem co miesiąc dla każdego Ukraińca. SKANDAL??? Tak traktuje się POLAKÓW z pochodzenia w ich własnym KRAJU. SKANDAL??? SKANDAL??? Ja się pytam, czym sobie UKRAIŃCY zasłużyli na POMOC Narodu POLSKIEGO??? Jakim PRAWEM przekazuje im się MILJARDY do KIJOWA z ciężko zarobionych pieniędzy POLSKICH PODATNIKÓW SKANDAL??? SKANDAL???

Gorący rynek pracowników sezonowych (457) Gorący rynek pracowników sezonowych - Forum dyskusyjne w INTERIA.PL

Negatywna nieokreślona

chyRZy (www.wykop.pl)

06.07.2017 21:01

Polski rząd widać robi łaskę Putinowi - Polskie veto w sprawie Ukrainy jest na rękę Rosji. @havermeyer: Napisz że Kaczyński to agent Putina. Potem się przełoguj i napisz że Kaczyński to dziki rusofob i przez to że domaga się wyjaśnienia katastrofy w Smoleńsku psuje relacje z Rosją. Potem się znów przełoguj i napisz że Kaczyński jest głupi i PiS psuje relacje z Ukrainą. Na koniec przełoguj się ponownie i napisz że Kaczyński to banderowiec. I dwa piódnosiątki wpadnie (bo z 10 groszy premii to na pewno dostaniesz).

Wpiska #polityka #ukraina #kaczynski #historia Ukrainy polityk Jurek Szuzyewicz w skandaliczny sposób komentuje słowa Włodzisław Wieruszyńskiego a możliwym więcej Polski w sprawie

Negatywna nieokreślona

